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Abstract 
 
This dissertation deals with the implementation process of privatisation policy in Nepal. 
The main objective of the study was to explore the implementation process of 
privatisation efforts, to identify the problems that have been met in the process of 
privatisation and to identify the prospects of privatisation policy for a developing country 
such as Nepal. Inline with the objectives the main research assumption was the policy has 
been implemented due to the internal and external factors to achieve some stated goals 
but due to some implementation barriers, they have not been achieved as expected.  The 
theory of policy implementation, the concept of privatisation and strategic group analysis 
has been chosen for the analysis of data - to compare and contrast the Nepal’s situation. 
 
The main findings show that due to the deteriorating conditions of the PEs and the 
ideological shift of the new government with the advice and suggestions of the 
international donor community, the government formulated and implemented the 
privatisation policy in Nepal.  There were different actors/strategic groups who 
contributed to formulate and implement the policy. They were policy elites including the 
Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, the Vice-Chairman of the National Planning 
Commission, high ranking government officials, the members of parliament, the business 
community and the donor agencies. However, some of the strategic groups such as 
employees of the privatised enterprises and trade union representatives were against the 
privatisation. The main objectives of the policy have not been met in Nepal due to some 
implementation barriers. Despite explicit opposition from the political parties regarding 
policy content as such, the problems of implementation were more closely related to the 
process of implementation and other factors, such as evaluation of the enterprise, 
selection of bidders, political instability, lack of developed capital market, lack of 
investors and poor conditions of public enterprises. Although the overall impact of 
privatisation in Nepal is not very promising, it is necessary for the overall  development 
of the country, as the government cannot continue to run such loss-making enterprises in 
the age of globalisation and liberalisation, nevertheless it should be implemented in a 
cautious and selective manner. 
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Chapter One 
Implementing Privatisation Policy in Nepal: Introductory Discussion 
 
1.1 Privatisation from a Global Perspective 
In popular usage, ‘privatisation’ means the transfer of government assets or ownership 
and activities to the private sector. The term ‘privatisation’ has been used to describe a 
range of actions designed to broaden the scope of private sector activity, or the 
assimilation by the public sector of efficiency-enhancing techniques generally employed 
by the private sector. Essentially, privatisation is a process that covers the transfer from 
the public to the private sector of the ownership and/or control of productive assets, their 
allocation and pricing, and entitlement to the residual profit flows generated by them 
(Adam et al., 1992:6). In Nepal, The Privatisation Act, 1994 defined the term 
‘privatisation’ as “involving private sector in the management of the enterprise, or to sell 
or lease it, or to transfer government ownership into public ownership, or an act to infuse 
participation by any means, either wholly or partly, or private sector or of the employees 
or workers, or of all desirous groups” (Article 2.b). 
 
‘Privatisation’ implies a move toward the divestment of total ownership by the 
government to the private sector. At the broadest level, privatisation refers to the 
introduction of market forces into an economy. ‘Privatisation’ may be defined as the 
transfer of a function, activity, or organisation from the public to the private sector 
(Cowan, 1990:6) and involves both the ends and the means of this process. The means of 
privatisation range from replacing public ownership with private ownership to the 
introduction of private management techniques into the public sector. Although much 
attention has been focused on specific examples of the first kind of strategy, for example, 
in the sale of huge public enterprises, it may be argued that the most extensive type of 
privatisation is the search for internal reform within the public sector under the influence 
of private management models (Lane, 1995:184-185). 
 
Several major influences have propelled the privatisation movement: pragmatic, 
economic, ideological, commercial, and populist. The goal of the pragmatists is better 
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government in the sense of a more cost-effective one. Economic affluence reduces 
people’s dependence on government and increases their acceptance of privatised 
approaches. The goal of those who approach the matter philosophically—some would say 
ideologically—is less government, or one that plays a smaller role as in a private 
institution. The goal of commercial interests is to get more business by having more 
government spending directed toward them. However, the goal of the populists is to 
achieve a better society by empowering people so they can satisfy their common needs, 
while diminishing the power of large public and private bureaucracies (Savas, 2000).  
 
The process of privatisation may assume a number of forms. In complete divestiture 
publicly owned assets may be completely transferred by sale to private individuals or 
firms, after which the government bears no further responsibility for the operation of the 
assets. Alternatively, in partial divestiture the state retains partial ownership of the 
divested assets by means of public stock flotation. The assets may also be removed from 
the direct control of the government by management contracting, which places operations 
in the hands of an outside management group, while leaving ownership in government 
hands; its major purpose (as is the case with leasing or franchising) is to restore an ailing 
firm to profitability (Cowan, 1990).  
 
The consensus on the question of privatisation is that it is generally a more efficient way 
of running commercial operations than when they are run by the government (Vickers & 
Yarrow 1985:20 cf. Nelson 1996:17). It is usually found that privatisation brings about 
reductions in cost and price, improvement in service, increases efficiency and efficient 
resource allocation, and reduces monopoly. Most studies from middle- and high-income 
countries show positive results after privatisation, as far as profitability measures are 
concerned. Even some lower income countries have been successful in improving 
profitability through privatisation (UNCTAD, 1995). Success stories of the United 
Kingdom and other Western countries have been cited as evidence that privatisation can 
reduce subsidy costs and increase the productivity of formerly state enterprises. Attempts 
have been made to prove that privatisation is a viable policy option for developing 
countries to better their performance. 
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Vickers and Yarrow (1988) observe that privatisation as a policy option has been adopted 
with the following aims: 
a. improving efficiency; 
b. reducing the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR); 
c. reducing government involvement in enterprise decision making; 
d. easing problems of public sector pay determination; 
e. widening share ownership; 
f. gaining political ownership (1988:157).  
 
Vuylesteke (1988) argues that the most commonly used methods of privatisation are: 
public offering of shares, private sale of shares, new private investment in an SOE, sale 
of government or SOE assets, reorganisation (or ‘break up’) into component parts, 
management/employee buy out, lease, and management contract (1988:8). 
 
The 1979 general elections in the UK were a watershed in making the transition from 
public ownership to privatisation. Prime Minister Margaret Thacher decided to move in 
the direction of the ‘New Right’ doctrine, which led to widespread privatisation. The 
UK’s experience of privatisation has been considered by many as a role model for other 
countries. 19 major privatisations took place in the UK during the period of 1979-1993, 
with gross sale proceeds of £56,847 million (Narain, 2003:354-56), which included 
British Petroleum (1979), British Aerospace (1981), Britoil (1982) Cable and Wireless 
(1983), British Telecom (1984), British Gas (1986), and British Airways (1987). 
Compulsory tendering (required competitive bidding) of local government services in 
Britain was mandated in 1988 (Savas, 2000:15).  
 
Despite an ambitious array of privatisation proposals unveiled by the Reagan 
Administration in 1985, in the United States relatively little privatisation by sale took 
place at the federal government level, in part because the United States had few 
government-owned enterprises. Conrail, the government-owned freight rail network, was 
sold but President Reagan’s effort to sell the United States Enrichment Corporation, 
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which prepared enriched uranium for nuclear reactors, was blocked by a Democratic 
Congress (President Clinton, supported by a Republican Congress, accomplished this a 
decade later). Considerable contracting out of support services (for example, data 
processing, food service, building maintenance, etc.) was carried out by federal 
government agencies, and privatisation by contracting continued to grow in local 
governments, both for support services and for direct services to the public (waste 
collection, street cleaning, ambulance services, etc) (Ibid :15-16).  
 
In March 1986, after the political right won the election in France, the new prime 
minister announced that he would de-nationalise. The Privatisation Commission, 
comprised of seven members recognised for their competence and independence, was set 
up. However the price for the shares to be sold, as fixed by the commission, was subject 
to review by the minister of finance, who had the right to increase it (not decrease), which 
he exercised in many cases. The privatisation scheme was to sell 10% shares to 
employees, 15% to foreigners, 50% to the public and about 25% to 10 large shareholders 
comprising a ‘stable nucleus’, who were to pay 5% more than the ordinary buyer and 
agree not to sell the shares for at least two years. Seven major privatisations took place in 
the first phase 1986-87 and 21 in the second phase 1993-96 (Narain 2003: 361-364).  
 
The role of transferring the social system into a market system in East Germany was 
assigned to the state-owned trust named Treuhandanstalt (THA), founded in 1990. It 
temporarily became the owner of about 8000 companies, with more than 45,000 plants; 
33,000 shops, hotels, restaurants, pharmacies and cinemas; as well as 3.9 million hectares 
of agricultural and forest land. By law, THA was required to privatise its assets as fast as 
possible, as privatisation was considered to be “the heart of the transformation process”. 
The law also instructed THA to restructure and break up companies in order to create 
smaller units for the ease of privatisation. It should be noted that all manufacturing in 
East Germany was concentrated in 221 Kombinate, horizontally or vertically integrated 
conglomerates of plants. Some of these Kombinates employed up to 60,000 workers. 
When THA was closed down by the end of 1994, about 75% of the former state business 
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had been privatised. Most of the remaining companies were in liquidation and some had 
been offered for sale (Ibid 367-68). 
 
In 1991, for the first time Mr. Yaswant Singh, finance minister in the Chandra Sekhar 
government (November 1990 - June 1991) in India, stated in his budget speech that the 
“government would disinvest up to 20% of its equity in selected public sector 
undertakings in favour of mutual funds and financial or investment institutions in the 
public sector”. Similarly, Dr. Manmohan Singh, finance minister in the Narshimha Rao 
government (June 1991 - May1996), announced in his budget speech in July 1991: “In 
order to raise resources, encourage wider public participation and promote greater 
accountability, up to 20% of government equity in selected public sector undertakings 
would be offered to mutual funds and investment institutions in the public sector, as also 
to workers in these firms” (Ibid). The Indian government has fired the first salvo for 
privatisation by disinvesting shares of 31 public enterprises in order to raise Rs. 2500 
crore in two phases in December 1991 and February 1992. During the first phase of 
disinvestment, bids were received from 9 parties totalling Rs. 1427 crore; 51.62 crore 
shares constituting 4.7% of the equity were sold. In the second transaction in February 
1992, bids were received from 19 parties for Rs. 1611 crore; 35.59 crore shares 
constituting 3.3% of the equity were sold. The total shares disinvested during 1991-92 
thus comprised 8% of the total government share holding in the 31 public enterprises and 
the total amount realized was Rs. 3038 crore (Bastra and Bhatia, 1995 cf. KC 1999:96-
97). Thus, India has also formally embarked on its privatisation policy.  
 
Hence from a global perspective, in the 1970s the privatisation movement was realised 
and gathered momentum in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Nepal could no longer remain the 
exception to this widespread transition and embarked on its own massive privatisation 
program in 1991, when the new government formed after the restoration of democracy in 
1990. 
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1.2. Privatisation Process in Nepal 
 
Public enterprises (PEs) are usually defined as government-owned entities and active 
operation of agencies engaged in supplying goods and services to the public which 
otherwise might be supplied by privately owned profit-motivated firms. The term 
emphasises government ownership without a profit motive. Presently it covers: 
• Industrial, commercial and economic activities, 
• State ownership, 
• Self-contained managerial care, i.e. autonomous (Satish Chandra, 1997). 
 
The first public enterprise to have legal validity in Nepal was the Nepal Bank Limited, 
established in 1938. After the inception of the bank as a public enterprise, a series of 
additional PEs was established. In total 64 PEs were established in Nepal. In spite of this 
impressive growth in the number, role and scope of public enterprises in Nepal, their 
performances—financial or otherwise—has always remained below a satisfactory level 
(Manandhar, 1998). 
 
His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMG/N) has established a number of public 
enterprises that were supposed to play a catalytic role in the social and economic 
development process of the nation. HMG/N has been investing huge amounts of 
resources annually into this sector to achieve the stated objective. By FY 2002/03, the net 
capital investment in these enterprises totalled Rs1.97.23 billion (MoF, 2004 Economic 
Survey 2003/2004:139). 
 
State-owned enterprises in Nepal are in an almost universally poor condition. The 
standards of PEs are lowered by a series of factors, which include suffering from losses, 
political interference, frequent changes of board membership and of the chief executive 
officer, mismanagement, shortage of capital, over staffing and poor financial 
management and other accounting and record-keeping are the subject of frequent and 
                                                 
1  Rupees is an official currency of Nepal and one U S $=70.50 Nepalese Rupees (as of 26th Aug, 2005). 
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justified criticism. In order to overcome such problems, and with the aim of contributing 
to national development by raising their efficiency, the privatisation program of public 
enterprises in Nepal was initiated in the late 1980s and has gained momentum since the 
early 1990s, when the democratically elected government came into power after the 
restoration of multiparty democracy. 
 
Analysis of the financial management of public enterprises in FY 1991/92 revealed a 
total net operating loss of Rs.1,145.5 million. By the end of FY 1991/92, net investment 
in the PEs totalled Rs. 50,530.3 million. In FY 1991/92, return on investment in the PEs 
registered a negative 2.4% (MoF, 2000- Economic Survey 1999:74). When the bleak 
outlook for PEs became apparent, the then-government accelerated the pace of 
privatisation with great hopes for success. In 1991, an attitudinal survey on privatisation 
was sponsored by USAID. The ongoing deterioration of PEs compelled the government 
to introduce an alternative policy option for the improvement of PEs. The then-
government introduced a privatisation policy in 1991 by issuing a government concept 
paper, called a white paper of ‘privatisation policy’, which outlined a set of three broad 
objectives of privatisation in Nepal: (a) a reduction of the managerial and financial 
burden on the government, (b) the promotion of functional expertise to enhance 
productivity and output, and (c) the promotion of the private sector’s role and public 
employees’ participation in industrial investment. The assistance and pressure from the 
donor community had, and still have, a major impact on the strategy of privatisation in 
Nepal (Reejal, 1998). Overall, 24 small- and medium-sized enterprises have been 
privatised since the program began. Three PEs, namely Bhrikuti Paper Mills, Bansbari 
Leatherage Ltd. and Harisiddihi Bricks and Tiles Factory were privatised in the first 
phase 1992. Similarly, seven PEs were privatised in the second phase in 1993-94, six PEs 
in the third phase in 1996-97 and eight PEs after 1997. Among the privatised enterprises, 
assets and business of three PEs and share of ten PEs were sold out, nine PEs were 
liquidated/dissolved, and two were leased out (one for ten years with asset sale and 
another for 50 years).  
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Despite the legal provision and initiation for better privatisation, critics argue that the 
program has not been properly implemented. There is no consensus among the various 
political parties concerning the program. Critics have also argued that the privatisation 
objectives have not been achieved and the privatisation policy is not a viable policy 
option for developing countries such as Nepal. 
 
On the one hand, “the majority of public corporations, where billions of rupees of this 
resource-poor country have been poured, have failed to deliver expected services, their 
productivity is low and quality of their products are short of standard. The returns are 
negligible. They are still plagued with the government intervention in professional 
matters like recruitment of personnel, investment, procurement, etc. Professionalism for 
good governance is still not a reality in these corporations...” (MoF, 1999a- Budget 
Speech, 1999:4).  
 
On the other hand, “...most of the privatised enterprises had faced adjustment problems 
during the first twelve months after privatisation owing to labour resistance, delay in 
handing over of the enterprise to the private sector and management, etc. The picture is 
more disappointing for all 5 enterprises privatised in phase II (on all fronts capacity 
utilisation, employment and employee productivity).”(Reejal, 1998:223-24).  
 
In addition, in the context of Nepal's privatisation program, there are two prominent 
points of criticism. The first criticism is directed towards the privatisation policy of 
Nepal, which has resulted in the complete withdrawal of the government from a 
particular sector after its privatisation, whereby the government no longer even acts as a 
regulator to ensure the supply of goods and provision of services to the consumers at an 
affordable price. The second criticism concerns the privatisation process, for which the 
government has been accused for its improper approaches to issues such as: under-
valuation of the sold enterprises, lack of transparency, and improper and unbalanced 
utilisation of the revenue generated from the proceeds of the sick SOEs. In fact, in the 
context of the performances of the privatised enterprises, the experience of privatisation 
in Nepal has been extremely discouraging (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2000). At the same 
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time, international financial institutions like the WB, IMF, and ADB have compelled the 
government to adopt and implement the privatisation policy as a panacea for the 
developing countries. 
 
The failure and success of any policy depend, to a great extent, upon the context of the 
policy environment and the ability to effectively implement it. Outcomes of privatisation 
policy in developed countries are different from those in developing countries. Indeed, 
outcomes may even differ among developing countries. 
 
In the context of this broad scenario, the aim of this study is to explore the 
implementation process of privatisation efforts, to identify the problems that have been 
met in the process of privatisation and to identify the prospects of privatisation policy for 
a developing country such as Nepal.  The specific objectives of the study are: 
• To examine the influence of administrative reform on the implementation of a 
privatisation policy for the improvement of public enterprises.  
• To assess the role of the institutional design and legal framework in implementing 
policy reforms, especially on privatisation policy.  
• To investigate the policy characteristics and arena of conflicts on the process of 
agenda setting to the implementation phase and identify the problems that are 
encountered in the process.  
• To look at the changes brought about by the implementation of the policy to 
enterprises in Nepal. 
• To identify whether privatisation is a success or a failure, a distinction which will 
enable a conclusion to be made concerning the prospects of the policy in Nepal. 
 
1.3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
This study focuses on the implementation process of the privatisation policy in Nepal and 
its effects, by analysing privatised enterprises. This might lead to an assessment of the 
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privatisation policy that is its success or failure, so that we can identify the prospects of 
the policy in Nepal. In addition, the following are research questions for this study: 
• What are the factors that led HMG/N to adopt the privatisation policy and what are 
the major processes applied to the implementation of the privatisation policy in 
Nepal? 
• To what extent is the present legal and institutional setting conducive to the 
implementation of privatisation policy? 
• Who were/are the main influential actors/strategic groups to adopt the privatisation 
policy in Nepal? 
• What are the main obstacles encountered in the process of implementation of the 
privatisation policy in Nepal? 
• What is the impact of the privatisation policy in Nepal? 
• What lessons could be learned from the privatisation policy of Nepal (is the 
privatisation of public enterprises essential in Nepal? If so, has it been successful)? 
 1.3.2 Research Hypotheses  
As I have stated in the sub-section 1.2, there is ongoing debate concerning whether the 
implementation of the privatisation policy is a viable option in regards to increasing 
efficiency, reducing the burden on the government with respect to PEs, generating 
employment, market-oriented competitiveness, and so forth. In order to address the above 
debate, the main assumptions (hypotheses) of this research are as follows (based on the 
available literature related to the Nepal’s privatisation policy): 
• Privatisation policy has been implemented not only as a necessity of the 
country (internally) but also as a requirement imposed by the donor 
community. 
• Privatisation policy has been implemented to achieve some stated goals 
but they have not been achieved as expected.  
• Privatisation policy has some implementation barriers that affect the 
policy’s ability to meet its objectives. 
• Privatisation has brought about some positive changes, i.e. it has assisted 
in reducing the financial burden on the government, contributed to 
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enhancing the efficiency of enterprises, and facilitated popular 
participation in management; these benefits, however, are negligible.  
• Privatisation policy per se is not necessarily conducive to improving the 
efficiency of the enterprises.   
 
The above hypotheses will not be tested in rigid terms but they will be checked (falsified) 
on the basis of the research findings. In summary, by this study I do not intend to prove a 
theoretical proposition or test quantitative hypotheses, but rather to explore and describe 
the specific phenomenon of implementing privatisation policy in Nepal.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One is the introductory chapter, which provides a general outline of the thesis. 
Chapter Two deals with theoretical framework and literature review. In this chapter, the 
definition of privatisation, the objectives of privatisation, the techniques of privatisation 
(methods and implementation) and general explanation of policy implementation, brief 
discussion of the theory of strategic group analysis, among other things, are explained. 
Also in this chapter various writers’ views of the subject matter are discussed in detail. In 
Chapter Three public enterprises in Nepal, their performance, the need for reform, and 
the need for privatisation are discussed. Chapter Four deals with privatisation policy in 
Nepal and its main issues and goals. The policy formulation process, i.e. agenda setting, 
decision making and implementation, are discussed based on the model presented by 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) in “Public Choices and Policy Change; the Political 
Economy of Reform in Developing Countries”. Chapter Five deals with the 
implementation of privatisation policy and its impact in Nepal. In this chapter the 
institutional and legal arrangement are also discussed, as well as the implementation 
process of four selected privatised enterprises and the impact of the policy (changes made 
after privatisation). Chapter Six describes the problems encountered in the privatisation 
process and the prospects of privatisation in Nepal, and the final chapter (Chapter Seven) 
outlines and discusses the findings of the study on the basis of the descriptions and 
interpretations already presented in the earlier chapters. The chapter mainly discusses the 
results, based on the research questions that have framed this research work.  
 12
  Chapter Two 
Implementation of Privatisation Policy: A Theoretical / Analytical Framework 
 
The literature in a research study accomplishes several purposes: (a) It shares with the 
reader the results of other studies that are closely related to the study being reported. (b) 
It relates a study to the larger, ongoing dialogue in the literature about a topic, filling in 
gaps and extending prior studies. (c) It provides a framework for establishing the 
importance of the study, as well as a benchmark for comparing the results of a study with 
other findings (Creswell, 1994:20-21). 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this theoretical chapter is to develop an analytical framework for the 
analysis of the implementation of privatisation policy in Nepal. As indicated in the first 
chapter, three approaches (privatisation, strategic group analysis and implementation) 
have been chosen for the purpose of the data analysis. In order to properly present the 
study and analyse the data in a comparable form, it is necessary briefly to review the 
literature on the subject matter in order to gain a clear understanding of the conditions 
essential for the successful implementation of the privatisation policy. 
  
In the first section, I will begin my discussion by reviewing privatisation-related literature 
concerning the concepts, forces for adopting the policy, objectives, techniques and 
methods. In particular, the discussion will be based on “Techniques of Privatisation of 
State-Owned Enterprises Volume I” (1988) by Charles Vuylsteke, “Privatisation and 
Public Private Partnerships” (2000) by E. S. Savas, and other prominent writers’ work 
discussing different aspects of privatisation. In the second section, I will present a brief 
literature review of the policy implementation, including the definition, approaches, 
models of implementation and conditions for effective policy implementation. In the third 
part, concepts of strategic group analysis (Evers, 1966, 1973, 1982; Evers and Schiel 
1987) will be discussed in brief. 
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2.1. Concept of Privatisation 
2.1.1 What is Privatisation?  
Privatisation has been defined in various ways. In popular usage, it means the transfer of 
government assets and activities to the private sector. 
 
Privatisation may be defined as the transfer of a function, activity, or organisation from 
the public to the private sector (Cowan, 1990:6, GTZ, 2004). Privatisation tends to imply 
a move towards the divestment of total ownership by the government, from the public to 
the private sector (Nelson, 1996:10). The term ‘privatisation’ has been used to describe a 
range of actions designed to broaden the scope of private sector activity, or the 
assimilation by the public sector of efficiency-enhancing techniques generally employed 
by the private sector. Essentially privatisation is a process that involves the transfer from 
the public to the private sector of the ownership and/or control of productive assets, their 
allocation and pricing, and entitlement to the residual profit flows generated by them 
(Adam et al., 1992:6). 
 
Regarding the political meaning of privatisation, Prof. Paul Starr argues that there may be 
a broad and a more specific definition of privatisation. “The first, broader definition of 
privatisation includes all reductions in the regulatory and spending activity of the state. 
The second, more specific definition of privatisation excludes deregulation and spending 
cuts except when they result in a shift from public to private in the production of goods 
and services” (Starr, 1988). He further clarified his definition by pointing out that the 
public sector includes agencies administered as part of the state and organisations owned 
by it; privatisation refers here to shifts from the public to the private sector, not shifts 
within the sector (Ibid). A notable economist Joseph E. Stiglitz (Nobel Prize winner in 
2001) argues that privatisation entails the conversion of enterprises formerly controlled 
by the government into private hands (Stiglitz, 1992: 181). Similarly, Narain (2003:289) 
defined privatisation as “in the broad sense of the term, privatisation is roll-back of the 
state in the lives and activities of citizens and strengthening the role of markets. In the 
narrow sense, privatisation is transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector 
or transfer of control over assets or activities as in the case of privatisation through 
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leasing, where ownership is retained, leaving management of assets and activity to 
private parties.”  
  
‘Privatisation’ means involving the private sector in the management of the enterprise, or 
to sell or lease it, or to an act to infuse participation by any means, either wholly or 
partly, of the private sector or of the employees or workers, or of all desirous groups 
(Article 2(b) of the Privatisation Act, 1994 of Nepal). 
 
The term ‘privatisation’ therefore indicates a transfer mainly of the carrying out of 
activities economic in nature, either in whole or in part to the private sector, that were 
formerly carried out in the public sector through different modalities. 
2.1.2 Forces that influence Promoting Privatisation 
Savas (2000) has mentioned the five forces that influence promoting privatisation, i.e. 
pragmatic, economic, ideological, commercial, and populist. He summarized the 
characteristics of these five forces as follows (Savas 2000:5-6): 
 
Table 2.1: The Influences Promoting Privatisation 
Influence Effect Reasoning 
Pragmatic Better Government Prudent privatisation leads to more cost effective public services. 
Economic Less Dependence 
on Government 
Growing affluence allows more people to provide for their own 
needs, making them more receptive to privatisation. 
Ideological Less Government Government is too big, too powerful, too intrusive in people’s lives 
and therefore is a danger to democracy. Government’s political 
decisions are inherently less trustworthy than free-market decisions. 
Privatisation reduces government’s role. 
Commercial 
 
More Business 
Opportunities 
Government spending is a large part of the economy; more of it can 
and should be directed toward private firms. State-owned enterprises 
and assets can be put to better use by the private sector. 
Populist 
 
Better Society 
 
People should have more choice in public services. They should be 
empowered to define and address common needs, and to establish a 
sense of community by relying more on family, neighbourhood, 
church, and ethnic and voluntary associations and less on distant 
bureaucratic structures. 
 
(Source: Savas, 2000: 5-6) 
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The common explanation of why privatisation has become so important in developing 
nations is the debt crisis that emerged in 1981/82 and has been continuing unabated ever 
since. Ira W. Lieberman, a World Bank senior consultant and privatisation expert, has 
argued that the following six factors have influenced the adoption of privatisation as a 
critical feature of countries’ economic policies (Lieberman, 1993:9-11).  
 
The first key factor is the successful economic performance of Japan and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) (Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan). Second, at 
the time that the growth model of Japan and the Asian NICs was proving so successful, 
there was growing awareness that other models for economic development, such as the 
command economy, had outlived their usefulness and needed to be rejected. A third 
factor that emerged in the 1980s is what some analysts call the fourth industrial 
revolution, driven by information-based technologies, which requires competitiveness. 
The fourth factor is the role of state-owned enterprises, which have monopoly status and 
have generally bred inefficiency and a lack of competitiveness. A fifth factor influencing 
privatisation in the developing countries is that in the 1980s advanced industrial countries 
such as the USA and the UK expressed a strong ideological commitment to private 
enterprise. Finally, since 1989 the political revolution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union has lent new impetus to the privatisation process, as the newly emerging 
democracies in most of these countries are utilizing privatisation as a cornerstone of their 
economic reform process to create the basis for a market economy. 
2.1.3. Objectives of Privatisation 
The following objectives are mentioned frequently in connection with privatisation 
(Lieberman 1993: 11): 
• reduce the government’s operating deficit; 
• raise cash through SOE sales; 
• generate new sources of tax revenue; 
• deepen domestic capital markets and broaden domestic equity ownership; 
• ‘democratization’ of capital; 
• promote domestic investment; 
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• attract direct foreign investment and new technology; 
• increase domestic and international business confidence; 
• increase competition; 
• create opportunities for employment through real growth; 
• increase productive and operating efficiency; 
• ‘turn around’ or restructure sick SOEs; 
• increase exports; 
• improve the quality of services; and 
• reduce the role of the state in the economy. 
 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) observed that privatisation as a policy option has been 
adopted with the following aims: 
• reducing government involvement in industry; 
• improving efficiency in privatised industries; 
• reducing the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR); 
• easing problems of public sector pay determination by weakening the public 
sector unions; 
• widening share ownership; 
• encouraging employee share ownership; 
• gaining political advantage (1988:157 cf. Clarke and Pitelis, 1993: 7). 
 
Bennett (1997) has categorized the commonly stated objectives of privatisation as 
follows: 
1. Political goals, such as reducing the size of the public sector, restoring or 
strengthening the private sector, spreading share ownership more widely, and 
making productive enterprises more responsive and accountable to those for 
whom they produce; 
2. Efficiency goals, such as increasing productivity and microeconomic efficiency. 
The development of capital market institutions, which intermediate between 
savers and investors, may also be classed as efficiency objectives; 
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3. Fiscal stabilization goals, such as maximizing proceeds of sales, reducing the 
future drain of subventions and capital contributions from government revenue, 
increasing tax revenues from higher profits and reducing the public debts; 
4. Resources mobilization goals, such as promoting foreign investment in the 
country and releasing limited state resources for investment in other sectors like 
education and health (Bennett, 1997: 7-8). 
 
Dobek (1993) argued that privatisation is more than merely an economic operation. The 
decision to privatise may be triggered by political as well as by economic considerations. 
Even if privatisation is initially undertaken to achieve certain economic goals, the 
government conducting it has to make this politically viable by generating sufficient 
political support for a particular privatisation effort. The British case of privatisation is an 
example of one that was politically motivated from its very inception (Dobek, 1993:4). 
 
Stiglitz argued that privatisation is based on the premise that privately run firms are 
necessarily more efficient than government-owned enterprises. However recent 
theoretical and empirical literature has cast considerable doubt on this underlying 
premise, at least in so far as it concerns large-scale enterprises (Stiglitz, 1992:181). 
 
Privatisation could have several objectives, as discussed above. However, in many cases 
it has been prescribed and advocated for ensuring the economic and financial objectives 
as envisaged in the economic policy for the development of a country. 
2.1.4. Techniques of Privatisation 
Pirie (1988) has identified a number of privatisation techniques categorized according to 
the five dimensions of privatisation as follows: 
A. Changes in ownership 
B. Changes in performance arrangements 
C. Changes in the financial base 
D. Deregulation by introducing competition 
 18
E. Measures to remove or reduce opposition to privatisation (Pirie, Madsen 1988, 
cited from UNESCAP, 1999:8). 
 
UNIDO (1994) argued that the privatisation of state enterprises can be accomplished by a 
public offering of shares, the sale of shares to private buyers, the free distribution of 
shares to the company’s workforce or other people or institutions, the restitution of assets 
to former owners, and by management buy-outs or other forms of ‘self’ privatisation. The 
effective implementation of any of these means of privatisation calls for a proper 
institutional framework in order to manage and monitor the process of privatisation. 
Given the underdeveloped financial systems in most developing countries, the 
administrative arrangements may be very demanding (1994:10).  
 
Privatisation policy, as an economic policy, has been adopted not only by developed 
countries but also by developing ones. As a result, there has been a gradual transfer of 
government assets and functions to the private sector. The most commonly used methods 
of privatisation are: public offering of shares, private sale of shares, new private 
investment in an SOE, sale of government or SOE assets, reorganisation (or ‘break up’) 
into component parts, management/employee buy out, and lease and management 
contracts (Vuylesteke, 1988:8, Parker and Saal, 2003:33-36). 
 
The above basic methods, as well as their characteristics and procedures, are summarized 
briefly in the following table: 
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Table 2.2: Summary of the Different Privatisation Methods  
Methods Characteristics Procedures 
Public offerings 
of shares 
Distribution to the general public of all or part 
of shares in public limited company (as a 
going concern) 
If PSE is in required condition, standard 
processing of public offering is on the basis 
of prospectus. If not in required condition, 
then readying process is necessary. Offer 
can be on fixed price or tender basis. 
Private sale of 
shares 
Sale of all or part of government shareholding 
in a stock corporation (as a going concern) to 
a single entity or group. Can take various 
forms such as a direct acquisition by another 
corporate entity or a private placement 
targeting institutional investors. Can be full or 
partial privatisation (i.e. transformation into 
joint venture). 
Sale may be result of negotiation or 
competitive bidding process. May be done 
ad hoc or may be subject to mandatory 
country procedures or guidelines on 
valuation, prequalification, evaluation of 
proposals, terms of payment, etc. In some 
cases, prior restructuring is necessary. 
Involves investor search.  
Sale of 
government or 
enterprise assets 
Sale of assets (instead of shares); private sale Alternatives: sale of assets by government; 
disposal of some assets by PSE; dissolution 
of PSE and sale of all assets; other 
procedures for private sale of shares 
generally apply. 
Fragmentation Reorganisation of a PSE into several entities 
(or one holding company and several 
subsidiaries). Each entity will then be 
privatised separately.  
Depends on structure of PSE. 
New private 
investment in 
PSE 
Primary share issue subscribed by the private 
sector (dilution of government’s equity 
position). 
Public offerings or private issue of new 
shares on basis of standard procedures for 
new issues possibly in conjunction with 
disposal of government equity. New private 
investment may be for capitalization of new 
company embodying assets transferred by 
government. 
Management/ 
employee buy-
out 
Acquisition by management and/or work 
force of controlling interest in PSE. 
Leveraged management/employee buy-out 
consists of purchase of shares on credit 
extended either by seller (government) or by 
financial institutions.  
Negotiations by government, management, 
employees and lenders to cover wide range 
of issues. 
Leases and 
management 
contracts 
No ownership transfer. Under lease, fee is 
payable to owner of productive facilities; 
lessee assumes full commercial risk. Under 
management contract, owner pays for 
management skills, while manager has full 
management and operational control. Many 
variations exit. 
No standard method. 
(Source:  UNESCAP 1999:22) 
The main characteristics of the various methods of privatisation, procedures, preferred 
applications/ special features and implementation issues which are not discussed here will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters to avoid the duplication (although they have been 
discussed very briefly in above table).   
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Methods and procedures for privatisation will be largely determined by:  
(a) the objectives of the government;  (b) the current organisational form of the SOE; 
(c) the financial condition and record of performance of the SOE; (d)  the sector of 
activity of the SOE; (e) the ability to mobilize private sector resources; (f) the degree of 
development of the capital market; and (g) Socio-political factors. 
 
Vuylsteke (1988) has extensively explained the above issues, care of which should be 
taken while implementing the privatisation policy. The issues will be discussed when the 
specific implementation process of selected enterprises is explained.  
  
2.2 Implementation of Policies 
2.2.1 What is Policy Implementation? 
Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or 
groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy 
decisions. This includes both on-time efforts to transform decisions into operational 
terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the major and minor changes mandated by 
policy decisions. The implementation phase does not commence until goals and 
objectives have been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions; it takes place 
only after legislation has been passed and funds committed (or after a judicial ruling and 
accompanying decrees) (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975:447). 
 
Implementing a public policy may include a wide variety of actions: issuing and 
enforcing directives, disbursing funds, making loans, awarding grants, signing contracts, 
collecting data, disseminating information, analysing problems, assigning and hiring 
personnel, creating organisational units, proposing alternatives, planning for the future, 
and negotiating with private citizens, business, interest groups, legislative committees, 
bureaucratic units, and even other countries (Edwards, 1984:2). 
 
Implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals 
and actions geared to achieving them. Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly 
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or not, policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future 
consequences. Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal 
chain so as to obtain the desired results (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984: XXIII). 
 
If we consider implementation as a process of putting policy into effect, it is, according to 
Barrett (2004) and Barrett and Fudge (1981), fundamentally dependent on: 
1. Knowing what you want to do 
2. The availability of the required resources 
3. The ability to manage and control these resources to achieve the desired result 
4. If others are to carry out the tasks, communicating what is wanted and controlling 
their performance (Barrett 2004 and Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 13). 
According to Lane (1995) implementation assessment focuses on the operation of a 
public policy and its consequences. It includes three logically separate activities: (a) 
clarification of the objectives involved (the goal functions), (b) statement of the 
relationship between outputs and outcomes in terms of causal effectiveness (the causal 
function), and (c) clarification of the relation between objectives and outcomes in order to 
affirm the extent of goal achievement (the accomplishment function) (Lane, 1995: 98-
99). 
2.2.2 Approaches to Policy Implementation  
Elmore (1982) identifies two distinguishable approaches to implementation analysis, i.e. 
forward mapping and backward mapping. Forward mapping is the most apparent strategy 
when considering how a policy maker might try to affect the implementation process. It 
begins at the top of the process, with as clear a statement as possible of the policy 
maker’s intent, and proceeds through a sequence of increasingly specific steps to define 
what is expected of the implementers at each level. At the bottom of the process, it is 
stated with as much precision as possible what a satisfactory outcome would be, 
measured in terms of the original statement of intent (Elmore, 1982:18). 
 
Backward mapping shares with forward mapping the notion that policy makers have a 
vested interest in affecting the implementation process and the outcomes of policy 
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decisions. However backward mapping explicitly questions the assumption that policy 
makers ought to, or do, exercise a determinant influence over the implementation 
process. It also questions the assumption that explicit policy directives, clear statements 
of administrative responsibilities, and well-defined outcomes will necessarily increase the 
likelihood that policies will be successfully implemented. 
 
Sabatier (1986:22) describes the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation 
research. The essential features of a top-down approach are that it starts with a policy 
decision by governmental (often central government) officials and then asks: 
1. To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups 
consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision? 
2. To what extent were the objectives attained over time, i.e. to what extent were the 
impacts consistent with the objectives? 
3. What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those 
relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones? 
4. How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? (Ibid: 22-
23). 
In contrast, the bottom-up approach to the policy implementation, starts by identifying 
the network of actors involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asks 
them about their goals, strategies, activities, and contacts. It then uses the contacts as a 
vehicle for developing a network technique to identify the local, regional, and national 
actors involved in the planning, financing, and execution of the relevant governmental 
and non-governmental programs. This provides a mechanism for moving from street-
level bureaucrats (the ‘bottom’) up to the ‘top’ policy makers in both the public and 
private sectors (Hjern et al., 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern and Hull, 1985 cf. 
Sabatier, 1986: 32; O’Toole, 2004). Comparisons between top-down and bottom-up 
approaches are made in the following table (Ibid 33). 
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Table 2.3: Comparison between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches 
 Top-Down 
(Sabatier & Mazmanian) 
Bottom-up 
(Hjern et al.) 
Initial focus (central) government decision, e.g. new 
pollution control law 
Local implementation structure 
(network) involved in a policy area, 
e.g. pollution control from bottom 
(govt. and private) up 
Identification of 
major actors in 
the process 
from top down and from govt. out to private 
sector (although importance attached to causal 
theory also calls for accurate understanding of 
target group’s incentive structure) 
From bottom (govt. and private) up 
 
Evaluation 
criteria 
Focus on extent of attainment of formal 
objectives (carefully analysed). May look at 
other politically significant criteria and 
unintended consequences but these are 
optional. 
Much less clear. Basically anything 
the analyst chooses, which is 
somehow relevant to the policy issue 
or problem. Certainly does not require 
any careful analysis of official govt. 
decision (s). 
Overall focus How does one steer system to achieve (top) 
policy maker’s intended policy results? 
Strategic interaction among multiple 
actors in a policy network. 
(Sources: Sabatier, 1986:33) 
2.2.3 Models of Implementation 
Several models have been discussed in implementation literature but here I would like to 
discuss only some of those which are quite relevant to the present study. 
 
The following diagram shows the general model that is called a rationalist model of 
policy implementation (Dunsire, 1990:15). 
Diagram 2.1: Rationalist Model of Implementation 
 
Input 
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 Output 
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Policy 
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of 
Government 
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of Govt. 
Transmission Operationalisation Programming 
Example: Rule 
Application 
Target or Client 
Population 
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(Source: Dunsire, 1990:16) 
 
The writer stated that if a government has arrived at a correct and appropriate policy 
objective (assuming), a ‘failure in implementation’ might occur because: 
(a) an inappropriate implementation strategy was chosen; or 
(b) within an appropriate strategy, inappropriate government agencies or machinery 
were selected;  or 
(c) although that was well done, an inappropriate instrumentality was selected. 
Continuing: although all these choices were correctly made, 
(d) the programming with in the bureaucracy was faulty; or 
(e) the operationalisation of the intention was poorly executed at one or more points; 
or 
(f) there were communication errors, mistakes in transmissions; or 
(g) although all these dangers were surmounted, nevertheless something went wrong 
at operation level, the ‘shop floor’ of bureaucratic process, the ‘output’ or 
‘production’ stage of government action; or 
(h) (this area alone accounts for many problems) even if everything up to this stage 
were ‘perfect’, the response or reaction of those affected was different from what 
had been calculated. 
Alternatively, if implementation actually occurs, if things go right, then it ‘must’ be 
because (by whatever processes of decisions; overt, intuitive or habitual) the choices 
made at all these points have been ‘appropriate’.    
 
Another impressive model for implementation has been presented by Van Meter and Van 
Horn (1975). This model consists of six variables that shape the relationship between 
policy and performance. This model not only specifies the relationship between the 
independent variables and the ultimate dependent variable of interest, but also makes 
explicit the relationships among the independent variables (Van Meter and Van Horn, 
1975: 462). Due to the complexity of the model, I do not intend to use it in this study. 
Hence, the details of the model have not been presented here. 
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Grindle and Thomas (1990, 1991) have discussed two separate models of 
implementation—linear and interactive. A roughly linear model of the policy process is 
implicit in many analyses of, or proposal for, reform. According to this view, a proposed 
reform gets on the agenda for government action, a decision is made about the proposal, 
and the new policy or institutional arrangement is implemented, either successfully or 
unsuccessfully (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:122). The model is as follows: 
 
Figure 2.1: The Linear Model of Policy Reform 
 
AGENDA PHASE  DECISION PHASE  IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
              
       Successfully Implemented 
     Decision for Reform        
            
   On Agenda      Unsuccessful                        Strengthen 
REFORM   Decision Against                                   Institutions 
ISSUE 
          Fortify 
   Not On Agenda      Political Will 
 
Time 
(Source: Thomas and Grindle, 1990: 1167) 
 
The figure illustrates this model in a decision tree format: the decision is seen as the 
critical choice and becomes the focus of the policy maker and donor attention and 
concerns about appropriate policy analysis, while implementation is either ignored or 
considered to be the responsibility of another group—the managers. All too often, 
implementation is thought to be a matter of carrying out that which has been decided 
upon, and successful implementation is viewed as a question of whether or not the 
implementing institution is strong enough for the task. If implementation is unsuccessful, 
the usual remedy is to call for greater efforts to strengthen institutional capacity.  
 
Analysis of implementation feasibility should become an essential part of policy analysis. 
The linear model treats this as a technical matter or even omits such considerations. But 
the case studies of Grindle and Thomas led to an interactive model in which policy is 
viewed as a process rather than a series of discrete stages (Turner and Hulme, 1997:79). 
Grindle and Thomas have argued that their ongoing observations, as well as their 
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research, indicate that implementation is often the most crucial aspect of the policy 
process and that the outcomes of implementation efforts are highly variable, ranging from 
successful to unsuccessful, but including also an almost unlimited number of potential 
outcomes. The range of outcomes results from the fact that implementation is an 
interactive and ongoing process of decision making by policy elites and managers in 
response to actual or anticipated reactions to reformist initiatives (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991:125). The alternative model presented by the writers is an interactive model.  
 
In this model, the writers begin with the assumption that a state of equilibrium surrounds 
an established policy set. This equilibrium results from the acceptance of existing policy 
or institutional arrangements by those who are affected—positively or negatively—by it.  
Efforts to alter existing policy upset that equilibrium and will elicit some response or 
reaction from those affected by the change. Reaction to policy change may come at any 
point in the process of decision and implementation. However, reactions are more than 
likely to occur farther into the process, since the effects of the change will become more 
visible as the nature and impact of the new policy become more evident. The nature, 
intensity, and location of those reactions will determine whether the reform is 
implemented and sustained (Ibid: 125). The model is as follows: 
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Figure 2.2: The Interactive Model of Policy Implementation 
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(Source: Thomas and Grindle, 1990: 1167) 
 
The central element of this model is that a policy reform initiative may be altered or 
reversed at any stage in its life cycle by the pressures and reactions of those who oppose 
it.  Unlike the linear model, the interactive model views policy reform as a process, one 
in which interested parties can exert pressure for change at many points. Some interests 
may be more effective at influencing high-level officials in government, while others are 
more effective at influencing the managers of the implementation process or those who 
control the resources needed for implementation. Understanding the location, strength, 
Policy 
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Policy managers 
assess and 
mobilize 
resources to 
sustain reform 
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and stakes involved in these attempts to promote, alter, or reverse policy reform 
initiatives is central to understanding the outcomes (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 126).  
 
Firstly, in this model pressures to put reform issues on the policy agenda come from 
many sources, including frequent ‘reform-mongering’ by policy elites, and the agenda 
represents a stockpile of proposed changes. Some items on the agenda are acted upon, 
but many are not, often because of the preferences, perceptions, and actions of policy 
elites and their appreciation of the economic and political environment they face. The 
agenda always contains many more issues than will be acted upon, as well as issues that 
have been acted upon but not implemented (Ibid: 126). 
 
According to Grindle and Thomas, some issues receive active consideration by policy 
makers, but the point of an actual decision is hard to determine precisely. The 
authorisation process may move through one or more stages of the bureaucracy and may 
have to be confirmed at some level of political decision making. They go on to say that 
once an affirmative decision is made, it may be reversed at a higher level or at some point 
in the implementation process, and the issues may be returned to the agenda. Thus, the 
decision needs to be envisaged as a series of formal and informal stages, with numerous 
actors who have distinct interests and concerns. 
 
The effects of a change in policy become more visible as implementation proceeds, and 
there are likely to be more challenges to the original conception of the reform. In this 
process, the characteristics of the policy will have an important influence on the nature of 
the reaction or response to change. In fact, the characteristics of a reformist initiative 
have a powerful influence on whether it will be implemented as intended or whether the 
outcome will be significantly different (Ibid). 
 
Lastly, in the implementation process, political, financial, managerial, and technical 
resources are likely to be needed in order to sustain the reform. Mobilising these is part of 
the challenge to decision makers and policy managers. Those opposing the policy change 
may attempt to block access to the necessary resources, thus stalling the reform and 
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returning it to the policy agenda. At this stage choices by policy elites and managers may 
have an important bearing on the eventual outcome of the reform initiative (Ibid: 128). 
2.2.4 Perfect/Effective Implementation 
The ineffective implementation of policies and programs in developing countries has not 
only proved problematic, but also been a major concern to governments and writers of 
public policy. The factors that influence policy implementation have not been given 
adequate attention in developing countries due to the fact that many of those who 
formulate policies assume that once policies are announced, they will be implemented 
and that intended objectives would be achieved in a technically competent way. 
However, experience with the implementation of policies in developing countries 
indicates that implementation is not merely a technical process of carrying out 
preconceived plans, but is a dynamic and somewhat unpredictable process of interaction 
(Adjei, 1996:12). 
 
What preconditions would have to be satisfied, then, if perfect implementation were to be 
achieved? Gunn (1978) has suggested ten preconditions (Kendal, 2002), as follows: 
 
First, that there are no crippling constraints (Gunn, 1978:170; Kendal, 2002); sometimes 
influential factors controlling a policy lie outside the control of implementers because 
they are external to the policy concerned. The nature of such obstacles may vary; they 
may be physical as in the case when an agricultural program is set back by drought, or 
they may be political in that either the policies or measures needed to implement it are 
not acceptable to the interests, which have the power to veto them. There is little that 
administrators can do to overcome such obstacles, except by ensuring that such obstacles 
are borne in mind during the policy-making stage. 
 
Second, that there are adequate time and resources available for the program. This 
condition partly overlaps the first in that it often comes within the category of external 
constraints (Gunn, 1978: 170). Third, that not only are there no constraints in terms of 
overall resources but also that at each stage the required combination of resources is 
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available (Gunn, 1978:170). Acute bottlenecks may be created within a sophisticated 
program when essential combinations of resources are not available when needed (Ibid).  
 
Fourth, that the policy for implementation is based upon a valid theory of cause and 
effect (Gunn 1978:171). A policy may be based upon an inadequate understanding of a 
problem or otherwise be misguided. In such circumstances policies when implemented 
fall short of the mark. Fifth, that the relation between cause and effect is direct and that 
there are few intervening links. In other words, due to the reciprocal relations involved 
the more links in the chain the greater the likelihood of poorly conceived and executed 
implementation (Ibid: 171-172). Simplifying the implementation chain can redress such 
inadequacies.  
 
Sixth, that there is a single implementer or agency which need not depend on others for 
success or, if other agencies are to be involved, then the dependency relationships are 
minimal in number and importance. Seventh, that there is complete understanding of and 
agreement about the objectives to be achieved and that this condition persists throughout 
implementation (Ibid: 173; Kendal, 2002). Difficulties can arise in the implementation 
process when objectives are misunderstood. This can arise when communication is poor 
both within an organisation and also from the organisation to the outside world. Other 
impediments can also arise when fundamental goals are displaced over time (Gunn, 
1978:173). Such difficulties can be overcome by ensuring that actual and achieved 
objectives are integrated. 
 
Eighth, that in satisfying objectives it is possible to specify in detail and perfect sequence 
the tasks to be performed by each participant (Gunn, 1978: 173). Perfect knowledge and 
foresight would be required if this condition of perfect implementation were to be 
attained. Also it is desirable that there should be some room for direction and 
improvisation in even the most carefully planned program (Gunn, 1978: 173). Ninth, that 
there is perfect communication and co-ordination (Gunn, 1978: 174); modern 
organisations feature many impediments to this condition. Tenth, that there is perfect 
obedience to those in authority (Gunn, 1978: 174); attainment of this condition means 
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that those in power would secure total compliance. However, every administrator knows 
how difficult it would be to achieve this condition of perfect obedience or compliance 
(Gunn, 1978: 175). 
 
The conditions necessary for perfect implementation cannot be expected to be fulfilled 
entirely in the real world. In that case, under what conditions can the objectives of what is 
to be implemented be effected i.e. achieved? Sabatier and Mazmanian have analysed the 
circumstances that must apply and have nominated five key conditions for effective 
implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979: 481-504; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 
1981; and Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).  A statute or policy decision will achieve its 
objectives if (1) it incorporates a valid theory linking target-group compliance to those 
objectives, (2) it contains policy directives that are unambiguous and focus the 
implementation process to maximise target group compliance, (3) the leaders of 
implementing agencies support the objectives and utilise resources skilfully, (4) the 
program enjoys the support of constituency groups and key legislators, with the courts 
being neutral or supportive, (5) the program is not undermined by changing conditions 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979: 500). Sabatier and Mazmanian state that if all these 
conditions are met then any statute can be effectively implemented.  
 
Hence, the perfect implementation is not expected to occur in its entirety, but effective 
implementation is not unachievable if one can ensure the fulfilment of the conditions as 
suggested by the writers. The challenge is how familiar the policy implementers are with 
this and whether they are willing to invest their crucial time and resources for the best 
implementation, despite their personal likes and dislikes. 
 
2.3 Concept of Strategic Group Analysis 
 
The basic objective of the original version of strategic group analysis was the 
transformation of ‘quasi-groups’ with unrecognised common interests and goals of 
appropriation into strategic groups. Group cohesion, solidarity and social integration 
emerge on the basis of a common lifestyle, increasing self-recruitment, and the 
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foundation of voluntary organisations (Evers 1973:114; Evers and Schiel, 1988:26 cf. 
Berner, 1995:2). 
 
“Neither the upper classes nor any other segment of society has a monopoly of strategic 
action. Individuals, families, clans, cliques, patronage systems, associations, non-
government organisations, labour unions etc.—they all do not merely react spontaneously 
to events in their environment but also pursue plans and try to have an effect on future 
developments. The exclusion of group formations among the dominated strata is 
conceded as a ‘desideratum’ of the theory by Evers and Schiel” (198813; 264 cf. Berner, 
1995:2). According to Evers and Schiel strategic groups are defined only by the fact that 
they act strategically. They further stated that their theoretical approach attempts to 
identify why and for what goals strategies are pursued, and which successes and failures 
of the collective strategies can possibly be the outcome (Evers and Schiel, 1989: 567 cf. 
Berner 1995:2). In their discussion Evers and Schiel have treated strategic groups, 
strategies and strategic action as more or less synonymous. Berner said, “Neither the 
rehabilitation of ‘grand theories’ nor a restriction to purely empirical-descriptive 
procedures is adequate in face of the heterogeneous and fast-changing developing 
societies.” He further proposed to conceptualise strategic groups as “organised networks 
of collective actors” which emerge on the basis of common or complementary interests 
and struggle to participate in the dominance system. Their determinative characteristic is 
not the appropriation of surplus but rather access to material and non-material “strategic 
resources”, which are seen as the precondition of dominance. Strategic theory is, in his 
view, complementary to other sociological approaches like those of Gidedens, Murphy 
and Parkin (Ibid). 
 
Strategic group analysis in industries, however, can be discussed in a different way from 
the way in which it is explained above. The meaning and strategies are quite different 
from the concept of general strategic group analysis presented by Evers and Schiel (1988, 
1989). For example, “Strategic group analysis is a subset of industry analysis that looks 
specifically at the different groups of rival firms clustered around a similar competitive 
approach or strategic position. It is used, among other things, to determine the:  
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• different competitive positions that rival firms occupy  
• intensity of competitive rivalry within and between industry groups  
• profit potential of the various strategic groups in an industry  
• implications for the competitive position of the firm under analysis.” 
(Competitive Intelligence Magazine Vol. 6, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2003 cf. 
http://www.scip.org/news/cimcomp/v6i1article1.asp  accessed on 5 Sep.05). 
Although the concept is different, for our purpose the general concept of strategic group 
analysis presented by Evers, Schiel and Berner is used as an analytical tool for 
understanding who are the actors-/strategic groups in the process of privatisation policy 
formulation-to-implementation stage in Nepal. It will enable us to analyse how some 
groups favour or oppose the policy for their own benefits, how they affect the success or 
failure of the policy, and so forth. 
2.4 Summary and Plan for Using the Idea in the Thesis 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed three specific issues; concept of privatisation, the 
implementation of policies, and the concept of strategic group analysis. In the first part of 
the chapter, I briefly discussed the concept, forces that influence the promotion of 
privatisation, objectives, and some frequently used methods/techniques of privatisation. 
The concepts discussed here and other related issues will also be referred to in the data 
analysis chapter discussing the Nepalese situation, four specific cases and the impact of 
the policy.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, implementation-related issues and some models have 
been discussed. Although this chapter is a basis for the data analysis of the thesis, not all 
concepts and models will be used; selected ones that are relevant in the Nepalese context 
will be used, as well as the literature reviewed here enables us to become familiar with 
the research and subject matter. Primarily, I intend to use the interactive model of 
implementation for the privatisation policy analysis. This is because the interactive model 
of implementation provides an alternative way of understanding and analysing the 
process of implementation, as it describes the positions and interests of those who support 
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or oppose the policy. It also allows us to understand the possibilities of disagreements 
over policy reforms.  
 
In the third part, the concept of strategic group analysis has been discussed in brief. This 
concept will help us to identify the strategic groups involved in the formulation-to-
implementation stage of privatisation policy in Nepal. It also identifies who favours the 
policy and who opposes it, according to their strategies and the resources at stake. 
Berner’s discussion of ‘civil society’ as a strategic group (Berner, 2005; also Thomson, 
2005, discussed students as a strategic group), will give us an understanding of how 
different strategic groups compete in the way of development discourse (in our case in 
regards to privatisation). 
  
Thus implementation, strategic group analysis and privatisation-related concepts will be 
used in the subsequent chapters for the data analysis. The following chapter will discuss 
public enterprises in Nepal—their origin, performance, the necessity for reform, and so 
forth.  
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Chapter Three 
Public Enterprises, Performance and Necessity for Reform 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The concepts of privatisation, policy implementation and strategic group analysis have 
been discussed as a theoretical framework in Chapter Two. In this chapter I will continue 
my discussion by giving an overview of the evolution, performance, problems and 
necessity of reform of public enterprises in Nepal. 
 
In this chapter, I will first define what public enterprise is, in short, then, continue the 
discussion of public enterprises in Nepal. The main aim of this chapter is to discuss how 
public enterprises have been established in Nepal, the level of performance of such 
enterprises, what types of problems they are facing and why we need the implementation 
of reform agenda, and so forth. This will give a background of the reform process in 
public enterprises in Nepal. 
 
3.1 What is Public Enterprise? 
 
Public enterprises (PEs) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are identified by three 
characteristics. First, SOEs are classified as part of the public sector. Therefore, they 
must be owned by the government. Second, SOEs are an enterprise and therefore must be 
engaged in the production of goods and services for sale. Third, sales revenues of SOEs 
should bear some relation to cost. Therefore, a public hospital charging a flat fee from its 
patients irrespective of treatment is not an SOE. SOEs are predominantly businesses, at 
least potentially self-sustaining, and get their revenue through the sale of goods they 
either purchased or produced, without much regard to the way they are legally organised 
(Aharoni, 1986:6). This definition of PEs or SOEs includes those SOEs that supply their 
services against fees paid by the users of the services, which are intended to cover costs, 
whether or not they are separately incorporated. 
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Aware of the definitional problem of PEs, in 1980 the International Centre for Public 
Enterprises (ICPE) attempted to reconcile and standardise the definition (Manandhar, 
1993:14). After exhaustively examining the characteristics underlying the concept of PEs, 
ICPE proposed a statistical and a conceptual definition as follows: 
Statistical definition of public enterprise - 
“A public enterprise is a productive organisational entity which engages in 
activities of a business character and markets any of its output and which is 
publicly-owned to the extent of 50% or more” (ICPE, 1981: 26 cf. Ibid 14).  
Conceptual definition of public enterprise - 
“A public enterprise is an organisation which is: 
a. owned by public authorities including central, state or local authorities, to the 
extent of 50% or more; 
b. is under the top managerial control of the owning public authorities, such 
public control including, inter alia, the right to appoint top management and 
to formulate critical policy decisions; 
c. is established for the achievement of a defined set of public purposes, which 
may be multidimensional in character; 
d. and is consequently placed under a system of public accountability; 
e. is engaged in activities of a business character; 
f. involves the basic idea of investment  and returns; 
g. and which markets its outputs in the shape of goods and services” (Ibid:15). 
  
In conclusion, based on the above definition, there are two dimensions to defining public 
enterprise—public and enterprise. In the public dimension, there should be public 
purpose, public ownership, public control and management accountability. The enterprise 
dimension includes business character, the concept of investment and return, and 
marketed the output when its pricing has some relation to the cost. Hence, public 
enterprise is a combination of both ‘public’ and ‘enterprise’.  
 
 37
3.2 Public Enterprises in Nepal 
3.2.1 Growth of Public Enterprises  
Public enterprises in Nepal emerged comparatively recently. Most of these enterprises 
came into existence during the Second, Third and Fourth plans in the 1960s and the first 
half of the ‘70s. With the initiation of the first five-year plan in 1956, public enterprises 
have been promoted in Nepal. For the first time the industrial policy of 1957 formally 
recognised the responsibility of the government in “promoting, assisting and regulating” 
industrial development in the country and the First Plan intended to establish state 
monopolies in the fields of transportation, telecommunication, hydro-electric power 
generation and irrigation, and to run some big industries, such as cement, sugar, 
cigarettes, textiles, iron and steel (GON, 1956:55). The emergence of public enterprises 
was stimulated by the inability of the private sector to adequately fulfil national 
objectives. 
 
The corporate form of public enterprise appeared only in 1952 when the government that 
came to power after the revolution of 1951 decided to go for the majority holding—from 
40% share ownership to 51% in Nepal Bank Limited, the only commercial bank 
operating in the country. The objective was clearly to control the financial market. Three 
struggling units (jute, cement and tea) were taken over by the government and two 
electrical companies were nationalised. Most of the enterprises were either established by 
the government or established by the donor countries (Manandhar, 1993:46). Similarly, at 
the same time India was preparing its first five-year plan after it got independence. The 
plan presented to the government by the Planning Commission in December, 1952 
indicated the need for “a rapid expansion of the economic and social responsibilities of 
the state” to satisfy the “legitimate expectations of the people”. It stated, however, that 
this “need not involve complete nationalisation of the means of production or elimination 
of private agencies in agriculture or business and industry”. Only a “progressive 
widening of the public sector and a reorientation of the private sector to the needs of 
planned economy” was envisaged (Narain, 2003:21). Hence, the ideology of the 
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controlling the economy by the government was obvious at that time, not only in Nepal 
but also in its neighbouring countries.  
 
There was successive growth in public enterprises with the exercise of development 
planning in the country. Public enterprises in Nepal were established mainly to serve the 
following objectives: 
• infrastructural facilities and services; 
• basic consumer and development goods; 
• adequate supplies of essential goods; 
• managerial support to needy enterprises; and 
• entrepreneurial support to needy enterprises (Shrestha, 1990:73). 
The entire process of public enterprise growth in Nepal can be divided into four 
periods—(i) growth period (1952-1975), (ii) period of reconciliation (1975-1980), (iii) 
period of restraint (1980-1990), and (iv) promise of privatisation (after 1990) 
(Manandhar, 1993:46). 
 
The following table and chart provide an overview of the growth of public enterprises in 
Nepal during the various plan periods: 
 
Table 3.2.1: Growth of Public Enterprise in Nepal during Various Plan Periods 
Periodic plan Total number Change 
Prior to                  1956 
First Plan               (1956-61) 
No Plan period      (1961-62) 
Second Plan          (1962-65) 
Third Plan             (1965-70) 
Fourth Plan           (1970-75) 
Fifth Plan              (1975-80) 
Sixth Plan             (1980-85) 
Seventh Plan         (1985-90) 
No Plan period     (1990-92) 
Eighth Plan           (1992-97) 
Ninth Plan             (1997-2002) 
1 
8 
11 
22 
34 
61 
59 
54 
63 
62 
46 
43 
- 
7 
3 
11 
12 
27 
-2 
-5 
9 
-1 
-16 
-3 
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(Source: National Planning Commission, various plan documents) 
 
The above table shows that the majority of public enterprises were established during the 
sixties and early seventies (1956-1975). The main reason of this was due to the political 
regime at the time, which focused on the planned economic policy, in which the state was 
seen as the dominant player, rather than the private sector (Panday, 1999). However, 
unlike in most developing countries, the growth of Nepalese public enterprises was not 
based on the nationalisation of private companies, but in many areas new enterprises 
were created, with the support of external donors, including China, former USSR, the 
Netherlands, Japan and multinational agencies. In other cases, units already existing as 
government departments were converted into statutory corporations and other kinds of 
autonomous bodies.  
 
In total there were 62 public enterprises in Nepal in 1991 (the time when the privatisation 
policy was being prepared) which were listed under different sectors as follows: 
Manufacturing sector 28 Trade sector   9 
Service sector               8 Social sector 6 
Public utilities              3 Finance sector   8 (HMG/N 1991). 
 
Though the PEs were established as government tools to provide goods and services to 
the people at affordable prices, the objectives were never achieved. Hence, pressure from 
the international donor agencies was vital to reform the economy, which had already been 
initiated before the adoption of the liberalisation policy in 1991. The then-government 
had already implemented the structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1986 under the 
pressure of the World Bank and IMF (Sharma, 2004: 6) as macro-economic crises 
emerged. The structural adjustment process, which included privatisation, tariff 
adjustments, liberalisation of industrial licensing, easing of terms for foreign investment 
and more liberal trade and foreign exchange regimes, was initiated in the FY 1987/88. 
These policies were supported by loan facilities from the World Bank and the IMF, but 
due to the trade and transit impasse with India in March 1989, only limited progress 
could be achieved in structural reforms. The SAP focused on both internal and external 
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liberalisation. These programs were advocated, applauded and supported by the donor 
agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank (Acharya et al., 2003:3).  
 
While the reform of the Nepalese economy was initiated in the mid-1980s, it was only in 
the early 1990s that Nepal introduced far-reaching reform programs when India 
liberalised its economy. Until the mid-1980s, Nepal's landlocked position and open 
border with India significantly limited its ability to pursue independent economic and 
commercial policies. By the mid-1990s, Nepal made significant progress in economic 
liberalisation. Similarly, a large number of public enterprises was privatised and the 
agriculture input market was opened up for the private sector (Sharma 2004: 6). 
 
Hence, after the restoration of the multiparty system in Nepal in 1990, the major policy 
shift had been taken by the new government with the adoption of liberalisation policy. 
With the implementation of the Eighth Plan in 1992, the government has adopted the 
privatisation policy instead of public enterprises policy in the country, as it embraced the 
economic liberalisation policy for the improvement of the national economy. 
3.2.2 Performance of Public Enterprises 
Performance can be defined as: the degree to which a development intervention or a 
development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or 
achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans.  
(www.ifad.org/evaluation/guide/annexa/a.htm accessed on 25 Aug. 2005). Linking with 
the previous definition of performance, the ‘performance’ of a public enterprise could be 
defined as the attainment of goals by the enterprise. In the context of public enterprises, 
‘performance’ refers to the extent to which a public enterprise achieves the objectives 
that have been set for it. More specifically, performance is interpreted in terms of success 
in achieving the stated objectives. Performance is thus essentially correlated with the 
objectives. 
 
The performance of public enterprises in Nepal has been an area of public concern and 
criticism. Successive government reports, documents and research studies have 
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unequivocally criticised their poor performance, inefficiency and wastefulness. Some 
have even questioned their objectives and existence (IDS: 1987 cf. Manandhar, 1993:60).  
 
It is widely believed that in most developing countries the performance of the PE sector 
has been disappointing. For example, in Nepal, SOEs have become an unsustainable 
burden on the budget and the banking system, absorbing scarce public resources. Despite 
measures to improve the performance of SOEs in the 1980s, public sector financial losses 
remained to constitute an ongoing burden to the treasury and to the economy. In 1992, 
gross transfers to the SOEs were more than the combined expenditure on health and 
education and total losses in the public sector were equal to 1% of GDP (Sharma, 
1995:7). 
 
Public enterprises in Nepal and elsewhere suffer from similar problems. They are very 
often over-manned, due to politicians and bureaucrats loading them with supporters, 
friends and often relatives. Most importantly, bureaucrats and politicians make 
management decisions for political reasons; profitability, customer service and efficiency 
should be the primary concerns, but unfortunately these only get the requisite attention 
when businessmen operate those same businesses (Clarke, 1999). Such allegations could 
be found in the Nepalese case also, as the PEs are accused of low performance, 
overstaffing and operating under a lack of autonomy due to political interference, and so 
forth ( Manandhar, 1998; MoF, 1999:6; CRPS, 1995:11; Sharma, 1995:7). 
 
Performance of public enterprises could be measured in various ways; Victor Powel 
(1987) has explained that there are several indicators for measuring public enterprise 
performance. However, the indices can be classified into the following six groups (cf. 
K.C.1999:144): 
• General performance indices 
• Management performance 
• Financial performance 
• Investment performance 
• Costs breakdown (input co-efficient), and 
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• Physical performance (i.e. resource use). 
All the indices could not be used in the present study; however an attempt has been made 
to evaluate the performance of Nepalese public enterprises largely looking at the financial 
performance. 
 
Financial performance is a significant consideration in the performance evaluation of 
public enterprises. Financial profitability, with regard to the financial performance 
evaluation, shows that the PE’s “ability to earn profits proves a measure of its market 
strength, its ability to keep down costs. Profitability also affects the amount of 
investment, for much industrial investment is financed out of reinvested profits, and 
hence the contribution of the firm to the overall growth of the economy” (Killick, 
1983:183 cf. K. C, 1999:144). 
 
The poor financial performance of public enterprises has had a direct impact on 
government budgets. Table 3.2.2 shows that government funds dedicated to public 
enterprises increased significantly (around 22.27% annually) during 1994/95–2001/02, 
while the flow of funds from public enterprises to the government recorded only a rise of 
14.55% during the same period. This clearly shows that public enterprises are a drain of 
scarce resources rather than a generator of resources, even though the situation improved 
slightly after 2001/02 in terms of rate of return from the PEs. Similarly, since 2000/01, 
the government stopped providing the capital subsidy, which can be interpreted as a 
positive sign. 
 
Regarding the financial performance of PEs, most of them incurred operating losses in 
FY 2002/03 aggregating Rs. 1.61 billion (see the table 3.2.2). During this period, the 
profit level of public utility enterprises has been positive, while losses of service and 
social sector have been transformed into profit. Operating losses of PEs belonging to 
industrial and trading sectors, however, have gone up. Aggregate operating profit of PEs 
in FY 2003/04 is totals Rs. 3.89 billion. The table painted a bleak picture of the financial 
performance of public enterprises, which justified adopting an alternative policy option to 
minimise the types of losses incurred from this sector. 
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Table 3.2.2: Flow of Funds between Government and Public Enterprise 
        - (Rs. in Million) 
Particular ‘94/95 ‘95/96 ‘96/97 1997/98 ‘98/99 ‘99/00 ‘00/01 2001/02 2002/03 03/04** 
A. Fund from 
HMG to PEs 
2780.0 6298.0 7065.1 7562.7 6213.7 7950.5 8255.1 5988.8 1150.5 1197.2 
* Share capital 858.7 1553.0 868.2 1839.0 1420.0 1373.0 1088.8 1036.0 319.3 392.0 
* Loan capital 1272.4 3822.0 5303.3 4658.8 4090.0 5945.0 6898.0 4663.3 589.3 642.5 
*Operating/Trans
port subsidy 
571.4 726.0 713.6 988.0 698.7 577.5 268.3 289.5 241.9 142.7 
* Capital subsidy 77.5 197.0 180.0 76.9 5.0 55.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
B. Fund from PEs 
to HMG 
3966.7 5330.4 4585.5 4913.3 6830.0 8523.2 8784.3 9159.8 6215.6 3488.2 
* Indirect taxes      0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
* Income taxes 860.2 1144.5 1231.0 1317.8 1150.0 2190.2 2928.0 3500.0 1251.0 811.6 
* Dividend 1063.0 1357.9 1134.2 1194.5 1780.0 2623.0 2336.3 2511.3 2500.0 1031.9 
* Interest 843.1 1734.0 1357.5 1153.0 1660.0 1568.0 1463.0 1220.3 924.6 549.5 
* Principal 1200.4 1094.0 862.8 1248.0 2240.0 2142.0 2057.0 1928.2 1540.0 1095.2 
C. Cash Flows 
from govt. to 
corporations 
-1186.7 967.6 2479.6 2649.4 -616.3 -572.7 -529.2 -5065.1 -5065.1 -2291.0 
** Estimate of first Eight months 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, 2004:65) 
 
Nepalese public enterprises have been widely criticised from the viewpoint of financial 
performance. The government invested huge amounts of capital (1197.2 million in 
2003/04) in public enterprises, but the financial return was not satisfactory compared to 
the capital employed. While public enterprises were supposed to generate investable 
surpluses for government, they actually often posed burdens on government budgets, in 
many cases amounting to significant sums. 
 
The percentage of gross profits to the capital employed was much higher in the earlier 
period (see the table and chart below); it was 5.9% in the year 1970-71. However, for a 
number of years, it also presented a negative figure. Public enterprises had the greatest 
negative rate of return on 5.22% in the year 1990-91. However, the rate of return on 
investment in public enterprises had been improved with a variation for some years. 
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Table 3.2.3: Profitability of Public Enterprises (1980/81 –2003/04) 
 -(Rs in Million) 
 
Year 
Capital 
Employed 
Gross 
Profit 
Gross Profit as % 
of Capital Employed 
1980-81 3331.3 -156.0 -4.68 
1985-86 7399.0 105.0 1.42 
1988-89 17118.0 -38.8 -0.23 
1989-90 18476.2 -244.6 -1.38 
1990-91 35843.2 -1871.7 -5.22 
1991-92 50530.3 -1145.5 -2.27 
1995-96 62010.9 1377.6 2.22 
1999-00 83420.6 2404.4 2.88 
2000-01 82910.5 -1353.2 -1.63 
2001-02 150088.2 -5475.3 -3.65 
2002-03 97232.0 -1614.4 -1.66 
2003-04* 128555.8 3894.8 3.03 
* Estimate 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, 2004:66) 
 
The table can be seen in the chart as follows: 
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3.2.3 Problems of PEs in Nepal 
All PEs face some common problems, including objectives, control, pricing, information 
and financing. The objectives of PEs are not clearly defined. Their goals are ambiguous. 
Yet without clearly defined objectives it is hard, if not impossible, to pin down what the 
PE manager is expected to achieve. Similarly, the question of control is another common 
problem that must be taken into consideration; the right balance between control and 
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supervision on the one hand, and autonomy and flexibility of business operations on the 
other, has not yet been found. In many cases, the problem is that legal control is for the 
purposes of appearance only, and the real control is political and informal (Aharoni,1986: 
378-380). Although there is a legal provision for how PEs operate in Nepal, it is heavily 
influenced by the ministry under which it operates. The minister and his or her deputies 
are the real controllers of PEs in Nepal, which reduces/eliminates the autonomy of the 
PEs. Political interference, especially to employ party supporters in the PEs, is routine. 
Hence, almost all PEs are overstaffed (MoF, 1999).  
 
The continued inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the SOEs in Nepal have had a profound 
negative impact on the economy, particularly in the areas of sustainability and their 
overwhelming demand on government resources. According to Sharma (1995), key 
problems contributing to the present state of affairs of SOEs include: conflicting 
objectives, creation of monopolies and protection from competitive pressures, ineffective 
supervision and control, managerial deficiency (lack of managerial skill and knowledge 
on board membership), lack of expertise, and so forth.   
 
The problems of state-owned enterprises in Nepal can be summarised as follows: 
1. They are a constant drain on the government budget 
2. They use their leverage as state-run enterprises to accumulate bad debts at state-
controlled commercial banks 
3. They are wasteful of scarce resources 
4. Their boards of directors are ineffective in representing the interests of the owners 
who are the government and ultimately the people of Nepal 
5. Management has no commercial managerial ability or dynamism, and has a public 
service mindset under which they ‘administer’ rather than ‘manage’ the 
companies 
6. Companies are bound by, and run along, public service lines and restricted by 
public service regulation and procedure 
7. There is a lack of technical expertise, even in basic areas such as accountancy, 
labour management, and production planning 
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8. There is an absence of responsible fiscal management and no sense of 
responsibility to either the government as the shareholder, or to other creditors 
9. Over-manning is practised at every level and is particularly acute in the 
‘administrative’ grades 
10. There is no consideration for the interest of the consumer 
11. There is no consideration for the interest of suppliers or the people with whom the 
enterprise does business (Sharma, 1995:35-36). 
 
Recognising the problems of SOEs and their financial drain on the economy, the then-
government announced policies to reform the performance of SOEs through various 
means, particularly through privatisation. The particular reasons for adopting this policy 
will be discussed in the next chapter (in 4.1.1 Agenda Setting). 
 
3.3 Necessity of Public Enterprises Reform 
 
In spite of the early contributions of PEs to the Nepalese economy, their overall 
performance has consistently lagged behind. These enterprises have failed to function in 
an efficient manner. Excessive political interference, lack of adequate autonomy and 
accountability, absence of professionalism, financial indiscipline and conflicting goals 
have been the main reasons for the poor performance of public enterprises in Nepal 
(KC,1999:10). 
 
The World Bank examined the condition of Nepalese public enterprises in 1985.  The 
bank found that the performance of public enterprises had deteriorated steadily since the 
early 1980s.  Many public enterprises were becoming a serious drain on fiscal resources 
(The World Bank, 1985:30) and the World Bank recommended that Nepal implement 
SAP, which was carried out in 1986.  SAP proposed sound macroeconomic management, 
effective management of public finances, support for agriculture and light manufacturing, 
liberalisation of trade, and at the initiation of reforming public enterprises (The World 
Bank, 1996).   
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Privatisation was conceived and advocated as a suitable measure in view of the dismal 
performance of PEs. It gained popularity both in developed and developing countries, 
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. The move towards economic reforms and 
liberalisation has paved the way for privatisation globally. Nepal could not remain fail to 
conform to the global trend. Therefore, having become aware of the gloomy forecast for 
PEs in Nepal, the initiation of reform in a global context and the convictions of the new 
government paved the way for the initiation of reform in Nepal.   
 
After the restoration of a multiparty, parliamentary form of government in Nepal in 1990 
and the promulgation of the democratic constitution, the system of governance has been 
altered to suit the reforms either recommended by the donor community or the rise of 
expectation of the people to get immediate results. After the first parliamentary election 
in 1991, the Nepali Congress Party won the majority in the parliament and formed a 
government under the premiership of G. P Koirala. The newly elected government made 
a major commitment towards a comprehensive privatisation program of state-owned 
enterprises as part of an overall program of liberalisation of the economy. This 
represented a marked departure from previous government policy of undertaking 
economic development with very little emphasis on private sector development and with 
state enterprises playing leading roles.  
 
The details of the policy initiation of PEs and the necessity for the introduction of the 
privatisation policy will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter Four).  
 
3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter the definition of PEs in general, as well as the growth, performance and 
problems of PEs in Nepal and the necessity for public enterprise reforms in Nepal have 
been discussed in brief. In Nepal there was rapid growth of public enterprises, especially 
during the Fifth and Sixth Plan periods. In total there were 63 enterprises by the end of 
the Seventh Plan period (1985-1990) yet their performances were disappointing. During 
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the Seventh Plan period, returns of enterprises were virtually negative, which led the 
government to adopt a privatisation policy. 
 
The next chapter will be dedicated to explaining the privatisation policy in Nepal from 
agenda setting to the implementation phase of the policy process. In first section, agenda 
setting, decision making and policy characteristics and implementation areas will be 
discussed and in the second section opposition/obstacles during the implementation 
process and the opinion of major political parties on privatisation, among other things, 
will be discussed.    
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Chapter Four 
Privatisation Policy in Nepal: Agenda Setting, Policy Characteristics and Decision 
Making 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, public enterprises in Nepal were discussed in brief. In the first 
part of this chapter, privatisation policy in Nepal will be discussed in regard to the model 
presented by Grindle and Thomas (1991) as: agenda setting, decision making and policy 
characteristics and implementation. Actors/strategic groups have been identified in line 
with Evers (1966, 1982), and Evers & Schiel (1988, 1989). In the second part of the 
chapter, opposition/obstacles encountered during the implementation phase will be 
discussed, accompanied by some examples of opposition from the general public and 
discussion of the opinion of the major political parties regarding privatisation, their 
common ground, and their differences. The analysis is dependent on the survey data 
collected from the different strategic groups. The discussion begins with the privatisation 
policy. 
 
4.1. Privatisation Policy in Nepal 
 
In this section, I will discuss the privatisation policy in Nepal, based on the model 
formulated by Grindle and Thomas (1991). As discussed in brief in the second chapter, 
the model argues that most policy processes consist of three sets of activities: first, a 
proposed policy reform has to get on the agenda for government action; second, some 
kind of decision making activities need to take place that identify a solution to the 
perceived problem; and third, the decision needs to be implemented (Askvik, 2001:1). 
The discussion in this section is based on the above framework.  
4.1.1 Agenda Setting 
Crisis is frequently invoked in explanations of reasons for the adoption and pursuit of 
major changes in public policy. Certain kinds of policy issues, for example devaluation, 
tend to be added to decision makers’ agendas only when crisis conditions exist. Other 
kinds of policies, for example decentralisation, emerge almost uniquely under politics- 
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as-usual circumstances (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:73). Thus, policy issues tend to get on 
decision makers’ agenda in two situations; when crisis conditions exist, and as politics- 
as-usual. 
 
When discussing the Nepalese privatisation policy, we may have difficulty identifying 
exactly where it stands; as crisis-ridden policy issues or as politics-as-usual. For example, 
if we look at the situation discussed in the previous chapter—the performance of public 
enterprises—we can say that the conditions of PEs were severe and the losses of the 
government in this sector were huge. This created a pressing problem and the government 
was compelled to take the initiative for the adoption of a privatisation policy. On the 
other hand, this policy was on the government’s priority when the new government, after 
the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990, took office in 1991. When the 
government formally announced its economic liberalisation policy in 1991, privatisation 
was understood to be a component of the liberalisation policy. So this policy was also 
taken as a planning reform initiative introduced by the new government as part of a 
general effort to improve the performance of government, especially to improve the 
efficiency of PEs, which were thought to be resource crunches. So it seems that to a large 
extent the privatisation policy is characterized by what Grindle and Thomas call ‘politics- 
as-usual’.  
 
In the interactive model presented by the writers, pressures to put reform issues on the 
policy agenda come from many sources, including policy elites, and the agenda 
represents a stockpile of proposed changes (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:126). In the 
Nepalese context, the pressure from outsiders, such as the World Bank, UNDP, IMF, 
USAID, ADB, etc., was instrumental in putting the issue on the policy agenda. 
 
In 1985 the World Bank examined the condition of Nepalese public enterprises. The bank 
found that the performance of public enterprises had deteriorated steadily since the early 
1980s. It was found that many public enterprises had become a serious drain on fiscal 
resources (World Bank, 1985:30) and the World Bank recommended that Nepal 
implement a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Nepal implemented SAP in 1986. 
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One of the components of the SAP was to privatise public enterprises (The World Bank 
1996) and donor pressures, especially by the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Program and USAID, were instrumental in accelerating Nepal’s privatisation program 
from 1986 (CRPS, 1995:11). None of the governments in Nepal could ignore donor 
pressure on economic policy adoption, and the then-government was also bound to 
follow the donors’ recommendations. However, the policy gained momentum after the 
restoration of the multiparty system in Nepal in 1991. There was, at the same time, 
opposition from the general public pressuring the government not to implement the 
policy, although this did not occur on a mass basis. Some lawyers attempted to block the 
policy by suing in the supreme court of Nepal, which is discussed in the later part of this 
chapter.  
The Actors/Strategic Groups 
Actors in the policy process can be either individuals or groups. For the sake of 
simplification, policy actors may be divided into the following five categories: elected 
officials, appointed officials, interest groups, research organisations, and mass media 
(Howlett et al., 1995: 52). The first two reside within the state and the latter three in the 
society, and together they form the principal elements from which members of specific 
policy subsystems are drawn. 
 
The elected officials participating in the policy process may be divided into two 
categories—members of the executive and of the legislature—though the latter often play 
only a minor role (Ibid: 53). The appointed officials dealing with public policy and 
administration are often collectively referred to as ‘bureaucracy’. Their function is to 
assist the executive in the performance of its task, as is suggested by the terms ‘civil 
servants’ or ‘public servants’ used to describe them. However, the reality of modern 
government is such that their role goes well beyond what one would expect from a 
‘servant’. Indeed bureaucrats are very often the keystone in the policy process and the 
central figures in many policy subsystems. 
 
Grindle and Thomas propose that policy changes in developing countries are significantly 
shaped by policy elites. In particular they refer to influential four groups: (i) heads of 
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state and ministers; (ii) the executive bureaucracy; (iii) legislators; and (iv) influential 
representatives of social interests. These are general groups; however, depending on what 
particular policy is being considered the composition of the relevant policy elite will be 
distinct. Thus if agriculture issues are at stake, the agriculture minister and his/her senior 
civil servants will be involved. By contrast, if educational matters are in focus, the 
education minister and his principal chiefs will have a key role. When the legislator has a 
weak position in the political system, its members tend not to have a prominent position 
in the decision-making arena, but frequently they will play a key role in implementation 
when resources are to be allocated within various regions. Societal interests are 
comprised of various groups: e.g. business interests, religious elites, the military, 
organised labour, and the media (Evers, 1973; Evers and Schiel, 1988; and Berner, 1995), 
which may be activated when they are affected by government policies in an arena 
(Askvik, 2001: 3). 
 
Table 4.1.1: Influential Actors/Strategic Groups for Adopting the Policy 
Political 
leaders of the 
ruling party 
Donor 
community 
Private sector 
(FNCCI etc.) 
Higher level 
government 
officials 
 
Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
59 42 48 35 19 14 13 9 139 100 
 (Source: Sub sample one of the Field Survey 2003/20042) 
Grindle and Thomas presented four groups of influential policy elites, which are equally 
applicable to the Nepalese case. For example, the above table shows that the political 
leaders of the ruling party were the main actors in adopting the policy. About 42% of the 
respondents expressed that the majority of the influential actors come from the ruling 
party. In addition, the then-government was fully determined to adopt a reform agenda 
and the privatisation was one among others. Specifically, the prime minister, the minister 
for finance and the vice chairman of the National Planning Commission were committed 
to the policy change. The high-level government officials were involved in formulating 
                                                 
2 Details of the respondents/strategic groups have been given in the annex.  
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the policy, though only about 9% of the total respondents felt that they are influential 
actors in formulating the policy. Parliament was involved in passing the Privatisation Bill 
in 1994. Although there was oppositional voice regarding the Privatisation Bill, the 
proposed amendments on the bill from the members of various political parties were not 
substantial. The government was in majority in the parliament so it was not difficult to 
pass the Privatisation Bill. Thus the ruling party was indeed influential in adopting the 
policy.  
 
Likewise, the business community was in favour of privatisation (Jyoti, 1988; Golchha, 
1992). The total percentage of the respondents who felt that the private sector was also 
influential in adopting the policy was about 14%.  However in the Nepalese case the role 
of the religious elites and the military was minimal (in fact they played no role in the 
policy-making process of privatisation). Organised labour (trade unions, labour elites) 
opposed the policy and tried to influence the government not to adopt the policy. At the 
same time the role of the media was also important in the Nepalese case, although the 
media is divided into two parts—government controlled and privately owned. The 
government-owned media (Radio Nepal, Nepal Television, the Gorkha Patra daily 
newspaper, the Rising Nepal English daily) were in favour of the government policy and 
tried to disseminate the information to the public, but most of the private media 
(especially the left-inclined for instance- Drishti, Janaaasta, Budhabar etc.) were against 
the policy and tried to influence the government by arguing the policy was not 
appropriate for a country like Nepal. Thus the media’s role was important in the sense 
that they tried to inform people by advising them of the pros and cons of the policy. Thus, 
in the case of Nepal, the main actors influencing the setting of the agenda were those 
mentioned by the writers—head of the government, minister for finance, vice chairman 
of the National Planning Commission, legislators, societal interests-business community, 
organised labour, mass media and government officials. 
 
Besides the above mentioned actors, the role of the international community was also 
crucial in the context of Nepalese privatisation. As shown in the above table, the second-
biggest majority of respondents felt that the donor communities were/are the most 
 54
influential on the policy. About 35% of the respondents expressed that the government 
was bound to adopt this policy as the international donor community compelled it to do 
so. In particular, the World Bank, IMF, USAID, and the Asian Development Bank were 
actors that influenced the setting of the agenda for the privatisation policy. Most of the 
key informants also expressed that the government was compelled to adopt this policy 
due to the pressures from the international financial institutions. The government had no 
choice as it was unable to manage its expenses and had to seek international grants and 
loans for developmental tasks. If it did not comply with the international community, it 
could have forfeited further possibilities of getting financial assistance, without which it 
would have been impossible to manage development works for a country like Nepal with 
few resources.  
Reasons for Privatisation 
The high costs and poor performance of SOEs and the modest and fleeting results of 
reform efforts have caused the government to favour privatisation. Other reasons, such as 
shifting development theory, ideologies and fiscal crises, have also led the government to 
privatise. Similarly, the emergence of a dynamic private sector has weakened the 
argument that state ownership is needed as a substitute for frail or nonexistent domestic 
entrepreneurship in the country. Finally, some of the reasons that initially supported state 
ownership have disappeared; technology and growth have introduced competition into 
traditionally monopolistic activities (Sharma, 1995:12). 
 
Although the privatisation of public enterprises was a general feature of the government’s 
economic policy, there were different implicit reasons for privatisation. Indeed, if this 
had not been the case, HBTF would not have been privatised ahead of Hetauda Textile 
Industry. In the former case, the attractiveness of the enterprise to the private parties was 
a clear factor, while in the second case the desire to dispose of a sick unit was a deciding 
factor (CRPS, 1995:21-22). 
 
The role of the Nepalese film production unit (NFDC) has reduced drastically due to the 
growth of the private sector film industry in the country. Therefore, no government grants 
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were available, even though one of the objectives of NFDC was to promote the private 
sector film industry. Similarly, the reason behind the privatisation of the textile industry 
(BTI) and the shoe factory (BLSF) was their chronic inefficiency. 
 
Essentially the units privatised were a mixture of all kinds of industries. There were 
moribund enterprises and profitable ones. Enterprises such as paper mills, rawhide 
collection and bitumen production were running at a profit, albeit, not to a satisfactory 
level. There were also sick and dying enterprises like shoe and leather factories, and the 
textile and film industries. This mixture of units selected for privatisation implies that the 
government was not just interested in disposing of loss-making enterprises; it indicates a 
determination on the part of the government to go ahead with its privatisation program. 
The following table shows the summary of problems and constraints faced by the 
enterprises prior to privatisation. 
 
Table 4.1.2: Summary of Problems and Constraints Faced by the Enterprises Prior 
to Privatisation 
Enterprises Status Major Problems/Constraints 
BPM Profitable, generating nominal 
profits. 
Low capacity, high overhead costs. 
HBTF Running at ‘break-even’ point Low capacity, high overhead costs. 
BLSF Sick and dying Obsolete machinery, competitive market. 
NFDC Sick Market competition, lack of funds for further 
investment. 
BTI Sick Obsolete machinery, operational difficulty, poor 
financial condition. 
RHCDC Profitable Competition from private sector tanneries. 
NLO Loss making Poor capacity utilisation, active union, poor financial 
condition. 
NBBI Profitable Production confined to barrels rather than bitumen 
emulsion. 
Note: A sick unit is defined as an enterprise that had incurred losses for more than three years prior to 
privatisation. 
(Source: CRPS 1995:22) 
 
One thing that was common to all the enterprises was that, given the adequate managerial 
efficiency, marketing efforts and major capital injections, all selected units had a high 
degree of market potentiality for commercial success (CRPS, 1995:22-23). Considering 
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the disappointing performance of public enterprises, during the early eighties the then-
government started to adopt the privatisation policy in Nepal. 
 
At the same time, after the major political change in the country, the newly elected 
government decided to adopt the free economic liberalisation policy. The government 
constituted a high-level Administrative Reform Commission under the chairmanship of 
the prime minister. The commission, inter alia, recommended that the government adopt 
the privatisation policy. A series of high level seminars and workshops3 were held with 
the financial assistance of the donor agencies and the output of those seminars and 
workshops were a kind of pressure from the elites. 
 
Table 4.1.3: Necessity for Privatisation in Nepal 
Policy 
makers and 
academicians 
Employees 
of the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Trade union 
representatives 
General public 
residing around the 
privatised 
enterprises 
 
Total 
 
Freq. % Freq.  % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. Percent 
Yes 117 86.0 48 65 4 33 20 41 189 70 
No 14 11 26 35 6 50 14 28 60 22 
Don’t 
Know 
4 3   2 17 15 31 21 8 
Total 135 100 74 100 12 100 49 100 270 100 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
Responding to the question concerning “the necessity for privatisation in Nepal” almost 
70% of the respondents stressed the need for privatising all the manufacturing/industrial 
enterprises, but warned against the privatisation of enterprises related to basic services 
and natural resources. Only 22% of the respondents felt that it was not necessary to adopt 
                                                 
3 For example, a high-level workshop on privatisation was held on 8-11 August, 1988 sponsored by UNDP; 
another high-level seminar on privatising public enterprises was held on March 13-16, 1990. Likewise, a 7-
day seminar on privatisation management & implementation in Nepal was held on 27 Aug.- 2 Sep. 1992 
sponsored by USAID. In all of those workshop/seminars, different issues on privatisation were intensively 
discussed and various suggestions were made to the government for adoption and implementation of 
privatisation policy. In all of those workshop/seminars, participants were high-level government officials, 
representatives of different organisations e.g. FNCCI, chiefs of different PEs, etc. 
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and implement the privatisation policy in Nepal, while about 8% did not have any 
opinion on it. Most of the respondents who expressed opinions against privatisation were 
employees of the privatised enterprises and trade union representatives. Except trade 
union representatives (only 33%), the majority of all other strategic groups expressed that 
privatisation was necessary in Nepal (86%, 65% and 41%).  
 
The respondents who were in favour of privatisation were also asked to list reasons 
supporting privatisation. The responses were as follows: 
Table 4.1.4: Reasons for Implementing Privatisation Policy in 1991  
Policy 
makers and 
academicians 
Employees 
of the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Trade union 
representativ
es 
General public 
residing around 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Total 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
To increase productivity of 
the enterprises 
29 
 
23 
 
28 
 
55 
 2 50 11 42 70 34 
To reduce financial and 
administrative burden on 
the government 
25 20 4 8   2 8 31 15 
To increase efficiency of 
the enterprises 21 17 3 6 2 50 2 8 28 14 
To reduce political 
intervention in the 
enterprises 
17 13 3 6   3 11 23 11 
To promote private sector 18 14 3 6   1 4 22 11 
To increase government 
investment in social sector 9 7 3 6   2 8 14 7 
Because of the pressure 
from the donor community 1 1 2 3   2 8 5 2 
To generate additional 
revenue for the 
government 
1 1 1 2   3 11 5 2 
Because of the shifting 
preference of the 
government (ideology) 
2 2 3 6     5 2 
Because of the government 
budget deficit 2 1 1 2     3 1.5 
To reduce the public sector 
borrowing requirement 1 1       1 .5 
Total 126 100 51 100 4 100 26 100 207 100 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
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Four sets of questionnaires were used for the four sectors and in total 207 respondents 
commented on this question. Among them, 34% respondents (majority of all strategic 
groups) stated that privatisation increases the productivity of the enterprises. Similarly, 
15% of the respondents stated that it reduces the financial and administrative burden on 
the government; 14% expressed that it increases the efficiency of the enterprises, while 
11% expressed that it reduces political intervention in the enterprise and promotes private 
sector. Only 7% of the respondents said that to increase the government’s investment in 
social sector, privatisation is necessary. The rest of the respondents (about 8%) stated that 
the following are the reasons in support of privatisation: 
- Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology); 
- Because of the pressure from the donor community; 
- Because of the government budget deficit; 
- Because it generates additional revenue for the government; and 
- Because it reduces the public sector borrowing requirement. 
Some respondents further added that Nepal couldn’t avoid privatisation since it has 
entered into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and more importantly a decade ago it 
liberalised the economy in its transition towards a free-market economy. However, a few 
respondents (about 22% of the total 272respondents) said that the government should not 
pursue privatisation. They said that sick SOEs should be restructured instead of being 
privatised, that the private sector is not capable and that the government should not 
abruptly withdraw itself from its responsibility but should continue to function as a 
facilitator. The reasons they gave against privatisation were as follows: 
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Table 4.1.5: Reasons against Privatisation  
Policy 
makers and 
academicia
ns 
Employees 
of the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Trade union 
representati
ves 
General 
public 
residing 
around the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 
          
• Welfare of employees 1 9 20 77 6 86 7 44 34 57 
• Regular supply of quality 
goods/ services at reasonable 
prices 
6 55 5 19   6 37 17 28 
• Because it worsens the socio-
economic conditions 
 
1 9 1 4 1 14   3 5 
• Optimum use of public 
resources 
 
3 27       3 5 
• Because it promotes the 
concentration of wealth 
 
      3 19 3 5 
Total 11 100 26 100 7 100 16 100 60 100 
 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
57%28%
5%
5%
5%
Welfare of employees
Regular supply of quality
goods/ services in
reasonable prices
Because it worsens the
socio-economic conditions
Optimum use of public
resources
Because it promotes the
concentration of wealth
 
The respondents who were against privatisation were mainly trade union representatives 
(about 58% of total response), employees of the privatised enterprises (about 35% of total 
responses) and general public (about 32%). About 57% of the respondents (majority of 
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the respondents except policy makers and academicians) who were against privatisation 
expressed that for the welfare of employees, the policy should not be adopted. Similarly 
about 28% stated that to ensure the regular supply of goods and services the policy 
should not be implemented. Likewise, 5% each (total 15%) expressed that it should not 
be implemented due to the following reasons: 
• Optimum use of public resources; 
• Because it worsens the socio-economic conditions; and 
• Because it promotes the concentration of wealth. 
In relation to the objectives of the privatisation policy in Nepal, almost all informants 
said that the major causes of adopting the policy are poor performance of the PEs, 
international pressures, and the changing international economic environment. When 
asked whether the objectives of privatisation have been met in Nepal, the responses were 
as follows: 
 
Table 4.1.6: Opinion on Objectives of Privatisation (whether they have been met) 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 21 16 
No 80 61 
Don’t Know 30 23 
Total 131 100.0 
(Source: Sub Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
 
The above table shows a striking result; only 16% respondents believed that the 
objectives of privatisation have been met, while about 61% expressed that it has not been 
met; 23% did not have any opinion. This shows that although most of the respondents 
were in favour of privatisation, they were not satisfied the results achieved by the 
implementation of the policy. 
 
Regarding the objectives, almost all the key respondents said that the major objectives of 
privatisation are to reduce the economic burden on the government and increase 
efficiency of the enterprises. Some of the informants thought that increased private 
participation, productivity, competition and government revenue were the major 
objectives of privatisation. They also felt privatisation facilitates the process for increased 
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government spending on social sectors such as health, drinking water and education, and 
hence these should also be seen as the objectives of privatisation. Some of the 
respondents asserted that the adoption of the privatisation policy in the country is not due 
to the domestic reality, but because of the external pressures from the donor countries, 
particularly from the pressure of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). 
 
Similarly, a few respondents said that the government should not get involved in business 
operations. One respondent said that the government had initiated the program of 
privatisation in the country due to pressure from businessmen. A few respondents 
outlined other objectives of privatisation, such as preventing the misuse of public 
resources, reducing corruption and political interference in enterprises, and promoting 
direct foreign investment in the country. 
 
Arguing in favour of privatisation, Douglas G. Clarke, the then-resident advisor to the 
Privatisation Cell of the Ministry of Finance, said:  
The secret to success in anything is personal responsibility, if you own a property you take care 
of it, and ensure that it is properly maintained, whereas if it were owned by the government 
nobody seems to take the responsibility, so either it falls into decay or nobody seems to bother. 
Privatisation creates ownership and responsibility, owners who have an interest and have 
invested their money in a property, make certain that the customer receives good services and 
that it runs efficiently, not to do so would ruin their business. Government’s attempts to 
restructure SOEs usually fail, and delay the inevitable result. What is missing is they never 
provide the most essential commodity, the all-importance factor of personal responsibility (in an 
interview with Spotlight Magazine, on April 12, 1999). 
 
In the broader sense, the statement is true, as ownership and competition are two major 
factors affecting the efficiency of PEs. However, there is debate about whether it is the 
ownership or the competition that really matters. The experience to date is quite 
ambiguous. The performance of Canadian Railways tells us that it is irrelevant whether 
the enterprise is public or private; as long as it is in the competitive environment, both 
perform well. Experiences elsewhere tell us that ownership does matter in the 
privatisation drive (Manandhar, 1998:57), but the above statement does not address the 
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government’s social responsibility. The government cannot always evaluate PEs in terms 
of financial benefits/profits, as it has the social responsibility of providing goods and 
services to the people at an affordable price.    
4.1.2 Decision Making and Policy Characteristics 
What kinds of issues do decision makers consider when they assess possibilities for 
changing existing policies or organisational practices? Do they apply any criteria—
technical, political, ideological—to guide them toward certain choices? Decision-making 
situations are almost always complex, and clues about which choices to make tend to be 
numerous and conflicting. For any given decision, policy makers may be pushed in 
divergent directions by specific societal and bureaucratic interests, their own preferences 
and understanding of the issues involved, the historical and international context from 
which the problem has emerged, and a variety of other concerns and influences (Grindle 
and Thomas, 1991:95).     
 
The following table presents the criteria for choices about policy and institutional reform: 
Table 4.1.7: Criteria for Choices about Policy and Institutional Reform 
“Lenses” of Policy 
Elites 
Concerns influencing Decisions Influential Actors 
Technical advice 
 
Information, analyses, and options 
presented by advisors, experts 
Technocrats, ministers, and other high-
level bureaucrats; foreign advisors 
Bureaucratic 
 implications 
 
 
Career objectives of individuals; 
Competitive position of units; 
Budgets; Compliance and 
responsiveness  
Ministers and other high-level 
bureaucrats; Mid-level bureaucrats; 
International bureaucrats and Advisors 
 
Political stability and 
support 
Stability of political system; 
Calculated costs and benefits to 
groups, classes, interests; Military 
support or opposition 
Political leadership; Dominant 
economic elites; Leaders of class, 
ethnic, interest associations; military 
 
International pressure 
 
 
Access to aid; loans, trade relations 
 
IMF, World Bank, USAID, other 
multilateral or bilateral agencies; 
Governments of former colonial 
powers; International banks 
(Source: Grindle and Thomas 1991: 95) 
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According to this table, decision-making elites filter policy options through at least four 
lenses: the technical advice they receive, the impact of their choices on bureaucratic 
interactions, the meaning of potential changes for political stability and political support, 
and their concern about relationships with international actors. 
 
In Nepal’s case, having a detailed study of PEs, their performance, government 
investment in PEs and the returns from the investment, the reform initiatives have been in 
operation since the early ‘80s.  
 
In relation to the implementation of the privatisation policy in Nepal, three types of 
decisions are relevant, as stated by Askvik (2001:10): (i) legal decisions, which have to 
be passed by the parliament; (ii) program investment decisions are government decisions 
to allocate resources for planned development schemes; and (iii) administrative decisions 
are decisions to change the administrative system or create new organs. Since these three 
types of decisions are relevant in the discussion of the Nepalese privatisation policy, I 
have tried to do so in brief. In legal decisions, the privatisation white paper of 1991 and 
the Privatisation Act of 1994 will be discussed, along with their characteristics. 
Concerning program decisions, the government’s decision about privatisation during 
different plan periods, as well as the various strategies and policies, will be discussed in 
brief. Administrative decisions for implementing specific enterprises will be discussed in 
the latter part. 
A. Legal Decisions 
This category discusses primarily the policy paper on privatisation, released in 1991 by 
the then-government, and the Privatisation Act of 1994, which was passed by parliament. 
 
The Privatisation Policy (1991) (best known as Privatisation White Paper) 
As part of an overall program of liberalization of the economy in 1991, the newly elected 
government of Nepal made a major commitment to a comprehensive privatisation 
program of public enterprise. This represented a marked departure from the previous 
government policy of undertaking economic development with very little emphasis on 
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private sector development. This change in direction was underpinned by the policy 
paper on privatisation, which committed the government to giving the private sector 
ownership, operational control, and commercial freedom by minimising government 
interference in production, distribution, marketing and pricing. 
 
The government formed by the Nepali Congress Party brought out a phase-based 
program of privatisation with the objectives of:  
a. Reducing the financial and administrative burden on the government; 
b. improving operational efficiency; 
c. involving the participation of general public and the private sector in the 
management of public enterprises; and 
d. generating additional revenue (Sharma 1995). 
 
Since the government felt the need for broad economic reform, privatisation was 
considered as a major policy option. Due to the government’s determination to go ahead 
with the policy on the privatisation of PEs, a policy paper on privatisation was made 
public in 1991. 
 
The policy paper on the privatisation of public enterprises issued in 1991 stated that the 
majority of PEs were found to be operating unsatisfactorily. This problem, which was the 
responsibility of the government, was not conducive to the economic growth of the 
country. The government, with the hope of improving PEs under private sector 
management, adopted policy measures aimed at encouraging greater private sector 
participation. The policy assured minimal government interference in production, 
distribution and pricing in order to give the private sector maximum operational freedom. 
 
The white paper on privatisation policy recommended that the institutional arrangement 
of the privatisation program be divided into two categories. One is a high-level 
privatisation commission under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance, and the 
other is the technical committee under the chairmanship of the chief of the Corporation 
Coordination Division of the Ministry of Finance. The higher-level privatisation 
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commission was expected to set up priorities and design the privatisation program. In 
order to assist the commission, the technical committee was expected to conduct a review 
of public enterprises in order to identify and prioritise those that would be privatised. 
Thus, the commission was expected to be directly involved in actual privatisation 
activities. 
 
The industrial policy (1992) and the commercial policy (1992) also generated fertile 
ground for the smooth implementation of the privatisation policy. 
 
The Privatisation Act, 1994 
After the experience of the privatisation of three enterprises in 1992 (in the first phase) 
and one enterprise in 1993 (in the second phase), the Privatisation Act came into 
existence in 1994. The preamble of the act describes its objectives as follows: 
…In order to increase the productivity through enhancement of efficiency of the state-owned 
enterprises of the Kingdom of Nepal, and thereby mitigate the financial administrative burden to 
the government, and to usher in all-round economic development of the country by broadening 
the participation of private sector in the operation of such enterprises, it is expedient in the 
national interest to privatise such enterprises and to make arrangements there…(Preamble of the 
Privatisation Act 1994).  
Many provisions have been made in the act, such as the formulation of a privatisation 
committee; powers, functions and duties of the committee; committee meeting and 
decision procedure; publication of notice for privatisation; evaluation process of 
enterprise; determination of privatisation process; evaluation of the proposals; agreement 
to be concluded for privatisation; formation of sub-committees; settlement of disputes; 
provisions relating to employee; liquidation of enterprises; delegation of powers, etc. for 
smooth implementation of the policy in Nepal. 
B. Program Decisions 
A reform initiative in Nepal has to a large extent been channelled through the five years 
plans, which govern the long-term national allocation of resources. Since the sixth five-
year plan (1980-85), the role of the private sector in revitalising the economy has been 
recognised even though the involvement of the private sector was still in reality minimal. 
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In this sub-section, privatisation-related provisions (policies) adopted in different plan 
periods, especially from the Sixth to the Tenth Plan, will be briefly discussed. 
 
The Sixth Plan (1980-85): An Early Attempt at Privatisation 
During the course of the plan policy, in order to initiate the participation of the private 
sector in national economic development, a public enterprise policy was formulated. The 
policy clarified that enterprises with similar natures and objectives would be 
amalgamated. It further specified that enterprises that did not fall into government 
activities would be transferred to the private sector (NPC, 1980:31-32). In accordance 
with the plan policy, the necessary provisions and arrangements were made both for the 
sale of ownership and assets of selected enterprises to the private sector, and also the 
liquidation of selected enterprises. As a result, the government decided to liquidate eight 
rice-exporting companies in 1981. Moreover, the Sixth Plan provided for the ‘selling’ of 
unprofitable public enterprises, but its achievements were below expectations. During the 
plan period, two public enterprises, namely Chandeswori Textile Factory and Nepal 
Cheuri Ghee Plant, were sold to the private sector. 
 
Towards the end of the plan, the government announced two policy measures; the 
government intended to allow the market mechanism to perform its functions in a freer 
environment and the government intended to transfer public enterprises’ assets to the 
private sector. In pursuance of this objective, for the first time the government publicly 
announced its intention to divest assets of the state-owned enterprises in the FY 1985-86. 
 
The announcement can be viewed as a landmark in privatisation efforts. Moreover, with a 
view to achieving rapid economic development through well-managed industrial 
activities, the new Industrial Policy of 1981 was brought into effect, replacing the 
Industrial Policy of 1974. One of the policy-set objectives was to encourage private 
sector industrial investment as an element in the gross national product. The policy 
indeed assisted in preparing required initial environment for the privatisation movement 
in Nepal. In the process, shares in Rastriya Banijya Bank, Nepal Industrial Development 
Corporation and National Insurance Corporation were offered to the public at premium 
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prices; however the public’s response was very poor (CRPS 1995:11). From the total 
amount of shares on offer, only 4% were subscribed to. Thus, in this plan period, much 
had been promised to involve the private sector in the nation-building process but the 
results were not as expected.  
The Seventh Plan (1985-90) 
The Seventh Plan specified clearly that private sector participation in the management 
and investment of public enterprises would be encouraged and that a gradual transfer of 
ownership to them would be effected (NPC, 1985.13). It is evident that the plan laid 
down the function for implementing a privatisation program in the country. To this end, 
the government made the decision to privatise 12 PEs in a period of one year (NPC, 
1992:690). However, it could not materialise.   
 
The budget speech of the FY 1988-89 reflected the need to strengthen privatisation 
policy, outlining that “the policy adopted for the privatisation of public enterprises will be 
pursued in a planned way” (MOF, 1988). In the budget speech, the finance minister 
suggested different policy guidelines to achieve economic development, as mentioned in 
the budget speech. Among them three policy guidelines were directly related to the 
privatisation program, which were development of capital markets through financial 
sector investment, liberal policy to encourage private sector participation and 
encouragement of economic decentralisation and people’s participation (Manandhar, 
1989). 
 
In the year 1988, the government took the decision to sell 49% of shares of Birgunj Sugar 
Mill. The government also made an attempt to sell Balaju Textile Industry to a single 
buyer. But it could not be sold due to the lack of proper valuation of the business and its 
assets. Furthermore, efforts to privatise Himal Cement Company also failed due to public 
protest and partly due to the reluctance of the private parties. In the case of Himal 
Cement Company, the public raised doubts regarding the intention of the government, as 
the company was supposed to be transferred to a business kingpin (Joshi, 1991 in The 
Rising Nepal). It has therefore been indicated that the policy of privatisation needs to be 
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reviewed, and the management and environment for launching privatisation programs 
needs to be urged to be strengthened and reconsidered. 
 
In 1989, the government planned to privatise 50% of shares of 30 PEs and to form a 
privatisation committee (NPC, 1992:690). In accordance with the plan, in 1989 the shares 
of Nepal Metal Company were floated to the public at Rs.10 par value per share; however 
the result was well below expectations. In the same year, a privatisation cell was created 
within the Ministry of Finance. The committee prepared a draft white paper, which 
included programs relating to privatisation. It was submitted to the government but no 
action was taken regarding the direction of privatisation. It can be said that due to 
incomplete and faulty preparations and also the lack of necessary determination, efforts 
made towards privatisation in the past have been unsuccessful (Ibid). 
 
As a result of the people’s movement, the multiparty democratic system was reinstated in 
Nepal in 1990. The new constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal of 1990 embodied a new 
mindset. The constitution created an environment for adopting the economic 
liberalisation policy on one hand and initiating private sector participation in economic 
activities on the other. 
The Eighth Plan (1992-1997) 
The Eighth Plan came up with a determination both to adopt the privatisation program on 
a large scale and strengthen public sector enterprises. The plan formulated various 
policies on privatisation, some of which were as follows: 
a. A long-term strategy on privatisation would be devised. Corporations of an 
industrial and business nature would be gradually privatised. All policies and 
programs relating to privatisation would be made transparent. 
b. In the process of privatisation of corporations or in implementing efficiency-
enhancing programs, the current employees would be included as far as possible, 
but if the numbers of employees/labourers were higher than necessary, they would 
be removed only after providing adequate compensation. 
c. The privatisation of PEs would be undertaken in groups such as those being 
privatised immediately, those to be privatised after a certain period of time or 
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those to be privatised after restructuring in the long term. Necessary improvement 
programs would be launched for those corporations to be privatised later and not 
to be privatised at all.  
d. Legal basis would be prepared for the privatisation of corporations. Those 
corporations, established through special legal provisions, would be handed over 
through the company law and be privatised. 
e. To privatise and to increase the efficiency in corporations, a central unit would be 
formed. This unit would conduct all the works relating to privatisation with the 
supports of concerned ministries (NPC, 1992, the Eighth Plan). 
The plan also specified that programs relating to privatisation include the selection of 
corporations to be privatised considering the factors, such as public importance, financial 
capacity, and market guarantee. At the same time, those corporations which could not 
feasibly be privatised and also lack sufficient ground to function as corporations were to 
be closed down. With regard to the extent of privatisation, the plan also stated that the 
nature and problems of corporations would be studied extensively and then it would be 
decided whether they were to be fully sold. The government’s role would be minimised 
when selling shares and only the management would be handed over. ‘The method of 
privatisation will be decided keeping in view the needs of each corporation based on the 
economic condition, the market factor, the employment number and the investment 
potentiality.” In order to launch the programs as provisioned in the plan document, a legal 
basis as well as framework was of utmost importance. 
 
In relation to implementation, the plan should be regarded as successful in comparison to 
other plans as far as the objectives met. During the plan period a total of 15 PEs were 
privatised and the legal provisions were set up by enacting the Privatisation Act of 1994. 
 
The Ninth Plan (1997-2002) 
The Ninth Plan set the following objectives of privatisation: 
• to increase the effectiveness and production of government resources through 
efficient utilisation; 
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• to make the government gradually assume the role of facilitator by encouraging 
and motivating the private sector for participation in economic development; 
• to help maintain economic stability by enforcing financial discipline and relieving 
the government progressively from the burden of financing corporation deficit; 
• to promote the participation of common people in the economic development by 
means of participation (NPC, 1998:184). 
 
Policy and Implementation Strategy of the Ninth Plan 
In order to attain the objectives set by the plan, various policies and implementation 
strategies have been offered. The major policies and implementation strategies are 
identified as follows: 
• The process would be pushed ahead by adopting the appropriate modality so as to 
ensure a fair opportunity for all the investors. 
• While selecting a corporation, it would be assessed properly, applying various 
criteria, and detailed analysis would be carried out to determine the priority based 
on the study of timing, sequencing and pace of privatisation. 
• The selection of the investor would be made only after the careful assessment of 
the business and technical resources, skills knowledge and experience, the 
business plan, etc. 
• To ensure that the government gets a fair price from privatisation, arrangements 
would be made to provide the prospective investor with all relevant information 
about the enterprise. All relevant information about the business value of the 
enterprise, the value of its assets, its strengths and prospects would be widely 
disseminated in the public. 
• Foreign investment would be encouraged in some corporations requiring a huge 
amount of capital and modern technology. 
• A clear policy and approach would be evolved to protect the interests and rights 
of the employees as well as to determine the other necessary compensation to be 
given to them while privatising government corporations. 
• Monitoring of the privatised enterprises would be undertaken in the post-
privatisation phase.  
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• Measures would be taken to promote the private sector by keeping the door open 
for investment, enacting appropriate laws and by-laws and executing them. And,  
• Necessary amendments, based on experiences of the past and long-term 
perspective, would be made to the existing Privatisation Act to improve its 
effectiveness, etc. (Ibid: 184-186). 
Within the conceptual framework, to achieve the set objectives the plan has envisaged 
privatising 30 different PEs during the Ninth Plan, based on the findings of the studies 
(Ibid: 186). In the case of the enterprises remaining in the public sector for the time 
being, various improvement programs should be initiated so as to optimise the utilisation 
of available resources and capabilities. However, only one enterprise—Nepal Tea 
Development Corporation—was privatised during this plan period, which clearly 
indicates the implementation deficit. It showed the total failure in terms of 
implementation, as only one enterprise among 30 has been privatised. It also proved that 
formulating sound policies alone would not be enough, if one could not put into action 
the promise made through the policy paper (implementation).  
 
The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) 
The objective of the Tenth Plan was to make the economy vibrant, dynamic and 
competitive by promoting the private sector and creating a conducive environment for 
privatising the public enterprises that did not need to be retained in state ownership and 
management (NPC, 2002: 85). The quantitative target of the plan was that “at least 15 
enterprises will be privatised and handed over to the private sector within the plan period 
through privatisation of a minimum of 3 enterprises per annum inclusive of those which 
could not be privatised during the Ninth Plan” (Ibid:86). 
Strategy: 
1. The nature of activity, scope, status of financial transaction, need for additional 
investment, etc. would be the basis for the privatisation of the PEs. In the process, 
extensive participation would be encouraged to make privatisation competitive and 
transparent. 
2. Even those enterprises which have to be maintained under the public sector would 
be operated on the commercial principles. 
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The government has identified dual policies in relation to the above strategies in this plan 
period, which are as follows:  
1. Making the process of privatisation competitive and transparent (related to 
strategy 1).  
2. The public enterprises that need to be retained within the ownership and 
management of the government would be run on commercial principles (related to 
strategy 2). 
The government further elaborated how it would perform the privatisation of PEs during 
the Tenth Plan period by learning from past experience.  To make the privatisation 
process competitive and transparent, the government would carry out the following 
activities: 
• Priority would be given to privatising public enterprises in competitive areas that 
could attract the attention of the private sector. 
• Enterprises deemed unnecessary to be operated under public sector and failed to 
attract the private sector would be liquidated. 
• General public would be informed through regular monitoring of the works in 
progress about the compliance / non-compliance of the conditions of the 
agreements made that affect the privatisation negotiations of a given public 
enterprise. They would also be informed about whether or not the necessary 
goods and services have been made appropriately available after the privatisation 
of those enterprises. 
• Improvements would be made to the process of privatisation by resorting to 
promoting wider participation of the public as much as possible (Ibid). 
Likewise, the PEs which need to be retained under government ownership and 
management would be run on a commercial basis as follows: 
• Through continuation of the development of a competitive environment, which 
has been initiated in areas like drinking water, electricity and telecommunication, 
the necessary regulatory machinery would be developed for the public enterprises 
in these sectors to promote investment from private sectors. 
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• Foreign investment would be promoted in those feasible enterprises that are 
considered a national priority and can bring in foreign capital as well as modern 
technology. 
• Public enterprises would be encouraged to operate commercially by allowing 
them to be autonomous. 
The objectives, strategies, major activities and risk factors can be summarised in the 
following table: 
Table 4.1.8: Summary of the Tenth Plan on Privatisation  
Objective Strategies Indicators Information 
Sources 
Major Programs Risk factor 
and 
Hindrance 
Management 
and 
privatisation 
of public 
enterprises 
 
# To push forward the 
process of 
privatisation in 
competitive 
environment. 
# Not to support 
monopoly in any 
circumstances during 
the process of 
privatisation. 
# To create share 
ownership on broad 
base 
# Enterprises if 
conducted by 
government will be 
conducted 
commercially. 
 
# Quantitative 
increase in 
number of 
shareholders. 
# Privatisation 
of 15 
enterprises 
during the plan 
period, with at 
least 3 per 
year. 
 
# Report of 
Privatisation 
unit of 
Ministry of 
Finance. 
# Write-ups 
and reviews 
on 
privatisation 
by experts. 
 
# To conduct programs 
related to the evaluation of 
institution to be privatised, 
protection of employee 
interest, study and analysis of 
returns etc through 
government investment. 
# To make arrangements to 
empower commission that 
studies the procedure of 
privatisation and work 
efficiency of corporations. 
# To formulate essential 
programs by the privatisation 
unit for the 
privatisation of the 
enterprises on the basis of 
priority and to monitor them. 
# Entrance and 
release of 
time-relevant 
labour. 
# Concern of 
assistance 
provider in 
privatisation 
of institutions 
constructed 
through 
foreign 
assistance 
 
(Source: NPC 2002: 107) 
The Tenth Plan is currently being implemented (2002-2007) so an evaluation of its 
effectiveness could not be carried out. However, there are some positive results in terms 
of implementation that are encouraging regarding the plan’s achievements. At the same 
time, recent political developments in the country, combined with other factors regarded 
as negative for overall economic development, may hinder the plan’s achievements in the 
years to come.  
C. Administrative Decisions 
In order to carry out the privatisation program smoothly, the government created a 
Privatisation Cell under the Corporation Coordination Division at the Ministry of Finance 
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in 1989. The government also formed a privatisation committee in the same year. After 
issuing the policy paper on privatisation in 1991, the Privatisation Commission and the 
Privatisation Cell have become more powerful and responsible for the implementation of 
privatisation policy. As outlined in the policy paper, the government formed a 
privatisation commission under the chairmanship of the finance minister. Likewise a 
technical committee, evaluation committee etc were also formed. After enactment of the 
Privatisation Act in 1994, all administrative decisions were made within the jurisdiction 
of the act, whereby the government took decisions on the recommendation of the 
privatisation committee whether to privatise the PEs. Many decisions were therefore 
made individually (case by case) to privatise various enterprises. 
4.1.3 The Implementation Arena 
The implementation arena is where policy decisions are transferred into administrative 
practice. Normally, when a policy decision has been made, an administrative body is 
given responsibility for its implementation. This implies a process where the decision in 
question is interpreted and carried out by others than those who made the decision. As the 
implementation literature illustrates, this kind of processes can often be quite complex 
depending upon the character of the decision and those mandated to put it into practice. 
The latter may for instance disagree with the decision, they may misinterpret it, or they 
may lack the competence or financial resources to implement it (Askvik, 2001:13-14). 
 
Grindle and Thomas emphasise in their analysis that when a policy decision has been 
made, some kind of opposition is likely to occur, either in the public or in the 
bureaucratic arena. The success of its implementation will eventually depend upon the 
political, financial, managerial and technical resources at the disposal of the decision 
makers (Ibid).  
 
In the implementation process political, financial, managerial and technical resources are 
likely to be needed to sustain the reform. Mobilising these resources is part of the 
challenge to decision makers as those opposing the policy change may attempt to block 
access to the necessary resources. The Nepalese government encountered many 
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challenges concerning financial, managerial and technical resources. The policy has been 
implemented based on the funds provided by the donor agencies. UNDP assistance was 
requested for the exercise and, with the World Bank as executing agency, UNDP was 
approved to support the government in its privatisation effort (Peacock, 1992:16). At the 
same time many other donors are also supporting the program but they are threatening the 
government by showing their dissatisfaction at the implementation of the policy. For 
example, The Department for International Development (DFID), the British 
government’s international development agency and a major donor in Nepal’s 
privatisation project, warned the government to withdraw its assistance from the project 
if the government failed to show a clear commitment to the privatisation process (The 
Kathmandu Post, January 10, 2001). Grindle and Thomas argued that in some cases, 
donors’ interest in being associated with a visible change may be great enough that policy 
makers have the opportunity to negotiate and bargain successfully among them for 
substantial financial responses (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:147). Thus the challenge for 
managing financial resources is a crucial factor for policy implementation. In Nepal’s 
case there was inadequate training and the staffs were not technically skilled. The 
Privatisation Cell lacks qualified permanent staff. Few personnel are there to perform 
privatisation-related tasks and lack technical knowledge. Managing financial, managerial 
and technical resources therefore is a challenge for the successful implementation of the 
privatisation policy in Nepal. 
 
In Nepal’s case, the opposition/obstacles will be shown in the next sub-section (in 4.2). In 
the rest of this sub-section, the general implementation of the privatisation program in 
different phases in Nepal will be discussed in brief. Although the case study will be 
conducted in the following chapter, a general outline of implementation will be given as 
follows. 
A. The First Phase of Privatisation 
In the first phase of the privatisation program, the government decided to privatise three 
PEs, based on the outcome of a joint study by the International Development Association 
(IDA) mission and the government. As per the study, three enterprises were selected from 
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six. The selection of the enterprises to be privatised by and large depended upon the 
following elements: 
(a) Commercial viability of the enterprises, (b) Competition from the private sector, 
(c) Impact on labour, (d) Political obstacles, (e) Investor interest, and (f) Possibility of 
successful privatisation (Sharma, 1995:61). 
 
As it was the first ever privatisation in the country, and the Privatisation Bill was under 
consideration, the privatisation process centred around the high-level Privatisation 
Committee. A small and compact Privatisation Cell was centralised for all the 
responsibilities of the process. The Council of Ministers was the decision-making 
authority for selecting enterprises and for final sales. 
Enterprises privatised in the first phase are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 4.1.9: Enterprises Privatised in the First Phase 
Name of Enterprises Types Main Activities 
Modality & 
privatisation 
proceed 
Year 
of Sale 
Sale 
Proceed 
(in 
Rs.’000) 
1. Bhrikuti Pulp and 
Paper Factory 
Manufacturing Paper 
production 
Business and 
Asset Sale 
21st Oct. 
1992 
229800 
2. Bansbari 
Leatherage Ltd. 
 
Manufacturing Processed 
Leather and 
Shoes 
Business and 
Asset Sale 
23rd 
March, 
1992 
29854 
3. Harisiddhi Bricks 
and Tiles Factory 
Manufacturing Bricks and 
Tiles 
Business and 
Asset Sale 
30th 
Oct. 
1992 
214830 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, Ministry of Finance) 
In the first phase, the government adopted the modality of assets and business sales in all 
three enterprises. 
B. The Second Phase 
As the government implemented the first phase of the privatisation program, it desired a 
long-term privatisation program considering the strengths and weaknesses from past 
experience. In accordance with the policy guidelines provided by the Eighth Plan and the 
privatisation policy issued in 1991, the long-term privatisation program was implemented 
to cover all public enterprises with regard to planned and phase- wise manner. 
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The high-level Privatisation Committee recommended that 27 PEs be privatised based on 
the long-term privatisation program and the recommendation of the Privatisation Cell 
with due considerations. The Council of Ministers decided to privatise all suitable 
candidates in five phases and continue with the enterprise reform and restructuring 
wherever possible (Sharma, 1995:86). The Council of Ministers decided to privatise 14 
PEs by September, 1994. As part of the second phase of the privatisation program, five 
public enterprises were privatised by June, 1994 and two were liquidated. Those 
enterprises are presented in the following table: 
Table 4.1.10: Enterprises Privatised in the Second Phase 
Name of Enterprises Types Main Activities 
Modality & 
privatisation 
proceed 
Year of 
Sale 
Sale 
Proceed 
(in 
Rs.’000)
1. Nepal Film 
Development Company 
Processing 
 
 
Film 
Production 
and Process 
Share Sale 
 
 
11th 
Nov. 
1993 
64662 
 
 
2. Nepal Lube Oil Ltd. Manufacturing 
 
Lubricant 
Production 
Share Sale 
 
5th June 
1994 
31057 
 
3. Nepal Bitumin and 
Barrel Industries Ltd. 
Manufacturing 
 
Bitumin & 
Emulsion 
Production 
Share Sale 21st June 
1994 
13127 
 
 
4. Balaju Textile Industry Manufacturing 
 
Textile 
Production 
Share Sale 
 
2nd Dec. 
1993 
17716 
 
5. Raw Hide Collection & 
Dev. Company 
Trading Collection 
and Supply 
Share Sale 14th Dec. 
1993 
3990 
- 
6. Tobacco Development 
Company 
Trading 
 
Promotion 
 
Liquidation 
 
1994 
 
- 
7. Nepal Jute 
Development &Trading 
Company 
Trading Promotion Liquidation 1993  
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
While 14 enterprises were proposed for privatisation in the second phase, only five were 
privatised and two were liquidated. This was due mainly to the change in policy, which 
was a consequence of a change in the government. Unlike the first phase, all PEs were 
privatised through a method of share sale, except two liquidated enterprises. It is evident 
that the government was mindful of the criticism it received in the first phase due to 
adopting the asset sale method, so during the second phase it changed tack and utilised 
only the share sale method and liquidation.  
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C .The Third Phase 
The privatisation policy gathered momentum once again on the basis of national needs 
and social justice. Committed to transparency in the process, the policy also considered 
the rights, interests and welfare of labourers. The following table shows the PEs 
privatised in the third phase from March 1996 to August 1997, through various modes. 
Table 4.1.11: Enterprises Privatised in the Third Phase 
Name of Enterprises Types Main Activities 
Modality 
& 
privatisat
ion 
proceed 
Year of 
Sale 
Sale 
Procee
d (in 
Rs.’000
) 
1. Nepal Foundry 
Industry 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
Cast Iron, Tools 
Spare Parts, 
Production 
Share Sale 
 
 
25th March 
1996 
 
14473 
 
 
2. Raghupati Jute Mills 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Jute Processing & 
Production 
Share Sale 
 
14 Aug. 
1996 
82204 
 
3. Biratnagar Jute Mills 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Jute Processing & 
Production 
Manageme
nt Contract 
19 Dec. 
1996 
NA 
 
4. Nepal Bank Ltd. 
 
Banking 
 
Banking 
Operation 
Share Sale 
 
3rd March 
1997 
125140 
 
5. Agriculture Tools 
Factory Ltd. 
Manufacturing 
 
Agr. Tools 
Production 
Share Sale 
 
30th May, 
1997 
95100 
 
6. Bhaktapur Brick 
Factory Ltd. 
Manufacturing Brick Production Lease 11th Aug. 
1997 
20300 
(for 10 
years) 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
Of the above privatised enterprises, Biratnagar Jute Mills was given to the private party 
on a five-year management contract on the condition that all standing obligations would 
be honoured by the new management. Bhaktapur Brick Factory Ltd. was given on lease 
for 10 years. Shares of Nepal Foundry Industry, Raghupati Jute Mills and Agriculture 
Tools Factory Ltd. were sold to the management and public through tenders. The share of 
Nepal Bank Ltd. was partially sold to the public and the employees of the bank itself. In 
this phase also the government refrained from using the assets sale modality. In addition 
to the methods of second phase, lease and management contract methods were also 
introduced. 
D. Privatisation after 1997 
Although the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) set the objective of privatising 30 PEs during the 
plan period, only one—Nepal Tea Development Corporation—has been privatised. This 
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is mainly due to the political instability in the country where none of the government was 
keen to privatise the PEs according to the set objectives. During this plan period and 
beyond, the following PEs were privatised through equity sale, assets sale and liquidation 
(MoF, 2004: 140). 
Table 4.1.12: Enterprises Privatised after 1997 
Name of Enterprises Types Main Activities 
Modality 
& 
privatisat
ion 
proceed 
Year 
of 
Sale 
Sale 
Proceed (in 
Rs.’000) 
1. Nepal Tea Development 
Corporation 
Manufacturing 
 
Tea production 
and sales 
Equity sale 
and lease 
June 
2000 
267105 
 
2. Agriculture Project 
Services Center Ltd.  
Service 
 
Research and 
service 
Liquidation 
 
2001 - 
3. Cottage Handicraft Sale 
Emporium Ltd.  
Trading 
 
Sales Liquidation 
 
2002 - 
4. Nepal Coal Ltd. Trading Sales Liquidation 2002 - 
5. Hetauda Textile Industry 
Ltd.  
Manufacturing Textile 
production 
Liquidation 
 
2002 - 
6. Nepal Transport 
Corporation 
Service transportation Dissolved 
 
2002 - 
7. Butwal Power Co.   Power 
generation and 
distribution 
Equity sale 2003 874.2 million 
+ 1 mil. US $ 
8. Birjung Sugar Factory 
Ltd. 
Manufacturing Sugar 
production 
Liquidation 
 
2003 - 
9. Agriculture Tools 
Factory Ltd.* 
Manufacturing 
 
Agr. Tools 
Production 
Liquidation 
 
2003 - 
10. Bhaktpur Brick 
Factory** 
Manufacturing Brick 
Production 
Assets and 
Business 
sale 
2004 14.5 (asset 
sale) + 31.9 
(rent/10 
years) 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
(* This company was firstly privatised by share sale but due to the breach of the contract the 
government withdrew and later liquidated.) 
(** This company was firstly privatised by lease in 1997 but due to the breach of the contract the 
government withdrew and later privatised by selling the assets and business.)  
Of 10 PEs, most were either liquidated or dissolved during this period, except Nepal Tea 
Development Corporation, which was leased out, and Butwal Power Company, of which 
equity shares were sold. Similarly, recently Bhaktpur Brick Factory was privatised 
through the selling of its assets and renting the land for ten years. The government has 
privatised 24 PEs so far, applying various modalities comprising about 39% of the total 
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PEs. Nepal Resin and Turpentine Ltd. and Himal Cement Company are currently in the 
process of privatisation.  
 
4.2 Opposition/Obstacles during the Implementation Process 
 
In Nepal’s case the opposition to privatisation will be shown in two categories—private 
and party-oriented differences. In the first part of this sub-section, some opposition from 
the general public, which was shown in the implementation phases by challenging the 
government’s decision in the Supreme Court of Nepal, will be discussed4. In the second 
part, major political parties’ opinions on privatisation will be discussed. 
4.2.1 Opposition from the General Public 
Advocate Bal Krishna Neupane Vs. HMG and others5 
During the first phase of privatisation three PEs, namely BPM, HBTF and BLSF, were 
privatised by applying the ‘assets sale’ method. Following the process it was alleged that 
there was low valuation of assets. Meanwhile, a writ petition was filed in the Supreme 
Court of Nepal by advocate Bal Krishna Neupane naming HMG et al against the 
decisions that enabled the privatisation of the three PEs. The writ petitioner charged that 
HMG privatised these PEs in the absence of authority to privatise (during that period, the 
Privatisation Act had not been enacted). HMG was also charged with improper valuation 
of assets, providing foreigners with the opportunity to participate at the cost of the 
Nepalese. Additionally, there was seen to be an undue affiliation between HMG and 
businessmen. 
 
The respondents (the government) of the case strongly opposed the petition, stating that 
there was no proof that the government violated the existing rules and regulations. The 
government contended that there was proper valuation carried out by experts. The case 
remained sub judice in the Supreme Court for about 5 years. Finally, the Division Bench 
of the Supreme Court rejected the writ petition unanimously. Some of the ratio decidendi 
followed in the verdict were as follows: 
                                                 
4 The discussion of those cases is based on Mishra (1999) 
5 NKP, (2054 (1998)), Decision No. 6396, SC/N, PP 335-345. 
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1. There was no prima facie evidence of undue affiliation between politicians 
and businessmen in the course of privatisation,  
2. HMG is entitled to sell its assets subject to legal provisions, 
3. Though the action of challenged privatisation was held in the absence of 
privatisation law, the privatisation law was enacted to regulate the steps of 
privatisation. 
4. There seemed to be no possibility of repeating such controversial irregularities 
immediately by the government. 
Result: SC quashed the petition. 
The above stated decision of the SC/N has been criticised strongly by scholars. The 
decision enabled HMG to action arbitrarily. In any case, through this decision the 
program of privatisation has received recognition and a declaration of validity by the 
highest court of the nation. This declaration of validity has served to make it more 
concrete. 
Ram Prasad Bhattarai vs. HMG Cabinet Secretariat and others6 
The facts of the case were: HMG privatised the Nepal Jute Development and Trading 
Company through liquidation. Later the assets of the liquidated company were transferred 
to the Agriculture Input Corporation and Nepal Agriculture Research Center. The Service 
Regulation of the workers and employees had guaranteed service up to the age of 65. The 
petitioner, an aggrieved employee, challenged HMG/N's decision to liquidate the 
company on the grounds of lacking authority. As an alternative plea he demanded the 
government shift his service to one of the institutions that acquired the assets of the 
liquidated company. 
 
The respondents denied fulfilling the demand forwarded by the petitioner, by stating the 
causes, inter alia, the presence of authority of HMG to liquidate and non-legal obligation 
to shift the service of the petitioner as demanded. 
Based on the following ratio decidendi SC/N quashed the petition: 
                                                 
6 NKP, (2053- (1997)), Decision No. 6021, SC/N, PP 495-502. 
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1. The Corporation Act of 1965 empowers HMG to liquidate the company. 
No legal fault is found while liquidating the loss running enterprise; 
2. HMG is entitled to transfer assets of liquidated company to others after 
having it under control,  
3. No legal provision has been made to shift the service of the employees of 
the liquidated company to other corporations. 
 
Hence, the SC/N has settled various cases filed in relation to privatisation. The nature of 
the decisions are based on the facts of the particular case. Therefore, based on the facts, 
various principles have been propounded. In both decisions, SC/N has strongly supported 
the tendency toward privatisation.  
 
The Supreme Court of Nepal has delivered verdicts in various ways but most of them are 
in favour of privatisation and the voices of opposition of the public challenging the 
government’s decisions, especially on implementation issues, have not been endorsed by 
the court. 
 
Regarding whether there were conflicts during the implementation of the policy 
between/among different actors, 43% of the respondents expressed that there were 
conflicts but did not specify what exactly the conflicts were, while 15% expressed that 
there were not and 42% expressed that they did not know. The majority of respondents 
who were directly or indirectly involved in the implementation process expressed that 
there were conflicts during the implementation phase. There was conflict within the 
privatisation committee itself, though this was not a very bad case (i.e. during the 30th, 
31st, 32nd and 36th meeting of the privatisation committee held in July 1998, August 1998, 
August 1999 and Jan.2001 respectively, one of the committee members expressed his 
dissatisfaction and wrote a note of dissent about the committee decision, which caused 
the delay of the privatisation process in some PEs, which were in the pipeline of 
privatisation - minutes of the privatisation committee, Privatisation Cell, MoF). There 
was also conflict between/among the employees and management of the company who 
 83
were against the privatisation and tried to block the process. The following table shows 
the number of the respondents and the frequency: 
 
Table 4.2.1: Conflicts During the Implementation Phase 
 Frequency  
Percent 
 
Yes 58 43 
No 21 15 
Don’t Know/ No 
Comment 57 42 
Total 136 100 
(Source: Sub Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The second largest majority of respondents did not know whether there were conflicts or 
not. This shows that there was not full transparency in the process. On the issue of 
transparency, results of the empirical data are shown below: 
 
Table 4.2.2: Level of Transparency during the Privatisation Process 
 Frequency Percent 
Good 8 6 
Average 55 41 
Poor 54 40 
Don’t know 18 13 
Total 135 100 
(Source: Sub Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The above table clearly shows that the majority of respondents (about 41%) expressed 
that the process was moderately transparent while 40% said that the process was poorly 
transparent. Only 6% found the level of transparency to be good, whereas 13% did not 
know. The above result proved that the government should implement the policy in a 
fully transparent way. 
4.2.2 Opinion of the Major Political Parties on Privatisation 
The opinion of the major political parties represented in parliament is presented here. The 
opinions noted here are based on the papers presented in the “Workshop on need of 
conceptual and policy consensus among major political parties on privatisation” 
organised by the SCOPE in Kathmandu on 28 Feb. 1997; respective parties’ election 
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manifestos of 1994 and 1999 parliamentary elections; published articles in various 
newspapers and magazines; and personal interviews of the leaders of the parties. 
4.2.2.1 Opinion of the Nepali Congress Party (NC)7 
Nepali Congress Party has shown a firm belief in the efficient use of resources for the 
broader welfare of the people. If efficiently used, any of the sectors should be allowed to 
be involved in the economic activities—be they public, private and/or non-government 
sector. So, if the private sector can use resources more efficiently and productively, the 
government can afford to play the role of facilitator, guiding the private sector and 
working toward macro-economic stability. Only by creating an atmosphere for active 
private sector participation can Nepal attract the required domestic and foreign 
investment, and privatisation is a step towards achieving this end. 
 
Nepali Congress Party places emphasis upon the following aspects in the process of 
privatisation: 
• Transparency and accountability. 
• Forms of privatisation (dissolving, total sale, management contract, leasing, 
partial sale, etc.) to be spelt out clearly and transparently. 
                                                 
7 Opposition party that was split in 2002 which was also in power when the privatisation policy was 
formulated in 1991-1994. 
 
The Nepali Congress (NC) was formed in exile in India as a result of the merger of Nepali National 
Congress and Nepali Democratic Congress. Since its inception in January 1947 Nepali Congress has 
occupied a pivotal position in the annals of contemporary politics of Nepal. Its original objectives were: 
 
• To raise political consciousness of the people to overthrow the century-old Rana rule as a 
precondition for the liquidation of feudalism. 
• To establish a democratic system of government with a constitutional monarchy. 
• The Nepali Congress adopted democratic socialism in 1956 as a principle for social 
transformation. 
 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the NC has been waging a ceaseless struggle using both peaceful 
and armed means. In the course of its struggle the NC has gone through several ups and downs, trials and 
tribulations (http://www.nepalicongress.org.np/contents accessed on 20 July 2005). 
 
The party summarises its ideology as: “Nationalism, Democracy, Socialism and Constitutional Monarchy”.  
Although the NC’s core ideology is Socialism, since coming to power in the 1990s the party has 
implemented liberal economic policies such as the privatisation of state-owned enterprises.  
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• No displacement of existing employees as far as possible, if at all, adequate 
compensation need to be arranged. 
• Clear statement on the provision for foreign investment, to be emphasised 
particularly if heavy investment and/or new technology are required.  
• Valuation by assessing asset value, business value, image of the PEs under 
consideration, etc. 
• Criteria for selecting investors, on the basis of proposed management plan of the 
investors, their credibility and experiences, financial position, management 
capability, etc. 
• Terms and conditions for the employees who continue working. 
• Regulations to prevent monopoly. 
• Effective monitoring to ensure contract obligations are followed. 
• Terms and conditions of the contract, etc. 
This party feels that the existing process incorporates many of these features, which need 
to be strengthened and the public need to be educated (SCOPE 1997:11-12). 
 
Likewise, the party once again emphasised its commitment to privatisation in its election 
manifesto of 1999’s parliamentary election. The party confirmed that “economic 
activities and industrialisation will be developed to create employment. The party will 
review its liberal economic policy and involve the private, non-governmental and 
cooperative sectors in economic activities. All remaining obstacles to national and 
foreign investment will be removed. Poorly performing state-owned enterprises with 
potential will be privatised” (Keeling, 2000:16; NCP, 1999). 
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4.2.2.2 Opinion of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-UML)8  
This party feels that privatisation is not an essential feature for the development of the 
country that it has instead been thrust upon the country by the World Bank institutions in 
the name of liberalisation of the economy and as a part of the structural adjustment loan. 
At the same time, it also acknowledges that privatisation enhances the efficiency of 
business units. So if any PE is operating at a profit and exhibits business efficiency, there 
is no need to privatise such units. Thus, instead of taking privatisation as a general feature 
of a liberal economic policy, it should be seen as an isolated economic policy to privatise 
PEs if they: 
• Reduce government expenditure; however care should be taken not to include PEs 
having social responsibility and working for human welfare; 
• Increase government revenue; 
• Increase GDP by enhancing production, investment and plant capacity; 
• Do not encourage monopoly and/or cartel after privatisation; 
• Give adequate share of ownership to Nepali citizens, employees and workers; 
                                                 
8 Main opposition party which was in power in 1994-1995 
  
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was founded on 22nd April, 1949 during the people's struggle 
against the autocratic feudal Rana regime. The CPN was founded by the revolutionaries to wage the 
people's struggle and to establish a new democratic system in the country. From the inception of the party, 
different views emerged in the party line which split the party into different factions. The increasing 
disputes in the international communist movement further fostered party division. Various groups appeared 
in different parts of the country.  
 
 The unification process gradually gained momentum. After the establishment of the multi-party system in 
1990, the CPN (M-L) and CPN (M) unified as the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
(CPN - UML) - in January 1991. 
 
The Fifth National Congress of the CPN (UML) was held in January, 1993 in Kathmandu, which was a 
milestone in the history of the communist movement of Nepal. The Congress adopted the People's Multi-
Party Democracy as the political program of the Nepalese revolution, which was propounded by Comrade 
Madan Bhandari. The Party is firmly committed to nationalism, democracy, equality and justice and to 
enhance the progress and prosperity of the people. The Party upholds the principles of socialism and 
pursues the road of People's Multi-Party Democracy, which is a creative application of Marxism and 
Leninism in Nepal. Consolidation of democracy, strengthening people's sovereign rights, changing socio-
economic relations and accelerating economic development in the country are the major concerns of the 
Party. Periodical election and the government of the majority, pluralism, rule of law, human rights are other 
important elements of the People's Multi-Party Democracy. Economically self-sustained society, quality 
education and health service, full employment and social security are also important features of the Party 
program aiming to achieve the welfare state (http://www.cpnuml.org/ideology.html accessed on 25 July 
2005).   
 
 87
• Generate employment and provide such opportunities to Nepali citizens; and 
• Do not issue unusual rises in price. 
The implementation of privatisation policy should not stop the operation of other PEs and 
should not prevent the establishment of new PEs, in case there is a need for them 
(SCOPE 1997: 10). 
 
Likewise, in its 1999 election manifesto, the party stressed the following points regarding 
foreign capital and privatisation: 
• Ensure the productive use of foreign capital for high economic growth and 
technological development: by mobilising foreign assistance as per national 
priorities, maximising the use of local resources and human power, promoting 
private sector investment and monitoring any activities that adversely affect 
national unity, religious harmony or social justice. 
• Selectively privatise public institutions: by reassessing the privatisation policy, 
conducting selective privatisation, making public enterprises autonomous, whilst 
keeping in mind the rights and welfare of employees (Keeling, 2000:20 and CPN 
UML, 1999). 
The faction of the party (CPN ML) during the election period in 1999 indicated that it 
would abandon any policies in the name of liberalisation and privatisation that are 
detrimental to the nation and its economy. However, the faction could not win a seat in 
the parliamentary election and later merged with the mainstream CPN UML. 
4.2.2.3 Opinion of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)9  
                                                 
9 Fourth largest party in parliament  
Background of the Party 
Two Rastriya Prajatantra Parties: RPP (Thapa) and RPP (Chand) came into being on May 29, 1990; 
however they agreed to make a joint party in 1994. The party was formed primarily by supporters of the 
previous party (Panchayat before 1990) - best known as ‘Panchas’ in an open environment and multi-party 
political system in the country.  
 
RPP is based on four broad principles: Multi-party Democracy, Constitutional Monarchy, Liberalism and 
Nationalism. By liberalism, RPP mean the protection of people’s individual freedom from state 
intervention. Thus, human rights and the rule of law are rooted in the thoughts propounded by John Stuart 
Mill, John Locke, among others. These four principles are like four pillars of a table; RPP wouldn’t be able 
to stand if one of these pillars were shortened (http://www.rppnepal.com/channels/history.htm accessed on 
26 July 2005).  
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Privatisation is an inherent feature of the liberal economic policy, believing that the 
government is not a producer; producers are farmers and labourers. The government, 
therefore, should concentrate its efforts only in those areas where such producers are not 
involved. Hence, this party claims explicitly that activating other sectors does not 
necessarily weaken the government. By recognising the duality in the economy in terms 
of rural and urban economies, the rural economy sees much more direct government 
involvement. The party emphasises the following elements in the process of privatisation: 
• Privatisation of enterprises with a tendency of monopoly should not be 
encouraged. 
• Instalment payment method should be discouraged. 
• Proper valuation needs to be made. 
• Public share distribution through the stock market should be encouraged for the 
broader participation of the general public. 
• Process should be transparent. 
This party feels that there should be a clear-cut policy regarding the use of sales proceeds 
from the privatisation of public enterprises. Privatisation reduces the fiscal burden of the 
government and lessens the need for external borrowing (SCOPE 1997:12-13). 
 
In its 1999 election manifesto the RPP stressed that it would make the process of 
privatisation transparent and jump-start it by floating shares in privatised public 
enterprises. Similarly, it would invest the income from privatisation in productive sectors 
and ensure that the rights and welfare of the management and workforce were considered 
(Keeling, 2000:29; RPP, 1999). 
4.2.2.4 Opinion of the Nepal Sadbhabana Party (NSP)10  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 The Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) was founded in 1990 after its precursor the Nepal Sadbhavana 
Parishad—a non-political forum to promote the causes of Nepal’s Terai People—decided to form a 
political party. The central pillar of the party’s agenda is to press for equal treatment of the Terai people in 
every sphere of national life. It claims that the Terai people account for 50% of Nepal’s population. The 
party wants to see a federal system of government in Nepal, and is demanding places for Terai people 
within government services. In 2002, NSP (Anandi Devi) was formed as a new party after differences with 
the then-president of the NSP.  
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This party feels that privatisation should be an inherent feature of the economy in a 
global context. It suggests the formation of a commission consisting of economists, other 
intellectuals, representatives from political parties, staff members, representatives of the 
private sector, and so forth, to prepare a white paper on the privatisation process. Such a 
commission would explain the reasons for the privatisation of any particular PE (SCOPE, 
1997:12). 
Common Opinions among Political Parties 
It is worth noting that there are more agreements than disagreements about the 
privatisation policy in Nepal, which contradicts the views presented by Grindle and 
Thomas. The writers stated that the opposition would try to block resources to resist 
policy implementation, but in Nepal’s case this did not occur. Disagreements were more 
concerned with operational aspects and the ways in which public enterprises have been 
privatised so far. For one reason or other, all the major political parties support the 
necessity of privatisation policy, either as an inherent component of the broader private 
sector participation in economic activities and liberal economic policy, or as a 
mechanism to promote market forces for enhancing allocative efficiency of resources. 
Therefore privatisation is seen as a tool to promote economic growth (SCOPE, 1997:13). 
 
There was also agreement among parties regarding the optimum allocation of resources 
for basic social and infrastructure programs, which otherwise would have been made for 
PEs. Efficient use of resources after privatisation can be ensured only when there is a 
competitive environment and market forces are permitted to play their roles. In this 
respect there is also general agreement that monopoly and cartel situation should not 
prevail after privatisation. If likely to prevail, government should retain control over 
prices. 
 
Another point of agreement concerns the employees working in the PEs. All the parties 
feel that the existing employees should not be laid off if such manpower is required. If 
the staff is not required, adequate compensation should be given and government 
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assistance given to find new jobs. Also, there is agreement that preference should be 
given to national investors.  
Differences among the Parties 
There is one major difference between CPN (UML) on one hand and other parties on the 
other, in so far as the perceived urgency of this particular policy measure is concerned. 
UML feels that it is not a ‘must’ policy option, but rather there are ample opportunities to 
improve the operation of PEs as expressed in its last election manifesto as “selective 
privatisation”. On the other, Nepali Congress feels that there is an inherent tendency for 
PEs to be less efficient than the private sector and hence the economy is bound to benefit 
from privatisation. Their emphasis is upon minimum government involvement in 
economic activities. 
 
Parties seem to have held different opinions particularly with regard to valuation and 
promoters’ shares. CPN-UML party suggests valuing on the basis of market value. Nepali 
Congress Party, however, distinguishes between asset value and business value and 
places greater importance on the business value of the property (SCOPE, 1997:14). 
Hence, on the issue of privatisation in Nepal there was more common ground among 
parties than differences. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
In the first part of this chapter, privatisation policy in Nepal was discussed and analysed 
according to the model presented by Grindle and Thomas (1991). In particular, agenda 
setting, decision making and implementation were discussed. In agenda setting, the main 
actors/strategic groups involved in the policy-making and implementation processes and 
the main reasons for adopting the privatisation policy in Nepal have been discussed. In 
the decision-making arena, different kinds of decisions, i.e. legal decisions, program 
decisions and administrative decisions, have been discussed. In the implementation arena, 
the general implementation process, i.e. from the first phase to the third phase and after 
1997 (without phase), of the privatisation policy has been discussed. In the second part, 
opposition from the general public has been discussed by illustrating two identical cases, 
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as well as the opinion of the major political parties of privatisation, as represented in the 
last parliament. Common ground and differences among them have been also examined 
in this section. The discussion showed that there was more common ground than 
differences among the political parties. These differences were regarding the privatisation 
process, valuation process and transparency among the political parties.  
 
Legal and institutional arrangements, specific implementation processes in the four 
different cases, and the impact of the privatisation policy will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The facts will be discussed in the case study (second part) and opinion of 
different strategic groups on the different aspects of privatisation will be discussed in the 
third sub-section. 
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Chapter Five 
Implementation of Privatisation Policy and Its Impact in 
Nepal: Expectations and Reality 
5.0 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter I discussed the privatisation policy in Nepal, in particular agenda 
setting, decision making and implementation. In this chapter the implementation of 
privatisation policy in Nepal, especially in four specific enterprises, will be discussed. In 
the first part of this chapter, institutional arrangements for privatisation, particularly 
institutional frameworks specified in the privatisation white paper (policy paper on the 
privatisation of public enterprises 1991) and in the Privatisation Act of 1994, will be 
discussed. 
 
In the second part, the implementation process, background of the enterprises, valuation 
and privatisation approaches, analysis of the received proposals and the broad features of 
agreements and impact of privatisation on four enterprises, i.e. Harisiddhi Brick and Tile 
Factory, Bhrikuti Paper Mills, Nepal Foundry Industry and Biratnagar Jute Mills, will be 
discussed. In this sub-section, the data of the privatised enterprises collected from the 
field research (collected quantitative data from the company) will be discussed. 
 
In the third part, the overall impact of the privatisation policy in Nepal as perceived by 
the stakeholders/strategic groups (respondents) will be discussed. Although some 
quantitative data are presented in annexes, only the opinions of the people involved in the 
different sectors (drawn from the different strategic groups) have been explored and 
analysed, which is fully dependent on the empirical data. Hence, the second part of this 
chapter will be based on the facts (data) and the third part will be the reaction/opinion of 
the respondents/different strategic groups on the facts. 
 
5.1 Institutional Arrangement 
 
According to Vuylsteke, a government requires analysis and informed advice on many 
issues, coordinated formulation of recommendations, prompt and expedient decision 
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making, as well as an effective implementation capability. The possibility for abuse of its 
procedures must be minimised. The emphasis is generally placed on centralisation, 
simplicity, flexibility, speed and transparency. No single organisational model for 
managing privatisation is appropriate in all circumstances. Managing a privatisation 
program requires a variety of skills. Some may be available within government 
departments, others must be obtained from outside (Vuylsteke, 1988:80). He further 
mentioned that many organisational set ups have been adopted, i.e. specialised 
government ministry, permanent privatisation committee, sectoral ministry, ad hoc 
privatisation units, privatisation by the parent holding company, and so forth. Most 
privatisation programs fall into one or another of the organisational alternatives 
mentioned above, or a combination of them. 
 
Some countries aim to have one organisational entity make the political decisions, i.e. 
establish overall policy and approve individual transactions, while a different, separate 
entity actually conducts the operational tasks associated with privatisation, such as 
negotiations.  The Committee on Privatisation in the Philippines, for instance, is 
responsible for deciding which SOEs will be sold and must approve all sales, while the 
Asset Privatisation Trust, a government agency acting as trustee of the national 
government, is responsible for actually selling the assets and taking all the related 
actions. In Costa Rica, a trust with similar functions was set up to assist in the divestiture 
of companies held by Corporation Costaricense de Desarollo (CODESA). Other countries 
find that utmost authority must be placed with a given body or ministry to handle all 
aspects of privatisation, subject to the scrutiny of an independent commission with 
respect to certain aspects, such as valuation. A good example of this system is France, 
whose organisational scheme has proven to be able to proceed speedily with the 
implementation of authorised transactions (Ibid: 85). A number of countries have given 
the responsibility to privatise SOEs to the sectoral ministry or department most closely 
involved with their operations. In the United Kingdom and the USA, for instance, 
principal responsibility for privatisation was assigned to the Ministry (or ‘department’ in 
USA’s case) of Transportation in the case of airlines (U. K) or railways (U.S.), or the 
Department of Trade and Industry in the case of telecommunications (U.K.), and so forth. 
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In the UK, the treasury plays a coordinating role to ensure consistent decisions across 
individual privatisations and to preclude undesirable precedents (Ibid: 82). 
 
Whatever structure countries have adopted, the main question is how responsive it is to 
the interests of government, interested business circles and investors, and other related 
parties. It must be able to deal not only with the transfer of ownership aspects, but also 
with likely implications for competition and efficiency. It is sometimes argued that 
elaborate schemes for handling privatisation may be counterproductive. It would be 
simplistic, however, not to recognise that in both developed and developing country 
environments, a minimum degree of checks and balances, coordination and transparency 
is necessary to try and protect the public interest when disposing of state assets. There is 
no conducive evidence, however, to prove that, for instance, centralised decision-making 
power in one ministry yields better results than the committee approach. It depends solely 
on the specific country, the environment and the governance systems as well.  
 
In the Nepalese context, there is a separate implementation unit under the ministry of 
finance (Privatisation Cell) which is mainly responsible for the implementation of the 
policy. The white paper on privatisation policy recommended the institutional 
arrangement of the privatisation program. Consequently a High Level Privatisation 
Commission (HLPC) chaired by the Minister of Finance to be supported by a technical 
committee headed by the chief, Corporation Coordination Division (CCD), was formed 
to provide guidelines and technical assistance to the privatisation program. A 
Privatisation Cell, under the CCD in the Ministry of Finance, was established to 
implement the process and serve as a secretariat to the HLPC (Sharma, 1995:39). 
 
The formation of the high-level committee and the technical committee were as follows: 
The High-Level Committee 
• Finance Minister     Chairman 
• Member of Parliament (two)    Member 
• Member, National Planning Commission  Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Finance   Member 
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• Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and  
      Parliamentary Affairs     Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Labour   Member 
• Secretary, Line (concerned) Ministry   Member 
• President, Federation of Nepalese Chamber 
of Commerce and Industries    Member 
• Executive Head, Security Exchange Centre  Member- Secretary 
The Technical Committee 
• Chief, CCD, Ministry of Finance   Chairman 
• Representative, Line Ministry   Member 
• Chief Executive or representative of the SOE Member 
• Representative, Securities Exchange Centre  Member 
• Representative, Ministry of Law, Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs     Member 
• Representative, Association of Chartered  
Accountants of Nepal     Member 
• Expert on Privatisation    Member 
 
Since the management of the privatisation program was a complex task requiring both 
skill and experience, the Privatisation Cell was not very heavily staffed (only 8 persons 
were designated to manage the cell). 
 
This institutional arrangement was followed by a comprehensive study of six SOEs, of 
which three manufacturing SOEs were privatised in 1992, thereby launching the first 
phase of the privatisation program. After the enactment of the Privatisation Act in 1994, 
the institutional arrangement was changed slightly. In section three of the act, there is an 
arrangement for the formation of a privatisation committee comprised as follows: 
• Minister or State Minister for Finance    Chairman 
• Chairman, Finance Committee (House of Representatives)  Member 
• Two members of parliament nominated by the government  Member 
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• Member, National Planning Commission    Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Finance     Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Member 
• Secretary, Ministry of Labour     Member 
• Secretary, Ministry concerned with the enterprises being privatised Member 
• President, Federation of Nepalese Chamber of  
      Commerce and Industry      Member 
• Joint Secretary, MoF, Corporation Coordination Division Member- Secretary 
 
The committee shall, if necessary, invite the chief of the enterprises, labour 
representatives and any distinguished economist to the meeting of the committee. 
 
Powers, Functions and Duties of the Committee 
The powers, functions and duties of the committee shall be as follows: 
1. To recommend programs and priorities of privatisation to HMG, in view of 
suggestions contained in the Finance Committee Report (of the House of 
Representatives); 
2. To conduct study or research in order to formulate privatisation programs; 
3. To require evaluation of the enterprises and to recommend HMG on the process 
of privatisation; 
4. To remove hindrances faced in privatisation programs and maintain coordination; 
5. To follow up the decisions and agreements relating to privatisation and cause to 
do so; 
6. To constitute sub-committees, as may be necessary, in respect to privatisation; 
and 
7. To perform, or require to be performed, other works if necessary, in respect to 
privatisation (Section 4 of the Privatisation Act, 1994). 
According to the current legal arrangement, the privatisation committee is responsible for 
the smooth implementation of the privatisation program.  
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While enquiring about the role of the present legal and institutional provisions for the 
successful implementation of the privatisation policy, the respondents have expressed 
their opinion as follows: 
 
Table 5.1.1: Opinion on Legal and Institutional Provision (whether they are 
conducive) 
 
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 53 39 - - 53 36 
No 49 36 9 75 58 39 
Don’t Know 34 25 3 25 37 25 
Total 136 100 12 100 148 100.0 
(Source: Sub Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/200411) 
 
 
The table shows that the majority of the respondents (overall) do not agree that the 
present legal and institutional provisions are conducive to the successful implementation 
of the privatisation policy, but the margin between the respondents who believe that 
present provision is conducive is not very significant. About 3% less disagree with the 
present provision and seek the modification of legal provisions which can ensure 
transparent and efficient implementation. The interesting point here is that the differences 
between the two strategic groups are apparent. Only policy makers and academicians (a 
majority of 39%) express that the present legal and institutional arrangements are 
conducive to the successful implementation of the policy, while trade union 
representatives express that it is not conducive. This is due to the belief and their own 
strategic interest on the resources is at stake, as stated by Evers (Evers,1988 and 1989). 
Similarly, 25% of the respondents do not know whether it is conducive or not, which 
shows that we are still failing to communicate to people what we are doing, on what 
basis, and so on. The successful implementation of any kind of policy is to disseminate or 
communicate the whole policy and program to the stakeholders so that the participation 
of those in the policy process ensures the successful implementation, which in Nepal’s 
                                                 
11 Full description of the respondents divided into different strategic groups has been presented in annexes 
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case is apparently disappointing. In contrast to the above table, most of the key 
respondents (30 people in total) expressed that the real problem of implementation is not 
due to the legal provision, as we already have the Privatisation Act of 1994, where most 
of the provisions are enlisted, but to some extent the institutional set up. As the 
Privatisation Cell, MOF is responsible for the overall implementation process of 
privatisation, it should be staffed with technical personnel which is, at present, not 
enough for carrying out the job in an efficient way, as there are only few (7/8 people in 
total) personnel, most of whom do not have technical knowledge and the government has 
not been able to trained them as required.  
 
5.2 Implementation of Privatisation Policy in Four Enterprises 
 
There are several basic methods of privatisation—public offering of shares, private sale 
of shares, sale of government or enterprise assets, reorganisation into component parts, 
new private investment in SOE, management/employee buyouts and leases/management 
contracts. The choice of a particular method is dictated by the objectives being sought 
and other factors, and is generally based on an evaluation of alternative methods 
(Vuylsteke, 1988: 8). Before explaining the implementation process of four PEs, the 
basic characteristics of each method are described here in brief, based on Vuylsteke 
(1988). 
Public Offering of Shares (Full or Partial) 
Under this transaction, the state sells to the general public all, or large blocks, of the stock 
it holds, in a whole or partly owned SOE, which is assumed to be a going concern set up 
as a public limited company. Technically this transaction amounts to a secondary 
distribution of shares; when a government decides to sell only a portion of its holdings, 
the result is joint state/private ownership of the enterprise. The government may pursue 
this approach as a deliberate policy to maintain its presence or as a first step toward full 
privatisation. Where there is already private shareholding, the transaction may simply be 
a further privatisation (Vuylsteke, 1988:11). 
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The main advantages of public offerings are that they permit widespread shareholding, 
allow the broader resources of the general investing public to be targeted, and are 
normally characterised by openness and transparency. For the above reasons, they are 
often also politically more palatable. By their nature, public offering is more transparent 
and normally involves selling a portion of the shares of the company rather than selling 
assets and fixed property. So there is less chance of corruption and undervaluation in 
such a case, which is usually the grounds of opponents’ criticism. Hence, this option is 
more appropriate for a country where there is no political consensus. The condition of the 
SOE, targeting ownership, valuation and pricing, an absence of developed equity 
markets, the nature of capital market regulations, marketing and receptivity of the capital 
market and crowding out effect are some implementation-related issues. 
 
Private Sale of Shares (full or partial) 
Under this transaction, the state sells all or part of its shareholding in a wholly or partly 
owned SOE to a pre-identified single purchaser or group of purchasers. It is assumed the 
SOE is a going concern set up in the form of a corporation represented by shares. The 
transaction can take various forms, such as a direct acquisition by another corporate 
entity or a private placement targeting a specific group, for example institutional 
investors. The privatisation can be full or partial, with the latter resulting in mixed 
ownership enterprises. A private sale of shares may also be carried out before, or 
sometimes simultaneously with, a public offering (Ibid: 16-17). Because of their 
flexibility, private sales are the preferred method for weak performing SOEs in need of 
strong owners with relevant industrial, financial, commercial and other experience and a 
high financial stake in the success of the firm. It may also be the only feasible alternative 
in the absence of developed equity markets, where no mechanisms can be developed for 
reaching the general investing public, and where the size of the enterprise may not justify 
a public offering.  
 
In this method there are also some implementation issues, i.e. the SOE may be in need of 
financial restructuring, such as alleviation of liabilities. To ensure a government’s 
objectives are met and the public interest is served, mandatory procedures may need to be 
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introduced to govern valuation, purchaser selection (pre-qualification, bidding process), 
etc (Ibid: 19-20). A disadvantage of any private sale (of shares as well as assets) is that it 
may give rise to criticism as to the selection of the acquiring party, particularly if a large 
number of transactions are concluded, giving rise to the inadequate spread of wealth in 
the country. Strict mandatory procedures tend to compensate for this effect. Pricing will 
be one of the most difficult areas, as with several other forms of privatisation. 
 
Sale of Government or Enterprises Assets 
Under the previous two methods of privatisation, the private sector purchased shares in 
an SOE that was a going concern. Here the transaction consists basically of the sale of 
assets, rather than shares in a going concern. A government may sell the assets directly; 
the SOE may dispose of major assets. Generally, while the purpose may be to sell off 
separate assets representing distinct activities, the sale of separate assets may be a means 
of selling the enterprise as a whole. Thus, the assets may be sold individually or be sold 
together as a new corporate entity. Assets can only be sold privately (unless the 
government embodies the assets and activities into a new company established for the 
purpose of privatisation, in which case a public offering or private sale of shares is 
possible). In some cases, assets are not technically sold, but are contributed by the 
government to a new company formed with the private sector (Ibid 20). 
 
By definition, a sale of assets involves a known party and in that sense it may have the 
same advantages as a direct sale of shares. In addition, it offers additional flexibility in 
that it may be more feasible to sell individual assets rather than the whole SOE, or it may 
permit the sale of an SOE that might be borne in mind; however, often this approach can 
result in residual liabilities for the government. 
 
The main implementation issue in this method is how to handle existing liabilities. Unlike 
the sale of shares in a going concern, the assets are often sold without corresponding 
liabilities. As with several other forms of privatisation, pricing will be one of the most 
difficult areas. 
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Management/ Employee Buy-Out 
Management/employee buy-outs are a relevant means of transferring ownership to 
management and employees with little wealth or knowledge of share ownership and may 
be a solution for SOEs not otherwise saleable. They also constitute an enormous 
incentive to productivity. The application of the management/employee buy-outs of 
interest is the leveraged one, i.e., involving the use of credit. The underlying element in 
the leveraged management/employee buy-out is the enterprise’s cash flow and/or other 
security that can be provided. However, the problem with many SOEs to be privatised is 
often a weak cash flow and uncertain asset values. Therefore, in developing countries 
new and creative financing techniques need to be developed by governments and perhaps 
financiers to permit buy-outs (Ibid: 34). 
 
The buy-out can be very lucrative for the purchasers. It may also be risky. Under 
employee buy-outs, employees may more easily accept wage reductions on account of 
needed restructuring. However, if employees were subsequently to lose both their jobs 
and their stake in the enterprise, it might be felt that the government unduly exposed 
employees to risky privatisation schemes. 
 
Leases and Management Contracts 
Both leases and management contracts are arrangements whereby private sector 
management, technology and/or skills are provided under contract to an SOE or in 
respect of state-owned assets for an agreed period and compensation. While there is 
normally no transfer of ownership and therefore no divestiture of state assets, these 
arrangements can be used to ‘privatise’ management and operations and thereby possibly 
increase the efficiency and effective use of state assets (Ibid: 34-35). Although sometimes 
regarded as an intermediate step toward full privatisation, leases and management 
contracts are more often used as temporary measures, e.g. to return an SOE to an 
acceptable level of operation and profitability. 
 
Under both lease and management contracts, debt liabilities of the SOE or of the state, 
with respect to the underlying assets, will continue to be borne by the state. A 
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management contract represents a cost, and only increased profitability will offset this 
cost. In the case of a lease, the lease fee paid to the state may not cover the liabilities. 
Moreover, under a management contract the government may still need to inject funds to 
sustain operations. Maintenance/renewal obligations and other costs borne by the state 
and the private party, respectively, must be clearly defined (Ibid: 39). These are some of 
the implementation issues in this method. 
 
The above are some basic characteristics of some popularly known privatisation methods. 
In Nepal’s case some of those methods have already been adopted for privatising PEs, so 
the characteristics discussed here provide background information to compare and 
contrast the methods the government followed.  
 
Box 1: RNAC to be converted to public limited company 
By Kedar Bhattarai 
 
The Board of Directors of Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC) has decided to operate the 
43-year-old national flag carrier as a public limited company under the Company Act - 2053.  
 
Assistant Minister for Culture Tourism and Civil Aviation Ravi Bhakta Shrestha disclosed this at 
a program here today. He said that the government would give its decision once the RNAC 
management committee submits its report. The decision was taken at the recently-held meeting 
of the board in accordance with the recommendations made by the study committee headed by 
the then member of the National Planning Commission (NPC), Dr Shankar Sharma, almost a 
year ago. Dr. Sharma, currently the vice-chairman of the NPC, believes running the RNAC under 
the Company Act is the only way out to attract private sector participation and rescue it. "It could 
attract big investors and help it become a big public company like other international airlines." 
At the forum, Assistant Minister Shrestha said that other international airlines were free to 
operate in Nepal under its open sky policy until RNAC is self-sustaining.  
The Rising Nepal 17 Feb. 2003 
 
To show an example of the process and the impact of the specific enterprises, four 
privatised enterprises have been discussed in this sub-section. Two enterprises represent a 
modality of ‘assets and business sale’, another represents ‘share sale’ and the rest 
represents ‘lease’. Although the government adopted various methods of privatisation, in 
order to give an example only three types are discussed here, which are representative of 
privatisation transactions in Nepal.  
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5.2.1 Harisiddhi Brick and Tile Factory (HBTF) 
A. Background 
The company was established in Harisiddhi Lalitpur in 1969 under the Nepal Company 
Act of 1964 with financial aid from the People’s Republic of China and commenced 
production in 1970. The brick works occupied an area of 522 Ropani (27.19 hectares) at 
Harisiddhi in Lalitpur District before it was privatised. The main objective of the 
company was to provide machine-made high-quality clay bricks and tiles for private and 
public sector construction. The company had a capacity to produce 30 million bricks and 
1.3 million tiles per annum, but in 1990/91 just before it was privatised the company had 
produced 18 million machine-made bricks and 0.9 million tiles, which was 17% and 25% 
respectively of the total demand of the Kathmandu valley.  
 
The company was privatised in October, 1992 through the asset and business sale method 
(for 228.8 million Rs.) in the first phase of the government’s privatisation program. Now 
the management owns a 72% share and the public owns a 28% share of the company. 
The company employed 576 people prior to privatisation.  
B. Valuation and Privatisation Approach 
A detailed valuation and appraisal was carried on with the objective to provide a 
comprehensive compilation of the data necessary to enable the government to reach a 
conclusion of the salability and likely value of the enterprise. 
 
Using both local and external experts HMG/N had evaluated the assets and business of 
the company, through the following three approaches:  
 
Valuation Approach Value Rs. 
1. Going Concern Value (Net value to establish a new factory of its 
kind) 
Rs. 200.00 million. 
2. Liquidation value Rs. 118.00 million. 
3. Future cash flow value Rs. 98.00 million. 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
Based on the detailed appraisal and valuation report, the government decided that the 
modality of sales to be used was ‘sale of assets and business’. Notices were advertised in 
the national and Indian newspapers, allowing a total of 35 days for registrations of 
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interest to participate in the bidding process. An information memorandum was prepared 
for the investors and was sold to them. The information memorandum contained a 
detailed information on the company’s financial, organisational, and engineering status, 
market scenarios, terms and conditions that would be acceptable to the government, 
bidding procedures, a copy of the draft sales and purchase agreement and policy and 
regulatory issues concerning the industry. In addition to that the information 
memorandum also illustrated that bids should reach the Privatisation Cell, in the Ministry 
of Finance, no later than 12 noon on 7th July, 1992 (Sharma, 1995:70-71). 
 
In response to the advertisement published by the government, seven investors registered 
their interest to participate in the bidding process but, however, at the closing date only 
five different groups participated. Of those, four bidders were local businessmen and one 
group represented a consortium of the employees of the company and businessmen. 
 
After much deliberation in the high-level committee, the government decided to negotiate 
at least once with all the valid bidders. A preliminary negotiating committee was formed 
under the chairmanship of the chairman of the board of the factory. It was further decided 
that a high-level negotiating committee would be set up under the chairmanship of the 
minister for finance, with the minister for industry, secretaries of finance, labour, and law 
ministries as members. This high-level negotiating committee was responsible for 
negotiating with the final bidders based on the outcome of preliminary negotiations and 
also recommending the final decision to the high-level privatisation committee (Ibid: 75). 
C. Bids Analysis and Final Award 
Within the stipulated time and date, the following bids were received: 
Bidders Proposed Value 
1. Mr. Sundar Lal Bhavanani and Mr. Narsing Bahadur Shrestha Rs. 228.80 million 
2.Tawache Brick Industry Rs. 160.00 million 
3. Mr. Madan Bahadur Khatri Rs. 110.50 million 
4. Nepal Metal Trading Company Rs. 92.50 million 
5. Namaste Carpet Exports (P) Ltd. 49.50 million 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
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Among the proposals submitted by the bidders, the proposal of Mr. Sunder Lal 
Bhavanani and associate and Tawache Brick Industry were the most attractive proposals 
based on the price and condition set forth by them. 
 
According to the Privatisation Cell, the proposals received by HMG/N were evaluated on 
the basis of offer price, business plan, payment schedule, desired redundancy and 
managerial skills. The preliminary negotiation committee referred both the proposals to 
the high-level committee. Thereafter, the high-level negotiating committee received the 
revised proposals from both bidders and negotiated with them, specifically on the terms 
of redundancy, payment schedule and interest rates on the deferred payments, as well as 
the public’s and employees’ issue of shares. The high level negotiating committee then 
decided to award the bid to S. Bhavanani and associates (Nepali investors) and referred 
their recommendation to the high-level privatisation committee. Before recommending 
the case to the council of ministers the committee met three times, discussed in depth the 
issue of valuation of land and building and the credibility of the bidders. Then, the 
committee endorsed the decision of the high-level negotiating committee (Sharma, 
1995:72-73). The Privatisation Cell stated that HMG/N, mindful of the financial 
capability of Nepalese investors, project size and the lending limit of the financial 
institution, had accepted the deferred payment of 18 months and come to an agreement 
with Mr. Sunder Bhavanani and associates by offering the assets and business of the 
company to that group (Ghimire, 1995:113-114). 
 
In order to transfer the assets and business of the company, a local firm was contracted 
out. During the transfer, the employees/labourers of the company initiated industrial 
action, interrupting the production of the company for a month. The dispute was settled 
by the mutual consultation of representatives of the government, the buyer and the 
employees/labour force of the company (Ibid: 114). 
 
D. Broad Features of the Agreement 
1. The buyer agreed to buy the assets and business of the company at Rs. 228.80 
million. 
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2. The value of the current assets and current liabilities would be determined 
afterwards. 
3. 5% of total offer price was to be paid on agreement. Out of the remaining amount, 
the buyer had to pay Rs. 54.7435 million within 9 months of the agreement and 
the rest within 18 months of agreement with an interest rate of 17%. The 
convertible debenture was issued in the name of the government as a security for 
the deferred payment. 
4. 28% of the company’s share was to be issued to the employees and the general 
public at face value within 9 months from the date of the agreement. The share to 
be issued to the employees should not be less than 5% of the total shares. 
5. No redundancy in existing number of employees. 
6. While readjusting the price based on the total land area, a difference of 5 ropanis 
on either side of 522 ropanis (27.1962 hectare) would not be counted upon. 
However the offer price would be adjusted if the land transferred to the new 
management is less or more than 5 ropanis of the land area. 
7. The money deposited in advance for bricks and tiles by consumers was to be 
transferred to the buyer and the products provided to the consumers depositing 
money on a priority basis, as of the agreement between the company and the 
consumer. 
8. Registration fee would be as per regulations. 
9. Tax facility would be as per regulations. 
10. Request made for two new additional kilns was accepted by the government. But 
the company was required to get approval from the concerning authority, if the 
production of brick exceeded 80 million in a year based on single shift operation. 
11. Name of the company would be retained. 
12. The employees seeking to continue their service after the completion date would 
be kept on at work and provided with not less favourable terms and conditions on 
their existing facilities, including financial benefits (as provident fund, leave pay, 
gratuity, etc.). Employees not willing to continue their service would be paid 
readily the total amount as liable to the company. 
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13. If the financial terms and conditions stated in the agreement were violated by the 
bidder, HMG/N held the right to take any one or all the following actions with the 
prior notice of 15 days: 
• Nullify the agreement and cease all deposited amount. 
• Resale the shares in cash or on loan either by public auction or by personal 
negotiation. 
• Sue the purchaser for specific performance of the agreement. 
14. If the buyer failed to pay according to the payment schedule, interest at the rate of 
17% with surcharge and 4% as a fine was levied on the amount to be paid by the 
buyer. HMG held every right to provide this facility or not to the bidder (Ghimire, 
1995:15-116, Sharma, 1995 and Privatisation Cell, MoF). 
E. The Impact of Privatisation  
 
Data were collected from the company mainly by the researcher regarding two aspects—
one was collecting related information in two different periods of time (before 
privatisation and after privatisation for about three years during both periods), in order to 
compare the performance of the company after privatisation and interviewing employees 
and the other was ascertaining their perceptions and experiences of how they evaluate the 
privatisation of the company. In addition, general people residing in and around the 
company were also interviewed in order to get information of how they perceived the 
privatisation policy. The following table shows the differences during the two periods in 
some variables. 
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Table 5.2.1: Comparison between pre and post privatisation of HBTF 
Before privatisation  After Privatisation                        Units 
1989 1990 1991 2001 2002 2003 
Total 
Expenditure 
Rs. In 
million 
22.70 27.89 - 113.20 111.68 116.13 
Production 
  Tiles (Pcs.) 
  Bricks (Pcs.) 
 
 in million 
in million 
 
0.709 
13.327 
 
0.909 
18.043 
 
- 
-  
 
3.47 
41.22 
 
2.44 
36.25 
 
2.23 
37.37 
Sales Rs. In 
million 
21.37 27.72 - 60.38 86.52 47.33 
Employment Nos. 578 595 - 11212 12613 12414 
Borrowings Rs. In 
million 
- - - 308.52 331.35 382.35 
Profit/Loss   ,, (0.11) 1.65 - (52.82) (25.16) (68.80) 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004 and the company record) 
The above table shows the differences in HBTF before the privatisation and for three 
years after the privatisation. The table clearly indicates that there is a tremendous increase 
in production, sales, total expenditure and borrowing; however the profit/loss situation 
indicates that the company is incurring a huge loss after the privatisation, especially in 
recent years. The main reason for this loss is due to the heavy borrowing for which the 
company has to pay a huge amount of its earnings as interest. 
 
The table shows that the expenditure increased by a huge amount after privatisation. The 
figure on the production side also shows a big increase after privatisation. Similarly, total 
sales have also increased significantly, albeit in different scales in different periods. The 
total number of permanent employees decreased since privatisation, although there are 
seasonal labourers numbering around 500.  
 
One interesting post-privatisation change is the introduction of work contracts. The whole 
of the production system has been contracted out to workers on a piece-wage system. For 
this purpose, the company first retired all its permanent workers through a voluntary 
retirement scheme. Then it contracted out production to the same workforce. 
                                                 
12 Included only permanent and contracted staff; Labour contract is not included due to the unavailability of 
the figure 
13 Included only permanent and contracted staff 
14 Included only permanent and contracted staff 
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Management claims the introduction of a contract system increased productivity by 72% 
and at the same time increased workers’ incomes. Through the work contract, the 
management shed its long-term liability of having to carry a permanent workforce. The 
off-season payment to workers is also avoided using this system (Manandhar, 2002). 
 
Regarding capacity expansion, there has been tremendous growth. According to the 
management there were three brick shops and one tile shop before privatisation. Now 
there are four brick shops and two tile shops. The production capacity of the new brick 
shop alone is two-thirds of the existing three brick shops (HBTF, 1998). 
 
In terms of capacity utilisation, the scenario is not very optimistic. The economy is 
sluggish and, consequently, the construction works are slow. Hence, the demand for 
bricks and tiles is declining. In addition, more competitors have entered the market. The 
cost of production has increased tremendously, as the company has increased its payment 
to the farmers by 7-8 times. Similarly, the price of coal has also gone up significantly. As 
a result, the price of the product has risen sharply.  
 
The company has diversified its products. Before privatisation it was producing standard 
bricks and tiles. Now it is producing more compact, strong, comprehensive and durable 
products with a superior appearance. The company now produces roof tiles and Double 
De-aired bricks as well as standard bricks and tiles.  The company has added improved 
technology, plants and equipment (HBTF, 1998).  
 
The environmental situation remains the dire. Since the company is producing more 
bricks and tiles, more pollution may have been emitted into the atmosphere, which again 
adds to the deterioration of the environment. So in terms of the environment privatisation 
has had a negative impact. 
 
The profit trend was very unstable in the pre-privatisation years, while in the first years 
following privatisation, the trend had stabilised and the company was operating at a profit 
(though declining) for the subsequent years. In recent years, however, the company has 
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incurred huge losses, as shown in the above table. The main reason of this loss, as stated 
earlier, is due to the heavy borrowing for which the company is required to pay a huge 
amount of its earnings as interest. So in terms of profit/loss measurement, the company’s 
situation is weak and thus one of the major objectives of privatisation has not been met.  
 
The above data presents the situation of the company before and after privatisation. In 
this company the impact of privatisation on investment, production, sales, technology 
improvement, etc. are positive; however, in terms of profit, environment protection and 
capacity utilisation, results are negative, hence the overall impact is mixed. 
 
The data confirms that the performance of the enterprise is not encouraging and the 
enterprise joins the country’s category of ‘sick industry’. 
 
Similarly, employees of this enterprises and the general public living in the vicinity of the 
enterprise were interviewed to ascertain their opinions. In total 22 employees from 
different categories and 15 neighbours and members of the general public living around 
the enterprise were interviewed. Most of the employees and general public were critical 
of the policy and condemned the procedure followed by the government during the 
privatisation process for this enterprise. In particular they complained about the 
transparency of the valuation process and selling procedure. Employees were against the 
privatisation and suggested that the policy was not a viable policy option for Nepal. The 
company was privatised in the first phase of the government’s privatisation efforts when 
the privatisation act had not been enacted. The main criticism faced by the government is 
that although there was bidding for the selection for an appropriate buyer and different 
parties took part in the process, the actual valuation and other issues were not accessible 
to the public so they could evaluate whether the selection was fair. Hence, the 
transparency of the valuation process is a constant matter of criticism, for which the 
government was responsible. 
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5.2.2 Bhrikuti Paper Mills (BPM) 
A. Background 
The company was established in Gaidakot, Nawalparasi in 1981/82 under the Nepal 
Company Act of 1964, with financial aid from the People’s Republic of China, and 
commenced production in 1986/87. The main objective of the company was to provide 
machine-made writing and printing paper for private and public sector enterprises. The 
capacity of the company was an annual production of 4550 tons, but production never 
exceeded 3000 tons per annum.  
 
The company was privatised in 1992 through the assets and business sale method (in Rs. 
229.8 million). The company employed a total of 321 persons before it was privatised in 
the first phase of the government’s privatisation program, now the management owns a 
70% share and the public a 30% share of the company.  
 
B. Valuation and Privatisation Approach 
As is on HBTF, a detailed valuation and appraisal was carried on with the objective of 
providing a comprehensive compilation of the data necessary to enable the government to 
reach a conclusion on the privatisation of this enterprise. The following three approaches 
were applied while evaluating the assets and business of the enterprise: 
 
Valuation Approach Value Rs. 
1. Going Concern Value (Net value to establish a new factory of its 
kind) 
Rs. 334.00 million. 
2. Liquidation value Rs. 154.00 million. 
3. Future cash flow value Rs. 124.00 million. 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
 
Based on the detailed appraisal report and valuation report, as well as the 
recommendations from the consultants, the government decided upon the ‘sale of assets 
and business’ model of privatisation. The objective of the widespread sale of shares to the 
public and employees was difficult to achieve immediately, due to the historical 
performance of the enterprise (the possibility of developing a credible prospectus was 
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minimal). It was possible for the government either to hold the shares to be issued to the 
public and employees until a later date, or the sales agreement could incorporate 
obligations for the purchaser to issue shares on a particular date (Sharma, 1995). 
 
Notices were published in the national and Indian newspapers, allowing a total of 35 days 
for registrations of interest to participate in the bidding process. The information 
memorandum was prepared, as in HBTF, for the investors and was sold to them. It 
contained detailed information on the company’s financial, organisational, and 
engineering status, market scenarios, terms and conditions that would be acceptable to the 
government, and bidding procedures. 
 
In response to the advertisement published by the government, eleven investors showed 
their interest to participate in the bidding process but only eight participated in it. A 
similar procedure was followed to negotiate at least once with all the valid bidders. After 
receiving the outcome of the preliminary negotiating committee, the high-level 
negotiating committee was responsible for negotiating with the final bidders and 
recommending the final decision to the High-Level Privatisation Committee. 
 
C. Bids Analysis and Final Award 
The following bids were received within the stipulated time: 
Bidders Proposed Value (Million NRS) 
Kabra Group 259.5 
Himali Pipeco 229.8 
D. Acharya 80.0 
Tunga Bhadra Machinery & Tools 150.0 
Salt Trading Corporation 141.8 
Himal Impex 85.0 
Everest Paper Mills 100.0 
Straw Products (India) Ltd. No value indicated 
(Source: Privatisation Cells, MoF and Sharma, 1995) 
 
Among the received proposals, those of Kabra Group and Himali Pipeco were attractive 
and both bidders were asked to submit revised proposals. The high-level negotiating 
committee negotiated with them, specifically on the terms of redundancy, payment 
 113
schedule and interest rates on differed payments and the public’s and employees’ issue of 
shares. At the time of negotiation Mr. Rajendra Kabra (Kabra Group) submitted a written 
letter to the high-level committee that they were not willing to purchase the current assets 
equivalent to NRS. 40 million and that his bid would stand to be reduced by such an 
amount. The high-level negotiating committee decided then to award the bid to Himali 
Pipeco and referred their recommendation to the High-Level Privatisation Committee., 
Before recommending the case to the council of ministers, the committee met several 
times and discussed in depth the issues of valuation of land and building and the 
credibility of the bidders. Then, the committee endorsed the decision of the high-level 
negotiating committee. The government accepted the deferred payment of 2 years and 
came to an agreement with Himali Pipeco by offering the assets and business of the 
company. 
 
One very important fact that is worth mentioning here is that, at the time of the 
agreement, Mr. Rajendra Kabra joined the Himali Pipeco Group. The Parliamentary 
Finance Committee, while reviewing the privatisation of this company, did point out that 
the government was unable to stop collusion between bidders and thus lost 40 Million 
NRS on this particular deal. However, the fact that the bidders did collude was not known 
to the ministry, the Cell or the High-Level Committee. Another important fact is that 
even though the Himali Pipeco Group was second best in terms of the offered price, they 
were still better than Mr. Kabra in terms of deferred financing, industry and management 
experience (Sharma, 1995). 
 
D. Broad Features of the Agreement 
1. The buyer agreed to buy the assets and business of the company at Rs. 229.8 
million. 
2. The value of the current assets and current liabilities would be valued at the lower 
of cost or realisable value. 
3. The general public and employees of the company would be offered 25% and 5% 
of the company shares within two years of the completion date and proceeds were 
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to be paid to the government. Shares subscribed to by the employees would be 
sold at a 25% discount. 
4. No redundancy. 
5. The new name of the company was not to deviate from the original name of the 
company. 
6. Registration fee for the land would be borne out according to the existing laws. 
7. Tax facility would be accorded based on the Industrial Act. 
8. The existing employees willing to continue their service with the new owners, on 
completion date, would be kept on and their salaries and other benefits were not 
to be decreased from their present salaries (what they were getting before 
privatisation).  
9. If the purchasers violated the terms and conditions of the agreement the 
government could exercise all or any of the following options by furnishing a 
notice of three days to the purchasers: 
a. Nullify the agreement and forfeit all moneys deposited/paid with the 
government. 
b. Resale of assets and business. 
c. Sue the purchasers for specific performance of the contract. 
10. If the buyers failed to pay according to the payment schedule, interest and 
surcharge at the rate of 21% would be charged (Ghimire, 1995; Sharma, 1995; 
and privatisation Cell, MoF).  
 
E. The Impact of Privatisation 
Like HBTF, data were collected from the company regarding two aspects—first, data of 
two different periods of time (before and after privatisation over about three years) to 
compare the company’s performance, and second, the perception of employees of the 
company and the general public residing in the vicinity of the company was ascertained 
by interviewing them. The following table shows the differences before and after 
privatisation of the company. 
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Table 5.2.2: Comparison between pre and post privatisation of BPM 
Before privatisation  After Privatisation   Units 
1989             1990           1991 2001            2002               2003 
Total Expenditure Rs. In 
million 
82.20 - - 640.24 602.44 703.06 
Production 
              
MT. 2968 2574 2665 13194 8998 
 
14563 
Sales MT. 2947 2523 2560 13524 11991 14582 
Employment Nos. 280 283 - 469 460 457 
Borrowing Rs. In 
million 
- - - 941.2 1314.3 1295.3 
Profit/Loss   ,, 12.00 4.30 - (77.29) (110.53) (77.85) 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004 and the company record) 
The situation of this enterprise is bleak like HBTF; the overall performance of this 
enterprise is also negative. After privatisation the company is operating at great loss and 
the debt is mounting. Although employment, production and sales are increasing, due to 
the over-capitalisation of the company, it is in a very difficult position regarding survival. 
The data shows that, like HBTF, the effect of privatisation in this enterprise is negative. 
 
Total expenditure has increased tremendously. Similarly, production and sales have also 
increased hugely. The table shows that production in 2001 was almost 5 times greater in 
comparison to production in 1991. Furthermore, it was almost 3.38 times in 2002 and 
5.46 times in 2003. The data in sales also shows a significant change after privatisation. 
The sales amount increases after privatisation during the year of 2001, 2002 and 2003 are 
almost 5.28, 4.68 and 5.70 times that of the year 1991 (before privatisation). It shows a 
tremendous change after privatisation. Similarly, employment has increased hugely. 
Before privatisation there were 283 employees in the company and now in 2003 the 
number has risen to 457. Thus in this company employment has increased about 
161.48%, which is a positive sign. Borrowing after privatisation has increased incredibly. 
The data for previous years were not available, since the company was under government 
ownership, so no comparison has been made, but the amount the company has borrowed 
is so high that it has caused the company to incur a loss.  
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Regarding capacity expansion, there has been a dramatic change. New machinery was 
added to produce newsprint; changes in the structure of the factory and equipment, such 
as wickner, pulper, decker, etc., were effected. The major change was installing the new 
machine (PM2), the capacity of which is to produce 70 tons of paper, 60 tons of pulp and 
recycling 50 tons of waste paper (8th annual report of the company). The output of the 
mill was diversified to produce papers of different GSMs. These changes resulted in 
higher production. 
 
In terms of capacity utilisation, the situation is again bleak for this company, as it was for 
HBTF. The reasons for this are many—from economic development to decline in 
demand, due to the decline in economic activities in the country. Capacity utilisation (in 
percentage) for different years is as follows: 
 
Before privatisation After Privatisation 
1989 1990 1991 2001 2002 2003 
61.88 56.16 11.17 41.07 39.59 45.44 
 
Although the trend of capacity utilisation in recent years has been increasing, still it is 
less (except in 1991) than before privatisation.  
 
With the installation of pulp and recycling paper plants, the company diversified its 
production. Before privatisation, it was producing normal paper but now it produces 
export quality pulps (high-grade paper) and has been exporting it to Japan, as well as 
low-grade newsprints to the Indian markets. 
 
The environmental situation in this company has deteriorated since privatisation. All of 
the respondents strongly accused the company of not being serious about reducing 
environmental deterioration. The company claimed that it has been trying continuously to 
reduce environmental degradation by installing an effluent treatment plant to refine waste 
water. They have also started the Cleaner Production Scheme and Environment 
Management System Activities, with the assistance of the ESPS (Environment Sector 
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Program Support) and the Institute of Environment Management, which aimed to control 
the waste and to reduce the pollution load (Annual report of the company, 2001/2002). 
 
The profit/loss situation again shows the overall performance of the company. Before 
privatisation it was operating at a profit. After privatisation, however, it has incurred a 
huge loss. The interesting point here is that the company increased its production and 
sales, yet has incurred loss. The major reason for this is that due to over-capitalisation, 
the company has to pay a huge amount in interest for its borrowing; for the last couple of 
years it has had huge losses, as shown in the above table. So in terms of profit/loss 
measurement, the company’s situation is very weak and therefore one of the major 
objectives of privatisation has not been met.  
 
The above data confirms that the performance of the enterprise is not encouraging and it 
joins the country’s category of ‘sick industry’, even though the impact of privatisation on 
investment, production, sales, technology improvement, etc. is positive. However, in 
terms of profit, environmental protection and capacity utilisation, the outcomes are 
negative and the company is in such a condition that it might be closed down any time as 
it cannot continue to bear such huge losses. 
 
Box 2: Hoping against Hope! 
The government argues that the poor condition of BPM is merely because of the problems in the 
international paper industry which have to some extent affected the paper market in short run. Then, 
it is now an ordeal for the mill to show that it can really improve its performance. The mill is now 
feeling secure in the domestic market following a provision in the Indian budget this year to levy an 8 
percent production duty on cheap paper at a time when such paper is affecting the market here. This 
time government cannot say that Indian market of paper has been affecting the whole market of paper 
in Nepal. 
However, the Indian budget this year has also levied an 8 percent counter value duty and four percent 
Special Additional Duty (SAD) on goods imported from everywhere, Nepal included. Consequently, 
difficulty has arisen in the export of Nepalese goods to India.   
The tax on goods exported from Nepal to India, which used to be 8 percent, has now reached 20.64 
percent. The mill has been exporting over 35 metric tons of paper to India annually.  
But BPM can really make a great deal in the domestic sectors of the country if the factory is made 
efficient in producing the papers of good quality. Let's see what will happen in coming days? 
Source: The Rising Nepal (2000), Bhrikuti Paper Mill Doing Fine (cf. Adhikari and Adhikari 2001) 
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15 consumers/or neighbours and 31 employees were interviewed regarding this 
enterprise. Most of the employees opposed the privatisation policy. They said that the 
situation after privatisation in terms of security, financial benefits and other fringe 
benefits was worse and they are facing a status problem, having perceived that they are 
now the servants of private enterprise. Likewise, almost all consumers and the general 
public living in the vicinity of the company blamed the company for deterioration of the 
environment. They opposed the policy and suggested that the government not opt for the 
policy.  
 
The overall data collected regarding this company shows the negative outcome of the 
privatisation policy.  
5.2.3 Nepal Foundry Industry (NFI) 
A. Background 
Nepal Foundry Industry, located at Sat Dobato, Lalitpur, was established in 1979 with 
the financial and technical support of UNDP/UNIDO as a project and later converted into 
a public enterprise in 1990 by the government. Its major products before privatisation 
were cast iron products. However, since privatisation the company diversified its product 
ranges.  
 
The company was privatised in March, 1996 through the share sale method. The 
government owns 44% shares, private promoters own 51% shares, and a 5% share has 
been allocated to employees, but has not yet been distributed and is still with the 
government. 
B. Valuation and Privatisation Approach 
Like other enterprises, a detailed valuation and appraisal were carried out with the 
objective of providing a comprehensive compilation of the data necessary to enable the 
government to reach a conclusion about the saleable value and likely value of the 
enterprise. The appraisal report clearly stated that the privatisation objectives would be 
achieved either through the sale by HMG/N of all shares or through the sale of the 
movable assets for the relocation of the industry within Nepal. It was also stated that the 
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government could do so by choosing one of the options it recommended. The options 
were as follows: 
Option one: sale of the shares 
• 51% block shares to interested Nepalese investor(s)/group of investors; 
• 44% to the general public and interested corporate bodies; and  
• 5% to the employees of the company (NFI). 
Option Two: Sale of movable assets 
All of the movable assets of the company shall be sold for the relocation of the industry 
with the following conditions: 
1. HMG/N shall assume all the liabilities of the company, 
2. Current assets shall be transferred on book value, 
3. The bidders should retain all those employees who want to continue their service 
with the new management, 
4. Out of the total shares of the new company formed, the new management will 
divest 25% of the shares to the general public and 5% of the shares to the 
employees of the company within. Sale of 30% of shares as described above shall 
take place within one year, 
5. The employees shall receive a 25% discount on the share price for those shares 
reserved for them. HMG/N shall refund this discount amount to the management 
(MoF, 1995: section 2 p.1-2). 
Based on the detailed appraisal and valuation report, the government decided upon the 
modality of sales as ‘sale of shares’ (option one). The share offered by the government 
was based on the following pattern: 
Management General public and 
Corporate bodies 
Employees of the 
company 
Total 
51% 44% 5% 100% 
 
Notices were advertised in the newspapers, allowing 35 days for registrations of interest 
to participate in the bidding process for the 51% block of shares in the company. The 
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information memorandum was prepared and sold to the prospective bidders, and 
contained detailed information on the company’s financial, organisational and 
engineering status, market scenarios, terms and conditions, etc. 
 
In response to the advertisement, three investors registered their interest to participate in 
the bidding process but only two submitted their proposals.  
 
After much deliberation in the high-level committee, the government decided to negotiate 
at least once with both valid bidders. A preliminary negotiating committee was formed 
under the chairmanship of the secretary at the Ministry of Industry. The preliminary 
committee recommended that the high-level committee to negotiate once again with Mr. 
Sitaula before awarding the contract to him. The high-level negotiating committee was 
responsible for negotiating with the final bidders based on the outcome of preliminary 
negotiations and also recommending the final decision to the high level privatisation 
committee, as in the other cases. 
C. Bids Analysis and Final Award 
Within the stipulated time and date, the following bids were received: 
Description Mr. Khagendra Sitaula Mr. Ramesh Kumar Gupta
Proposed Offer Price Rs. 71 per share Rs. 60 per share 
Terms of Payment Within one year in instalment 
basis 
Within two years in 
instalment basis 
(Source: Privatisation Cell, MoF) 
The preliminary negotiating committee negotiated with both bidders and recommended 
that the high-level committee negotiate once again with Mr. Khagendra Sitaula, as Mr. 
Ramesh Kumar Gupta said that his proposed value (in bid) was final, so they need not 
negotiate with him again. Finally, as recommended by the preliminary negotiating 
committee, the high-level negotiating committee negotiated with Mr. Sitaula, who agreed 
to buy the shares of the company at Rs. 92.52 per share and recommended that the High-
Level Privatisation Committee award the contract to him, which in turn endorsed the 
decision of the high-level negotiating committee. Then the Privatisation Cell prepared the 
sale and purchase agreement and finally the government (cabinet) decided to sell 51% of 
shares in the company to Mr. Khagendra Sitaula. 
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D. Broad Features of the Agreement 
1. The buyer agreed to buy the total share 156438 (51% share) of the company at Rs. 
92.52 per share (Total Rs. 14473643.76). 
2. The buyer agreed to pay 20% of total offer price on agreement date. Of the 
remaining amount, the buyer had to pay: 
  10% of the total offer price within three months of the agreement, 
  10% of the total offer price within six months of the agreement, 
  10% of the total offer price within nine months of the agreement, 
  10% of the total offer price within twelve months of the agreement, 
   20% of the total offer price within fifteen months of the agreement, 
  20% of the total offer price within eighteen months of the agreement. 
3. Of the remaining share (49%), 44% would be sold to the general public and 5% to 
the employees of the company. 
4. Employees willing to continue their service with the new owner, on the completion 
date, were to be retained and their salaries and benefits not to be decreased from 
what they were receiving in the state sector. 
5. If the financial terms and conditions stated in the agreement were violated by the 
bidder, HMG/N held the right to take any one or all the following actions with the 
prior notice of 3 days: 
a. Nullify the agreement and seize all deposited amounts. 
b. Resell the shares in cash or on loan, either by public auction or by 
personal negotiation. 
c. Sue the purchaser for specific performance of the agreement. 
6. If the buyer failed to pay according to the payment schedule, interest at the rate of 
10% and a surcharge at the rate of 15% would be levied on the amount to be paid 
by the buyer. But HMG held every right to provide this facility or not to the 
bidder (from the signed contract and Privatisation Cell, MoF). 
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E. The Impact of Privatisation 
As like the other enterprises, data were collected regarding two aspects of this 
enterprise—quantitative data for two different periods of time (before and after 
privatisation) and the perception of employees and the general public residing in the 
vicinity of the enterprise. The quantitative data collected for this enterprise are given in 
the following table: 
Table 5.2.3: Comparison between pre and post privatisation of NFI 
Before privatisation After Privatisation  Units 
1993         1994           1995 2001            2002               2003 
Total 
Expenditure 
Rs. In 
million 6.61 8.02 5.93 12.77 11.73 9.53 
Production             KG.   107884 203786 215937 141979 
Sales Kg.   111054 215526 214565 146473 
Employment Nos. 60 61 46 41 38 37 
Borrowings Rs. In 
million - - - 143.11 121.39 12.07 
Profit/Loss   ,, (2.33) (2.72) (3.87) (0.42) 2.70 0.30 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004 and the company record) 
The above table shows the differences in NFI before the privatisation and in the three 
years after privatisation. The table clearly indicates that there is a tremendous increase in 
production, sales, total expenditure and borrowing, and to some extent profit also. 
However, the profit ratio for 2003 had decreased in comparison to the year 2002. 
 
The data presented in the above table shows that the expenditure increased by a huge 
amount after privatisation. The expenditure increased more than 215% in 2001, compared 
to 1995 (immediately before privatisation), 197% in 2002 and about 160% in 2003. The 
trend is decreasing, but the percentage of expenditure is still high. Similarly, total 
production and sales have increased significantly after privatisation though at different 
volumes. Employment, in contrast, decreased significantly after privatisation and consists 
of almost all temporary workers rather than permanent. Only a few administrative staffs 
are permanent. Thus the impact of privatization on employment in this company is 
negative.  
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Regarding capacity expansion and product diversification, there has been positive 
development in this company. According to the management, after privatisation the 
company diversified its products base to steel, iron, manganese and copper, from the 
traditional cast-iron base. The types and quality of products have also increased. 
 
In terms of capacity utilisation, the scenario is slightly optimistic. Before privatisation, it 
utilised about 23% of its total capacity but after privatisation it has increased by about 
43%, 45% and 30% in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. Although the capacity 
utilised in the year 2003 decreased from that of the previous year, the percentage is again 
higher than before it was privatised. The picture, however, is not as positive, as it has 
utilised only 30% of its capacity; the only positive aspect is that it is still higher than 
before privatisation. 
 
In terms of borrowing, data is not available for pre-privatisation, but the company has 
borrowed huge amounts of money from the local bank and other institutions since 
privatisation, which is of course used to expand its production. However, the interest to 
be paid and other negative aspects of the heavy loan directly affect the operation of the 
company in terms of profit, even though the company is slightly in profit situation. 
Otherwise the volume would have been rather high.  
 
The above table shows that most indicators in this enterprise are also increasing. The 
company shows a positive result in its profit/loss situation. Though the volume of profit 
is negligible, the company has shown an overall positive result in recent years.  
 
Due to the unreliable response of the employee, only 5 samples of the interviewed 
persons are used for this company, whereas 10 people living around the company were 
interviewed and used for the sake of data analysis.  
 
Unlike the other enterprises, employees of this enterprise were in favour of the 
privatisation policy, although they emphasised the transparency of the process. However, 
they were indifferent about the benefits and advantages they received after privatisation. 
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The general public living in the vicinity of the company were critical about the 
privatisation policy. As in the other enterprises, they blamed the company for 
environmental degradation and generating noise pollution.  
5.2.4. Biratnagar Jute Mills Ltd. (BJM)  
A. Background 
Biratnagar Jute Mills, located in the Mills Area, Biratnagar, was established on 13th July, 
1936 as the first industrial venture in Nepal. It is a manufacturer of hessian, sacking and 
twine. The production capacity of the factory is 42 metric tons/day but at present only 
70% capacity of the mill is being utilised. In the real sense, it is not a government-run 
company, as the government only owns 46.52% shares of the company. The rest of the 
shareholders are the private parties. But the government has invested a large sum of 
money in the form of loans in the company. The government also appointed a director on 
the board. The board of directors make decisions on all matters for the company. Hence, 
the overall activities of this company regarding leasing and management contracts were 
done through a board decision, which is entirely different from what has been outlined in 
the Privatisation Act of 1994 and other government procedures. Privatisation of this 
company is not in a real sense privatisation, since the majority of the shares are already in 
private hands, but the procedures it requires in order to hand over the management to 
other private parties are interesting to note in this study. Interestingly, the government has 
been bearing most of the liabilities of this company, as it has historical importance, even 
though the government’s share is less than what is in private hands.   
B. Management Contract and Lease 
According to the board of directors’ decision to operate this company on a management 
contract, the factory was initially given a management contract for five years in 
December, 1996 to Om Prakash Tapadia (International Trade Channel) on a profit-
sharing ratio of 80:20 between the company and the private party. However, after sixteen 
months, the chairman of the mill arbitrarily broke the agreement without the consent of 
the board. This private party was unable to run the factory and therefore the government 
terminated the contract (Adhikari and Adhikari, 2001). 
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Then, the factory was given to Mr. Jivan Nepal (Samy Enterprises) on a management 
contract in August, 1998 with a profit-sharing ratio of 60:40. This party was also unable 
to run the factory and the board terminated the contract in June, 1999. 
 
The board then made a fresh call and finally leased out the mill. The mill was leased to 
Nirmal Kumar Byas for a period of 20 years on the condition that he pay Rs. 9.5 million 
per year during the first five years and then yearly increments of 5% on the total amount 
in the succeeding years. But Mr. Byas failed to fulfil the conditions agreed with the board 
and then the board of directors terminated the contract and again it was given to Arihanta 
Multifibres (in Nov.17, 2002) for a period of five years. The main criticism of the leasing 
of the company is that the board of directors awarded the lease contract to the private 
party without any competition (OAG, 1998:51), but the reality is that there were no other 
interested parties, and the contract was awarded to whoever would take over such a sick 
industry.   
C. Broad Features of the Agreement 
1. The buyer (second party) agreed to take over the company on lease for 5 years and 
will be providing 9.5 million NRS per year as a lease amount to the board of the 
company (first party). 
2. The buyer shall, after the contract date, assume liability in respect of all liabilities 
and settle promptly as they fall due; however it will not be responsible for the 
liabilities that were due before the company was leased out. 
3.  The buyer will be responsible for the maintenance of the building, machinery, 
furniture and other materials during the contract period. 
4. Only 98 administrative staff and all workers/labourers who are not under 
compulsory retirement, on completion date, to be continued. 
5. If the purchaser violates the terms and conditions of the agreement, the first party 
may ask the second party by specifying a time to fulfil the duties and 
responsibilities. If the second party fails to act according to the written request of 
the first party, the first party may cancel the agreement by furnishing a three-
month notice and claim compensation from the second party. 
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6. If the instalment amount is not paid on the due date, interest (at the rate of a 
commercial bank’s loan interest rate) is to be charged to the second party on the 
due amount (from the lease contract provided by the company). 
 
D. The Impact of Privatisation  
As with the other enterprises, data were collected regarding two aspects in this 
enterprise—quantitative data for two different periods, i.e. before and after privatisation, 
and the perception of employees and the general public residing in the vicinity of the 
enterprise.  Due to the frequent closure of the company and lack of annual general 
meeting for a couple of years, the pre- and post-privatisation data were not available for 
this enterprise. In fact, only about 46.52% of the shares belong to the government and the 
rest is owned by private parties. So the company in a real sense was not privatised (it is 
already in the hands of private parties) but the government invests a huge amount of 
money due to the historical importance of the company (most of the political leaders of 
major political parties started their career from this company as labour leaders). 
Otherwise there would be no reason to invest such huge amounts in such a sick 
enterprise.  
 
The quantitative data collected for this enterprise are given in the following table; 
however, due to the unavailability of the data before it was leased out in 2002, only one 
year’s data are presented. 
Table 5.2.4: Comparison between pre and post privatisation of BJM 
Before Lease out  After Lease out                       Units 
 1996       1997                  1998 2003       2004               2005 
Total 
Expenditure 
Rs. In 
million 
270 129.3 283.3 118.16   
New Investment    ,, NA NA NA NA   
Production              MT 6366 4124 NA 6786   
Sales MT 6497 3793 5778 6340   
Employment Nos.    3318   
Borrowings Rs. In 
million 
  363.98  
(cumulative) 
196.59   
Profit/Loss   ,,   (618.85) 
cumulative loss 
until 1997 
(1.23)   
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(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004 and the company record) 
Since the comparable data are not available for pre- and post-lease periods, the impact on 
this company could not be analysed. However the historical performance of the company 
and its ups and downs show that at least the company is running at all since it was leased 
out in 2002. The production and sales during these two periods are not significantly 
different, as presented in the above table. However, the post-2002 data definitely 
indicates its positive direction. Due to the huge loans and liabilities15, no one can predict 
how the company will survive after the end of the five-year lease period.    
 
Sixteen employees and ten members of the general public were interviewed in this 
enterprise to ascertain their opinions of privatisation. Unlike the other enterprises, the 
employees were highly in favour of privatisation in this enterprise. They claimed that due 
to their willingness to lease out this company, it was possible to run the company in its 
present form, otherwise it would have been liquidated. They have a positive view towards 
privatisation and claim that there is no other way to run such a sick enterprise. There is a 
continuing issue of the payment of the retired workers of the company; the government is 
providing huge amounts to pay the money due to the workers.  
 
The general public has no clear-cut ideas about privatisation. They said that the only 
good option is to run the company in any form, to avoid the risk of unemployment of 
about 3300 workers, which would have a knock-on effect in society. They really don’t 
know what privatisation is and its consequences. Hence, it is difficult to conclude about 
their point of view. But the manner in which the company is being run is justified, as the 
only option to run this company is to lease it out for specific time periods, preferably for 
longer than five years. 
 
Although the data were not available for the analysis, the privatisation procedure in this 
company (though not technically privatisation, since the majority share is in the private 
                                                 
15 Property of the company is about 38.4 million, share capital is about 40.22 million and total loans of the 
company are 363.98 million.  
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sector) seems positive. Without being leased out, this company could not have been run 
while incurring such huge losses. 
 
5.3 Impact of Privatisation Policy: Stakeholders’ (Strategic Group’s) Point of View 
Privatisation has been advocated primarily as a means of improving the performance of 
public sector enterprises. It is frequently argued that privatisation may have a significant 
impact on performance efficiency, financial efficiency and distributional efficiency 
(Cook et al., 1998). Privatisation may, however, cut government expenditure and help 
budgetary balance. It can also be justified in terms of economic efficiency.  
 
The overall impact of the privatisation policy could be measured by the performance that 
privatised enterprises achieve. To calculate/measure the performance, Hodge (2000) has 
developed three types of performance indicators which are as follows: 
• Performance domain based on privatisation models, 
• Performance domain based on privatisation objectives, and  
• Performance domain based on public sector activities (Hodge, 2000:49-50). 
Firstly, a series of performance dimensions are gleaned from the models underpinning 
privatisation, as summarised in his book. For each performance dimension, he presented 
some potential performance indicators for illustration. Secondly, a range of illustrative 
indicators are presented by the author for each of the privatisation objectives. These two 
performance domains have been implied by governments, by privatisation advocates, or 
by privatisation analysts. Outside these indicators, a broader range of performance 
information is also relevant and deserves to be pursued. This third domain represents 
performance in terms of the values of service provision traditionally sought through 
public sector activities. Such values include, for example, equity and democracy (Ibid).  
 
Possible performance dimensions and illustrative indicators based on privatisation 
objectives are given in the following table16: 
                                                 
16 For a full description of other dimensions and indicators, please see “Hodge, Grame A. (2000), 
Privatisation, An International Review of Performance. Boulder and London: Westview”.  
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Table 5.3.1: Performance Indicators to measure the Impact of Privatisation 
Domain Objective Illustrative Performance Indicators 
Economic • Economic efficiency 
• Increased competition 
• More flexible labour market 
• Develop/create market for private 
capital 
• Balance/replace weak private 
sector 
• Produce higher investment ratio 
• Degree of cost minimisation 
• Number of new entrants in market 
• Labour productivity 
• Size and composition of capital 
market 
 
 
• Investment ratios 
Fiscal 
Management 
• Funding autonomy 
• Reduce public sector debt 
• Maximize sale proceeds 
• Create scope for tax cut 
• Reduced call on public purse 
• Public sector borrowing ratio effect 
• Dollar proceeds 
• Defined scope and cuts 
Political • Employee share participation 
 
• Create a “share owning 
democracy” 
• Freedom of government 
enterprise from government 
• Reduce trade union power 
• Transfer assets (i.e. smaller 
government) 
• Generate employment 
 
• Encourage the return of flight 
capital 
• Attract direct  foreign investment/ 
technology 
• Increase domestic and 
international business confidence 
• Control corruption in public 
sector utilities 
• Number and profile of employee 
owners 
• Number and profile of share- 
owning citizens 
• Extent to which new agencies have 
more freedom 
 
• Extent of asset transfer 
 
• Number and profile of employment 
generated 
•  Extent to which foreign investment/ 
technology is attracted 
• Business confidence survey  
 
 
 
• Degree of corruption 
Consumer • Better services 
• Lower prices 
• Increased choice 
• Survey results 
• Survey result 
• Number and profile of suppliers 
Other • Environment protection 
 
• Placate external financing 
agencies (e.g., IMF) 
• Environmental standards/ case 
studies 
• Degree and extent of external 
agency requirement for privatisation 
(Source: Hodge 2000:53) 
As stated in the above table, performance could be looked at in different ways, but the 
attempt here is just to look from a privatisation objectives point of view, though not in 
detail. Four privatised companies’ performances (fact) have been discussed in detail in 
the previous sub-section as case studies. In this sub-section, attempts have been made to 
analyse the people’s perception (from the opinion survey data) of privatisation—how 
they are following the program, how they rate the impact in overall aspects, how they 
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found the facilities and support from the government, how they perceive the performance 
of the privatised enterprises, how the employees rate overall facilities and benefits they 
are getting, etc., have been analysed based on the data collected from the field survey.  
However, some quantitative data regarding changes of some of the privatised enterprises’ 
production, sales, profit, employee/labour productivity, government subsidy, and 
employment effects have been presented in tabular form in annexes (in brief relied upon 
secondary information, as it was not possible to conduct an empirical study due to time 
and resource constraints).  
5.3.1 Objectives of Privatisation 
To acquire the perceptions of the different strategic groups (stakeholders), the 
respondents were asked whether the objectives of privatisation, as outlined by the 
government, have been met or not. The following table shows that only 16% of 
respondents expressed that the objectives have been met, whereas 61% stated that they 
have not been met. Similarly, 23% did not know whether they have met or not. Most of 
the respondents asserted that they have been met only partially, not absolutely. A few 
respondents thought that to some extent it has reduced the financial burden on the 
government. 
Table 5.3.2: Opinion on Objectives of Privatisation (whether they have been met) 
  
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 21 16 
No 80 61 
Don’t Know 30 23 
Total 131 100 
(Source: Sub Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of the respondents thought that the 
privatisation policy should be implemented but the above table confirmed that despite 
their positive attitude toward privatisation, they are not satisfied with the achievements 
gained by the policy. All of the respondents have a bachelor’s degree and above the 
qualification level and most of them are engaged either in government service17 or other 
institutions and have knowledge of privatisation, so the opinions they express are of 
                                                 
17 Detailed description of the respondents has been given in the annexes.  
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significant importance. This is a knowledgeable group that familiar with the notion of 
privatisation, so we can safely conclude that the objectives of privatisation outlined in the 
government documents and the Privatisation Act have not been met as expected. 
5.3.2 Efficiency of Privatised Enterprises  
Privatisation provides operational freedom and accountability to the managers of 
privatised enterprises. Hence, they are supposed to be innovative and efficient in 
executing their duties and responsibilities, through which the overall efficiency could be 
increased. Respondents were asked to give their opinion of three aspects to judge the 
efficiency of privatised enterprises, i.e. overall efficiency, managerial effectiveness and 
the economic burden on the government. The following three tables show the opinions 
expressed by the respondents:  
  
Table 5.3.3: Efficiency of the Privatised Enterprises 
 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Increased 37 50 3 25 40 47 
Decreased 21 28 5 41 26 30 
No change 14 19 2 17 16 19 
Don’t Know 2 3 2 17 4 5 
Total 74 100 12 100 86 100 
(Source: Sub Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (47%) in the study responded that the overall efficiency 
of the companies has increased after privatisation. Similarly about 30% stated that it 
decreased and about 19% showed indifference. About 5% of respondents did not know 
whether the efficiency had increased or decreased. In this case also, there is one 
difference between the two different strategic groups, i.e. the majority of the employees 
(50%) of the privatised enterprises found that the efficiency had increased, while the 
majority of the trade union representatives (41%) said it had decreased. This may be due 
to the differences in the strategies that they perceived.  
 
In terms of managerial effectiveness of the enterprises after privatisation, the results are 
as follows:  
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Table 5.3.4: Managerial Effectiveness of the Enterprises after Privatisation 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Improved 21 28 2 17 23 27 
Deteriorated 26 35 4 33 30 35 
No change 25 34 6 50 31 36 
Don’t know 2 3   2 2 
Total 74 100 12 100 86 100 
 (Source: Sub Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
Only about 27% of respondents said that the managerial effectiveness had improved after 
privatisation, whereas about 35% expressed that it had deteriorated. The majority of the 
respondents stated that there was no significant difference after privatisation (about 36%). 
Similarly about 2% did not know what was happening, whether it had improved or 
deteriorated. In this case both of the strategic groups have similar opinions on the 
outcome of privatisation regarding managerial efficiency. 
 
The respondents were asked whether the economic burden on the government due to the 
privatised enterprises had reduced. The results of their opinions are as follows:  
Table 5.3.5: Opinion on economic burden of the government after Privatisation 
 Frequency  
Percentage 
 
Reduced 89 66 
Increased 21 16 
Don’t Know 25 18 
Total 135 100 
(Source: Sub sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The overwhelming responses of the respondents confirm that the economic burden of the 
government has reduced (66%). Only 16% of respondents stated that it had increased, 
whereas 18% did not have any opinion. Of course, as stated by the majority of the 
respondents, the government’s economic burden of those enterprises has reduced, as the 
government need no longer pay any subsidy or other economic facility to them, neither as 
a form of subsidy nor investment as a form of loan. 
 133
5.3.3 Employment Generation 
Privatisation is supposed to bring about increased efficiency, growth in investment and, 
consequently, more employment in the long term. However, in the process, a certain 
amount of restructuring in the enterprise is expected, which could generally result in 
reduced employment in the short term. At the same time, it is very difficult to pinpoint 
the exact effect of privatisation on total employment, because both positive and negative 
factors act simultaneously. First, there is a ‘no reduction clause’, which seeks to stabilise 
the employment level. Second, a voluntary retirement scheme has been introduced in 
some privatised units before and after privatisation. Third, there are also cases where 
existing employees have resigned after privatisation and replacements have been made.  
This neutralizes the effects on total employment figures (Manadhar and Bajracharya, 
1999:23). 
 
Some of the privatised units have been closed down after privatisation. If we include 
employment figures in these closed units, then the total effect is substantially different. 
Although, whether such closure is due to privatisation or due to some other factor is a 
matter of debate. Even in the public enterprise sector, there has been a gradual decline in 
employment opportunities, i.e. 59,550 in 1989/90, 47,548 in 1996/97 and 46,733 in 
1998/99 (this may again be due to privatisation, number of public enterprises that have 
been reduced hence, total number of employee automatically declined). However, if we 
exclude the closed units and seeks to analyse the total employment figure, then the total 
effect is marginal. One study shows that in the 9 privatised units, total changes in 
employment were positive, though at minimal level, i.e. total 3228 before privatisation 
and 3242 after privatisation (until 1999) (Ibid 23). Similarly, another study (of 10 
privatised units) also shows a positive change during the period of 1992-1999 after 
privatisation, though among these ten units employment was increased only in two units 
(Ghimire 2004: 220). 
 
As discussed in a previous section of this chapter, employment in HBTF has declined as 
the number of permanent staff has declined sharply (595 before privatisation and 124 
after privatisation in 2003). This is due to the new arrangement of personnel 
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management, as the company has hired a significantly higher number on a temporary 
basis. Similarly in NFI, employment declined not only in the permanent staff but also in 
the total number (46 before privatisation and 37 after privatisation in 2003).  However, in 
BPM, the employment generation is significantly higher in comparison to before 
privatisation (283 before privation and 457 after privatisation in 2003). In BJM, the 
comparison could not be made, as the statistics were not available from the period before 
it was leased. However, the number of employees might not have reduced, as there was a 
clause requiring the lessee not to lay off the employees. Therefore the total number 
should not be less than before. The indicator of one year shows a positive change in other 
indicators as well.  
 
The perception of the respondents of employment generation is shown in the following 
table: 
Table 5.3.6: Employment Generation after Privatisation 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Increased 31 42 1 8 32 37 
Decreased 30 41 8 67 38 44 
No significant change 12 16 3 25 15 18 
Don’t Know 1 1 - - 1 1 
Total 74 100 12 100 86 100 
 (Source: Sub Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The table shows that about 37% of respondents considered that there was an increase in 
total employment after privatisation, whereas about 44% thought that it decreased. About 
18% thought that it has not changed significantly and about one percent did not know. 
The main reason of the perception among respondents was probably the company they 
were working for. For example, respondents who work in a company where employment 
has increased considered that the employment generation after privatisation had 
increased, and vice versa. However, the majority of the respondents considered that the 
total employment had reduced after privatisation and that is the case in the figures also.  
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 5.3.4 Employee-Related Facilities and Participation 
The employees working in privatised enterprises (in the study) and some trade union 
leaders and activists were asked to express their perceptions and opinions of job security 
after privatisation, participation in the decision-making process, and salary and other 
fringe benefits that employees have been gaining. The results are shown in the following 
tables.   
 
The loss of jobs is the major issue in any privatisation move. It is generally accepted that 
public enterprise employees enjoy job security to a considerable extent. One of the 
prerequisites of privatisation in Nepal is a guarantee of continued employment, provided 
the worker agrees to work for the private employer. Similarly the labour laws give some 
protection to workers with regards to job security. Accordingly, labourers employed in 
the private sector enjoy a fair measure of security of tenure. Taking into account this legal 
protection, it seems that the workforce to be transferred to the private sector may have job 
security (DEAN, 1998). However, the case study shows that the employees still feel 
insecure in privatised enterprises. 
 
In total 74 employees and 12 trade union representatives were interviewed to ascertain 
their perceptions of job security in the privatised enterprises, the results are as follows: 
Table 5.3.7: Job Security in the Privatised Enterprises 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
High 9 12 - - 9 10 
Average 44 59 2 17 46 54 
Low 16 22 10 83 26 30 
Don’t know 5 7 - - 5 6 
Total 74 100 12 100 86 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
Only about 10% of respondents (from the group of employees, not from the trade union 
groups) regarded their job security as being high in the privatised units, whereas the 
majority—about 54%—regarded it as average, i.e. neither high nor low, in the privatised 
units. This shows a positive attitude even though they did not consider their positions to 
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be highly secure. About 30%, however, thought that the job security was low after 
privatisation, whereas about 6% did not know whether they were secure or not. The 
overall attitude of the respondents could be interpreted as positive, as the percentage of 
high and average is about 64%. However, there is a difference between the two groups of 
respondents, i.e. the majority of the employees (59%) considered it to be average, 
whereas the majority of the trade union representatives (83%) considered it to be low.  
 
Employees’ participation in the decision-making process in Nepal is generally absent, 
whether it is a public or private enterprise. Outside of collective bargaining, the decision-
making process is considered a management prerogative, even though the Labour Act of 
1992 made a provision for workers’ participation and a Labour Relations Committee to 
be formed in every establishment. The purpose of the committee is to encourage friendly 
and amicable relations between the workers and the employers, and to discuss matters of 
mutual interest (Ibid 29). 
 
In total 86 employees and trade union representatives were interviewed to ascertain their 
perceptions on their participation in the decision-making process; their responses are as 
follows: 
Table 5.3.8: Role of Employees in the Decision-Making Process 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Yes 15 20 3 25 18 21 
No 58 79 9 75 67 78 
Don’t know 1 1 - - 1 1 
Total 74 100 12 100 86 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
About 21% responded that there is employee participation in the decision-making 
process, whereas about 78% stated that there is no such participation. About one percent 
did not know. The majority of respondents (from both strategic groups) felt that they are 
excluded from the decision-making process, directly or indirectly. This shows that there 
is still an implementation deficit in the provision set down in the Labour Act of 1992 to 
enable the participation of workers in the decision-making process, in order to improve 
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the working environment and the working relationship among workers, and enhance 
management efficiency.  
 
Respondents (employees of the privatised enterprises, sub-sample two) were asked to 
express their opinions of salary and other fringe benefits they receive in comparison to 
the situation from before privatisation. Overall, only about 5% were satisfied and 
reported that the salary and other benefits are higher than before privatisation, whereas 
about 41% expressed that there were no significant differences (almost similar) and the 
majority of them (about 53%) expressed that it is lower than before. Only about 1% could 
not figure out whether it is better or worse.  The following table shows the result as 
expressed by the respondents.  
 
Table 5.3.9: Salary and Other Facilities in the Privatised Enterprises 
 Frequency Percent 
Higher 4 5 
At Par (almost 
similar) 30 41 
Lower 39 53 
Don’t know 1 1 
Total 74 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample two of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
When asked about specific benefits and facilities, their responses are shown in the 
following table. The majority of the respondents viewed that workers’ exploitation, the 
company’s capacity, capacity utilisation and sales have all increased (55%, 81%, 49% 
and 72% respectively), whereas some viewed that there is further deterioration in the 
number of workers, security situation, union activities and profits (56%, 49%, 48%, 36% 
and 36% respectively). Some respondents believe that there are no significant changes in 
salary/allowances, working conditions and working time (45%, 49%, and 69% 
respectively). Some believe that bonuses and social securities have been abolished after 
privatisation (60 % and 51 % respectively). 
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Table 5.3.10: Salary and Other Facilities in the Privatised Enterprises (in detail)18 
 New addition Increased 
No 
change Decreased 
Abolishe
d 
Total 
Respondents 
1.Salary/Allowances 
1 
(1) 
10 
(12) 
37 
(45) 
35 
(42) 
- 
- 
83 
2. Leaves 
- 
- 
- 
- 
36 
(43) 
46 
(56) 
1 
(1) 
83 
3. Working Conditions 
1 
(1) 
14 
(17) 
39 
(49) 
23 
(28) 
4 
(5) 
81 
4. Working Time 
2 
(2) 
24 
(29) 
57 
(69) 
- - 83 
5. Number of Workers 
2 
(2) 
32 
(39) 
8 
(10) 
41 
(49) 
- 83 
6. Security 
1 
(1) 
8 
(10) 
34 
(41) 
39 
(48) 
- 82 
7. Union Activities 
3 
(4) 
19 
(25) 
26 
(34) 
28 
(36) 
1 
(1) 
77 
8. Worker’s Exploitation 
1 
(1) 
43 
(55) 
27 
(35) 
6 
(8) 
1 
(1) 
78 
9. Company’s Capacity 
6 
(7) 
68 
(81) 
7 
(8) 
3 
(4) 
- 84 
10. Capacity Utilization 
- 40 
(49) 
12 
(15) 
30 
(37) 
- 82 
11. Sales 
- 60 
(72) 
10 
(12) 
13 
(16) 
- 83 
12. Profits 
- 29 
(35) 
18 
(22) 
29 
(36) 
6 
(7) 
82 
13. Bonus 
- 3 
(4) 
12 
(15) 
17 
(22) 
47 
(60) 
79 
14. Social Security 
(insurances, pension, 
gratuity etc.) 
- 1 
(1) 
19 
(24) 
19 
(24) 
40 
(51) 
79 
(Figures in parentheses represent percentage of the respondents) 
(Source: Sub-Sample two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
                                                 
18 The opinion expressed by the both groups—employees of the privatised enterprises and trade union 
representatives—were almost similar so they are presented without being separated  
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In a nutshell, the above table clearly indicates that the majority of the respondents 
perceived the company’s capacity, capacity utilisation and sales to have increased 
(positive impact), workers’ exploitation also increased (negative impact), leaves, numbers 
of workers, security situation, union activities and profits have decreased (negative 
impact), bonuses and social securities have been abolished after privatisation (negative 
impact) and there are no significant differences in salary/allowances, working conditions 
and working time (neither negative nor positive).  
5.3.5 Role of the Government (Including Rules and Regulations) for Facilitating the 
Privatised Enterprises 
Respondents were asked to express their opinion on: 
• the role of the government on the management of privatised enterprises 
• the welfare of workers of privatised enterprises 
•  facilities/support provided by the government for the overall development of 
privatised enterprises 
• the role of the existing policies, statutes and regulations to promote the 
privatisation process in Nepal. 
The responses expressed by the different strategic groups are discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
According to the following table, the overwhelming response from the first group, i.e. 
policy makers and academicians, was that the role of the government in the management 
of privatised enterprises has been extremely positive (65%), whereas from the same 
group only 14% felt that it was negative and 21% did not know whether it was positive or 
negative. The response from the second group, i.e. trade union representatives, is 
somewhat different; only 8% thought that the role of the government was positive, 
whereas the majority (67%) thought it was negative and 31% did not know whether it 
was positive or negative. Although the overall responses were positive (60%), it differs 
according to the different strategic groups, as shown in the following table. This may be 
due to the interests of the different strategic groups in the resources at stake.  
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Table 5.3.11: Government’s Role on Management of Privatised Enterprises 
 
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Frequency Percent
Positive 87 65 1 8 88 60 
Negative 19 14 8 67 27 19 
Don’t Know 28 21 3 25 31 21 
Total 134 100 12 100 146 100 
 (Source: Sub-Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
While broaching the issue of the role of the government in the welfare of the workers in 
privatised enterprises, the responses were as follows: 
 
Table 5.3.12: Government’s Role on Welfare of the Workers 
  
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Frequency Percent
Positive 88 65 1 9 89 61 
Negative 25 18 8 73 33 22 
Don’t Know 23 17 2 18 25 17 
Total 136 100 11 100 147 100 
 (Source: Sub Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
On this issue also, the majority of the respondents from group one, i.e. policy makers and 
academicians, believed that the role is positive (65%), whereas from the same group 
about 18% felt that it is negative. Similarly, 17% expressed that they did not know 
whether it is positive or negative. However, the other group, i.e. trade union 
representatives, had a different response; 73% found the government’s role to be 
negative, whereas 9% found it to be positive. Although the overall result (61%) was 
found to be positive, it differed according to the background of the strategic group. Most 
of the respondents in the first category either work in the government sector or in the 
private sector as higher level bureaucrats, who felt that the business that the government 
conducts is correct (though some were very critical during the interview). Since the 
employees working in the privatised enterprises expressed their extreme dissatisfaction 
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with the management and other facilities, the result shown here does not match. It would 
have been otherwise if the government’s attitude toward the welfare of the privatised 
enterprises had been positive (as most of the employees were expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the government’s role during the interview, asking the researcher not 
mention their names).  
 
The respondents were requested to pinpoint whether any facilities/support have been 
provided by the government for the overall development of the privatised enterprises, 
their opinions are as follows: 
 
Table 5.3.13: Opinion on Facilities/Support Provided by the Government  
 Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Yes 28 21 
No 42 31 
Don’t Know 64 48 
Total 134 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
Only about 21% of respondents expressed that the government has provided some sort of 
facilities for the overall development of the privatised enterprises. They were asked to 
point out what types of facilities were/are being provided, and mentioned general things 
like the government has been providing a sound environment for the overall operation of 
the companies, the government has been showing flexibility for getting dues from the 
privatised companies (which is of course an accusation from the Auditor General 
expressed in his yearly audit report 1999), and so forth. However, the majority of the 
respondents (48%) expressed that they did not know whether there is something that the 
government has been doing for privatised enterprises, whereas 31% vocally expressed 
that there was/is nothing that the government has been providing for the overall 
development of the privatised companies.  
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Box 3: BOOT unable to attract investors 
Government to recall tenders for airport constructions 
 
After failing to attract investors to develop and operate four airports under the Build-Own-Operate and 
Transfer (BOOT) scheme by its first tender, the government has once again called bids for the purpose.  
 
"As we could not receive bids fulfilling our requirements in the first tender, we decided to re-tender," said 
an official at the Ministry of Culture, Civil Aviation and Tourism (MoCCAT).  Earlier, the government had 
invited tenders to operate four airports under the Infrastructure Development and Operation by Private 
Investment Ordiannce-2004, which include Gautam Buddha Airport, Bhairahawa, Pokhara Airport, Dharan 
Airport and Dhangadhi Airport.  
 
He said that through Yeti Incorporate submitted tenders for Pokhara and Dharan airports, it could not meet 
all the criteria set for the bids. "However, the government received no bid for the remaining airports, 
though some companies had submitted letter of intent," said Y. Gautam, joint secretary at the MoCCAT.  
He, however, expressed optimism that new offer will attract investors to operate these airports under the 
BOOT. "In case the government does not receive bids even during the second tender, it may decide on the 
grounds of mutual agreement to allow ‘capable’ company to operate airports," he said.  
 
The Kathmandu Post Oct 13 2004 
 
Attempts have been made to find out whether the present policies and regulations are 
conducive to the promotion of the privatisation process in Nepal, the responses are 
reflected in the following table.  
 
Table 5.3.14: Suitability of the Existing Policies, Statutes and Regulations for 
Promoting Privatisation Process 
 
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 49 36 - - 49 33 
No 68 50 8 67 76 51 
Don’t Know 19 14 4 33 23 16 
Total 136 100 12 100 148 100 
 (Source: Sub-Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (from both strategic groups) did not agree that the 
present rules and regulations are enough or conducive to the overall development of the 
privatisation process in Nepal. Only 33% (only from the group of policy makers and 
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academicians) believed that they are conducive, but the majority (51%) disagreed and 
expressed that there is still room for improvement of the policies. They said that the 
government should issue proper regulations to address the current demand (still we have 
only the Privatisation Act of 1994, but the government has not issued any regulation to 
address the implementation barriers, as the act has delegated the authority to the 
government to issue any regulation and the Auditor General also pointed this out in his 
report 1999). They also suggested that the government should amend the Privatisation 
Act according to the experiences so far, by implementing the policy. About 16%, 
however, did not know whether it is positive or conducive. 
Box 4: Who is Responsible, Who is to be Blamed 
In the case of Agricultural Tools Factory the government is heavily criticized by the experts. It is blamed 
that the government did not assess the financial standing and managerial capacity of the bidder. This 
became the major problem, which led the factory to its present state. The factory was privatised through 
the sale of shares in 1997. It is the first company transferred to the employees of the factory. Since then 
serious doubts were cast on the management ability of the acquirer to operate the factory.  
When the performance of the company deteriorated significantly, there was a severe clash among the 
owners, which led to the closure of the factory.  The employees do not have sufficient capital to invest and 
the real investors were someone else who wanted to get advantage from the provision of the Act that the 
employee may buy the bid at only Rs. 10,000 instead of Rs. 20,000. It was found that the investors were 
not industrialists with a good industrial background and were actually opportunists. They therefore lacked 
knowledge, skill and experience to run such a big enterprise.19 The finding of the MoF in the report relating 
to the cause of failure of ATF contradicts with the commitment of the government put forward in the Ninth 
Plan, which says  “the selection of investor will only be made after careful assessment of business skills 
and experience, financial status, resources, access to markets and business plans for the enterprise." Indeed, 
what has been written is just limited on the papers and not actually implemented.    
In the case of the failure of this enterprise, the Privatisation Act is also responsible. Though there are a 
number of criteria to select the best bid offer, there is no system for giving weight to each criterion. This is 
because the rules and guidelines under the Act are not prepared. As a result, the highest bidder is selected. 
This has been identified as one of the main reasons for the failure of ATF.20  Therefore, the government is 
fully responsible for the downfall of ATF. Before giving it to the private hand it was the responsibility of 
the government to see the whole background of the potential owner. 
Source: MoF (1999), Monitoring Privatised Enterprises, and Business Age (2000), Privatisation 
Process in Nepal (cf. Adhikari and Adhikari 2000) 
 
                                                 
19  MoF (1999) 
20 Business Age (2000), Privatisation Process in Nepal 
 144
5.3.6 The Gains and Losses of Privatisation 
Responding to the question relating to the gains of privatisation, most of the respondents 
listed increased private participation, reduced financial and administrative burden on the 
government, increased efficiency/productivity, reduced political interference and  
reduced corruption as the major gains of privatisation (35%, 23%, 14%, 9%, 6% 
respectively in the priority level). According to the priority level, the three most 
important achievements (gains) are recognised as being increasing private participation, 
reducing financial and administrative burden on the government and increased 
efficiency/productivity of the enterprises. A few respondents also said that it increased 
employment (4%) and strengthened market competition (4%) and the supply of quality 
goods and services (3%) to the people, as some achievements of privatisation. However, 
strikingly the least prioritised achievement is increasing revenue. Only 2% of respondents 
believed that privatisation could increase the revenue of the government, which is the 
main achievement in other countries.   Some of the key respondents (about 25%) also 
highlighted that privatisation helps inject capital in the social sectors by increasing 
revenue and investing in sectors such as water, electricity, education and health. Some 
others (about 15%) added that it makes labour disciplined and promotes private 
participation in the national economy.  A few respondents added that privatisation also 
facilitates technology upgrades, product diversification and capital mobilisation. 
However, very few informants said that there are no gains of privatisation. The following 
table shows the gains of privatisation expressed by the respondents: 
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Table 5.3.15: The Gains of Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Nepal 
Policy 
makers and 
academicia
ns 
Employees 
of 
privatised 
enterprises 
Trade 
union 
representati
ves 
General 
public 
residing 
around the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 
        
Freq. % 
Increased private 
participation 32 24 36 49 6 55 22 40 96 35 
Reduced financial and 
administrative burden on 
the government 
38 29 17 23 3 27 3 5 61 23 
Increased 
efficiency/productivity 
of the enterprises 
26 20 6 8 2 18 5 9 39 14 
Reduced political 
interference 13 10 - -  - 12 22 25 9 
Reduced corruption 5 4 4 5   7 13 16 6 
Increased employment 6 5 5 7   1 2 12 4 
Strengthened market 
competition 3 2 4 5   3 5 10 4 
Supply of quality goods 
and services 7 5     1 2 8 3 
Increased revenue 2 1 2 3   1 2 5 2 
Total 132 100 74 100 11 100 55 100 272 100 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
When the respondents were asked about the losses of privatisation, the majority stressed 
that it causes the creation of private monopolies, increasing the price of goods and 
services, a loss of employment and poor quality of the goods and services provided by the 
privatised enterprises (36%, 21%, 20% and 19% respectively in the priority level). Most 
argued that since the private sector is profit motivated, there are chances of price hikes 
and tax evasion. A few respondents added that there have been many losses, as most of 
the privatised enterprises in Nepal have failed. Some respondents (4%) expressed that the 
loss of revenue is also a loss of the privatisation program in Nepal.  
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Table 5.3.16: The Losses of Privatisation of Public Enterprises in Nepal 
Policy 
makers and 
academicia
ns 
Employees 
of 
privatised 
enterprises 
Trade 
union 
representati
ves 
General 
public 
residing 
around the 
privatised 
enterprises 
Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 
        
Freq. % 
Creation of private 
monopoly 54 41 25 36 2 17 13 26 94 36 
Price increase 33 25 9 13 1 8 13 26 56 21 
Loss of employment 22 17 12 17 7 59 13 26 54 20 
Poor service/quality of 
goods 17 13 21 30 1 8 11 22 50 19 
Loss of revenue 6 4 3 4 1 8   10 4 
Total 132 100 70 100 12 100 50 100 264 100 
(Source: Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The respondents were asked to express their opinion on the basis of the privatisation 
program implemented so far and the performance of the privatised enterprises’ 
achievements to date. In general, most of the respondents pointed out that the overall 
impact of the privatisation policy in Nepal is neither positive nor negative, but average (a 
mix). Hence, there are still some room for improvement.  
5.3.7 Level of Satisfaction with the Privatisation Process 
Privatisation has been taken as an alternative to public enterprise management to obtain a 
better performance. However, there are various opinions and views regarding this notion. 
To ascertain the perception of various stakeholders, the study conducted a survey and the 
results are as follows:  
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Table 5.3.17: Level of Satisfaction with the Privatisation Process Adopted in Nepal 
Benefits Strongly 
satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Strongly 
dissatisfied 
Total 
number
General objectives 16 
(12) 
62 
(48) 
32 
(25) 
13 
(10) 
6 
(5) 129 
Transparency in 
valuation process 
of assets 
2 
(2) 
12 
(9) 
23 
(18) 
65 
(51) 
26 
(20) 128 
Modality adopted 6 
(5) 
36 
(28) 
55 
(43) 
24 
(19) 
6 
(5) 127 
Selling process 1 
(1) 
12 
(9) 
45 
(35) 
58 
(46) 
11 
(9) 127 
Monitoring system 2 
(2) 
7 
(5) 
15 
(12) 
63 
(49) 
41 
(32) 128 
Institutional 
arrangement 
(privatisation 
committee, 
privatisation cell, 
technical 
committee etc.) 
4 
(3) 
36 
(28) 
51 
(40) 
25 
(20) 
12 
(9) 128 
(Source: Sub-Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The respondents were asked to express their opinion on general objectives set by the 
government to be achieved. The majority are satisfied with the objectives (48%), whereas 
12% said that they are strongly satisfied. But 25% expressed that they are neutral and 
10% are dissatisfied with the objectives sought by implementing the privatisation policy. 
Only 5% of respondents, however, are strongly dissatisfied. On the other hand, the 
majority of the respondents were dissatisfied with the transparency of the valuation 
process, selling process of the enterprises and monitoring and evaluation systems of the 
government towards privatised enterprises (51%, 46% and 49% respectively). At the 
same time, 20% and 32% of respondents were strongly dissatisfied with the transparency 
and monitoring system respectively, whereas 18% on transparency, 35% on selling 
process and 12% respondents on monitoring system were neutral. The majority of the 
respondents regarding the modality of the process adopted for privatising the PEs and 
institutional arrangements were neutral (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) (43% and 40% 
respectively) but 28% of each were satisfied with it.  
 
In a nutshell, the respondents were: 
• satisfied only with the aspects of the general objectives of privatisation,  
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• dissatisfied with the transparency of the valuation process of assets, selling 
process of PEs and monitoring and evaluation system after privatisation, 
• neutral regarding the modalities adopted and institutional arrangement 
(privatisation committee, Privatisation Cell, formation of Technical Committee 
etc.) for the privatisation process. 
Thus, apart from the general objectives, regarding the rest of the identified factors, 
responses were either dissatisfied or neutral. This indicates that the level of satisfaction 
with the privatisation process adopted in Nepal has not been very positive. It therefore 
signifies the need for reviewing the process in particular the transparency of the valuation 
process, selling process and monitoring system, in order to achieve a better privatisation 
process.   
5.3.8 The Principal Beneficiaries and Losers of the Privatisation Program 
One of the major objectives of this study was to identify the principal beneficiaries and 
losers of privatisation in Nepal. For identifying the beneficiaries and losers, one should 
take note of the basic idea of strategic group analysis, which was briefly mentioned in an 
earlier chapter (Chapter Two); the role of strategic groups cannot be ignored. As Evers 
indicated, strategic groups play a major role in obtaining resources for the benefit of the 
group to which they belong. Furthermore, in the Nepalese context it has become apparent 
that the role of the different groups has been found. However, some groups have 
benefited while others have lost. 
 
The privatisation program directly or indirectly affects its stakeholders, though not in the 
same proportion. The stakeholders of the program could be identified as the government, 
the big business houses (big investors), the small investors, the consumers and the 
employees of the enterprises. The benefits of privatisation might not be shared equally by 
all the stakeholders, i.e. some of them benefit and some of them lose out. The following 
two tables present the beneficiaries and losers of privatisation in Nepal, as identified by 
the three groups of respondents (policy makers and academicians; employees of the 
privatised enterprises and trade union representatives). 
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Table 5.3.18: The Principal Beneficiaries of the Privatisation Program  
Policy makers 
and academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade union 
representatives Total  
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Big business houses 
(big investors) 90 68 60 83 11 92 161 75 
Consumers 21 16 2 3 1 8 24 11 
Government/Decisio
n makers 10 8 8 11   18 8 
Small investors 9 7 2 3   11 5 
Employees 1 1     1 1 
Total 131 100 72 100 12 100 215 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (75%) from all groups pointed out that the big business 
houses (big investors) are the principal beneficiaries of the Nepalese privatisation 
program, while consumers are placed (11%) in the second position. Government/ 
decision makers are identified as ranking third (8%) as perceived by the respondents. 
They explained that big business houses are the principal beneficiaries due to the benefits 
obtained by them through the program. The respondents elaborated along the same lines 
that most of the criticism from the general public stated that the companies were 
generally under–valued when sold, the buyer of the companies benefited by obtaining the 
fixed assets at a very nominal price, and due to the lack of business culture, they are 
enjoying the benefits of the company even though the companies operate at severe losses 
(companies are in loss but due to double bookkeeping, buyers have been enjoying its gain 
by diverting the capital to their other companies). Most of the employees who were 
interviewed strongly expressed that by diverting the income of the company to their other 
companies, resulting in the company operating at a loss, the owners are enjoying the 
benefits of privatisation. This is evident in the performance of the company, as well as 
the fact that production and sales of the companies have increased enormously but the 
companies are in huge losses. It, therefore, indicates that something is gravely amiss that 
should be explored and mitigated. Hence, the principal beneficiaries of the program are 
the big business houses who were able to purchase the enterprises through privatisation. 
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The respondents identified the principal losers of the privatisation program of Nepal as 
follows:  
Table 5.3.19: The Principal Losers of the Privatisation Program 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade union 
representatives Total  
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Employees of the 
Privatised Enterprises 56 43 43 58 10 84 109 50 
Small investors 34 26 10 14 1 8 45 21 
Consumers 15 11 20 27 1 8 36 17 
Government/Decision 
makers 15 11 1 1   16 7 
Big business houses 
(big investors) 11 9     11 5 
Total 131 100 74 100 12 100 217 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of respondents from all three groups (50%) believed that the employees of 
the privatised enterprises are the major losers due to the privatisation of PEs in Nepal. 
Most of them were forced either to quit their jobs, as the working conditions had 
deteriorated, and the new management was reluctant to take them into the new 
environment, or simply accept the poor working conditions and benefits, whatever the 
new private management offered. The second biggest majority (21%) expressed that the 
other group who had lost out were the small investors who were not able to purchase the 
enterprises as the conditions were not suitable for them, whereas some (17%) felt that 
consumers are also losers as they are facing higher prices after privatisation, a decrease in 
the quality of goods and services, and monopoly in the market.  
 
Hence, from the above table we could conclude that the two major losers in the 
privatisation of PEs in Nepal are employees of the privatised enterprises and small 
investors who wish to invest in the enterprises but due to the unfavourable conditions 
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(though not excluded), could not take part in the competition (which might be more 
competitive if they were able to take part in the bidding process). 
5.3.9 Overall Impact of Privatisation 
Finally, the respondents were asked to express their opinion on the overall impact of the 
policy in Nepal (whether it is positive or not); their responses were as follows:  
Table 5.3.20: Overall impact of Privatisation in Nepal 
 
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Frequency Percent
Positive 8 6 - - 8 5 
Average 72 53 3 25 75 51 
Poor 56 41 9 75 65 44 
Total 136 100 12 100 148 100 
(Source: Sub Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The above table shows that only a few respondents (5%) (from the first group only) 
believed that the impact of privatisation in Nepal is positive, whereas the majority (51%) 
expressed that it is average, that it is neither positive, as some thought, nor poor, as some 
critics opined, but still there is something to be done to achieve the full benefits of 
privatisation. However, 44% of respondents felt that the achievement of privatisation in 
Nepal is poor. The objectives, according to them, were not achieved as expected and the 
economic conditions of the privatised enterprises even deteriorated in terms of overall 
performance—most of them are loss making with no significant contribution to the 
national economy. Some quantitative data collected from the secondary sources can be 
found in the annexes.   
 
5.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, attempts have been made to discuss the institutional arrangement for 
privatisation, the implementation process in four separate enterprises and the impact of 
privatisation. In the implementation process of the four enterprises, there were some 
distinctions made between them, especially in the negotiation process. For example, in 
 152
the first phase (in the case of HBTF and BPM) the negotiating committees did not 
negotiate with the bidders for the prices they had offered, whereas the bidders were asked 
to revise their offers in the second phase without disclosing the prices offered by other 
bidders. Instead of the council of ministers, the high-level privatisation and the high-level 
negotiating committees were given full authority by the government to finalise the 
transactions and conclude the agreement with the winning bidders. Based on the data 
presented in four privatised enterprises the overall impact of the privatisation policy is 
mixed. Similarly, the survey results of the different strategic groups’ opinions show 
mixed results, i.e. in some cases the respondents were positive; however, in regards to 
overall impact, they were not as positive. The main reason may be that, as privatisation 
proceeded and subsidies were removed as part of market-oriented reforms, prices of 
goods that had been previously subsidised rose significantly. These included electricity, 
water, fuel and some basic consumption goods such as sugar. This disadvantaged small 
farmers and those employed in the urban informal sector. 
 
In the next chapter, discussion will be continued while illustrating/exploring the problems 
faced in the process of privatisation in Nepal, as well as suggested measures to be taken 
into account for the improvement of the implementation process so that the objectives 
may be achieved as expected. 
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Chapter Six 
Problems and Prospects of Privatisation in Nepal 
 “Privatisation is like dismantling a bomb—it must be done very carefully, for 
wrong decisions can have nasty consequences” 
-  Savas, 2000:284 
6.0 Introduction 
 
Throughout the world an environment is being created that favours privatisation through 
liberalisation and economic reforms, but the privatisation movement is not free from 
constraints and obstacles. “There are obstacles to be overcome, arguments to be rebutted, 
proponents to be mobilised, and opponents to be thwarted” (Savas, 2000:284). These 
arguments are equally pertinent in the Nepalese context, as there have been many 
obstacles that can be held responsible for the results not being as expected. The obstacles 
are identified here and are analysed on the basis of what Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
proposed, which could be encountered during the implementation process of any policy 
in a developing country.  
 
This chapter is mainly dedicated to outlining the obstacles and prospects of the 
privatisation policy in Nepal. In the first part of the chapter, obstacles that were noted by 
our respondents and other sources such as published reports, study reports, and so on, 
which were believed to be the main barriers in the implementation process in Nepal, will 
be discussed. In the second part, problems of privatised enterprises will be discussed and 
in the third part suggestions that were offered by the respondents/strategic groups have 
been analysed in brief in order to identify the prospects of the policy in Nepal. Hence, the 
chapter is a combination of fact and the opinions of the strategic groups (respondents). 
The way in which the strategic groups have reacted to the facts collected from various 
resources such as field research and secondary information will also be demonstrated. 
 
6.1 Main Problems of Privatisation in Nepal 
 
Savas (2000) identified some barriers to privatisation. He divided those barriers into 
operational barriers, legislative barriers, and sources of opposition—opposition by 
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workers, opposition by public officials and bureaucrats, opposition by business interests 
and opposition by the public (Savas, 2000: 284- 314).  
 
In addition, Grindle and Thomas have also explained some implementation-related issues 
that affect the implementation of policies. They argued, “In the implementation process, 
political, financial, managerial, and technical resources are likely to be needed to sustain 
the reform. Mobilising these is part of the challenge to decision makers and policy 
managers. Those opposing the policy change may attempt to block access to the 
necessary resources, thus stalling the reform and returning it to the policy agenda. 
Choices by policy elites and managers at this stage may have an important bearing on the 
eventual outcome of the reform initiative.” Mobilising these resources, according to the 
writers, is challenging and equally important in the Nepalese case also, but in a different 
way. Since implementing the privatisation policy is a long-term policy issue, it takes a 
long time to implement it in full scale. In Nepal frequent changes in government are 
themselves a major problem which is discussed below. Also there was no commitment or 
consensus21 among the political parties22. Employees’ resistance also delays the 
implementation process. Likewise, a lack of investors, lack of a developed capital market 
and of privatisation funds are other problems related to the financial resources, to some 
extent, of what Grindle and Thomas explained. The deteriorating condition of public 
enterprises, a lack of confidence in government transaction, delays, formation of a 
privatisation committee and buck-passing are to some extent related to managerial and 
technical resources. What Grindle and Thomas argued is that to implement a policy 
successfully these resources should be mobilised in a proper way; however, in the 
Nepalese case, critics argued that these are not being mobilised properly and this creates 
an implementation problem. So the problems discussed here are the problems that were 
encountered in the process of privatisation.  
 
                                                 
21 Opinions of the major political parties are discussed in Chapter Four (4.2) and their common ground and 
differences are discussed as well. 
22 This is not only a problem in Nepal; recently the Japanese Prime Minister dissolved the Parliament and 
called for a snap poll, as some of his own party members disagreed with his proposal of post office 
privatisation (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4236946.stm ) accessed on 5 October 2005.  
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When asked to point out the problems that have been encountered in the implementation 
process of the policy, most of the respondents/strategic groups stated that political 
instability, political commitment/consensus, lack of developed capital market, employee 
resistance, worse conditions of public enterprises and lack of investors are serious 
problems that have been encountered. Some other respondents said that a lack of 
transparency, lack of confidence in government transactions, lack of adequate monitoring 
and evaluation systems, delaying of the process and buck-passing are major problems. 
Similarly a few said that the formation of a privatisation committee and a lack of 
resources available for the implementation of the policy (privatisation fund) are also 
problems. Thus, the respondents pointed out the various problems that hinder the 
effective implementation of the policy. The details are discussed in the following sub-
sections on a group-oriented basis, according to Grindle and Thomas (1991). 
 
Box 5: Main Problems of Privatisation  
pointed out by Mr. T.N. Khanal, the then chief of the Privatisation Cell, Ministry 
of Finance  
“The foremost problems are lack of corporate culture, business accountability, competitive 
atmosphere, operating autonomy and efficient manpower. The leadership and management team is 
not entirely responsible for the deteriorating performance in the PEs. The PEs can remain in 
existence and carry out their operations even if they are bankrupt. The political institutions do not 
assume accountability for the wrongdoing and the dismal performance in the PEs. The lack of 
discipline on the part of employees is another serious problem”  
(Spotlight, March 5, 1999). 
 
The respondents pointed out some problems that were encountered in the process of 
privatisation in Nepal which are given in the following table:  
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Table 6.1.1: Main Obstacles in the Process of Privatisation 
Policy makers 
and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives 
Total 
 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
• Political instability 76 56 7 64 83 57 
• Lack of political consensus 19 14 -  19 13 
• Lack of transparency 11 8 2 18 13 9 
• Lack of developed capital 
markets 5 4 -  5 3 
• Lack of investors 5 4 -  5 3 
• Employee related problems 5 4 -  5 3 
• Formation of privatisation 
committee 5 4 -  5 3 
• Lack of privatisation fund for 
the implementation 3 2 1 9 4 3 
• Worse condition of PEs 3 2 -  3 2 
• Delaying in the process 2 1 1 9 3 2 
• Lack of monitoring and 
evaluation system 2 1 - - 2 2 
Total 136 100 11 100 147 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
 
The above table shows that the respondents/strategic groups have identified some major 
problems that were encountered in the process of privatisation in Nepal. The respondents 
were asked to prioritise the problems that they considered to be the most important and 
the least important. Political instability, lack of political consensus and lack of 
transparency are three major problems that our respondents identified (57%, 13%, and 
9% respectively). Both strategic groups identified them as major problems. Similarly, a 
lack of developed capital markets, a lack of investors, employee-related problems, the 
formation of a privatisation committee and a lack of privatisation funds for the 
implementation are five moderate reasons (each got a 3% response) encountered during 
the implementation process. The three least important, in comparison with other reasons, 
are worse conditions of PEs, delaying in the process and lack of adequate monitoring and 
evaluation systems (each got 2% responses).  
 
The problems that respondents pointed out have been classified into different groups and 
discussed in brief in the following sub-sections. 
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6.1.1 Problems Related to Political Resources 
A series of questions illuminate the fact that political resources can be important in 
introducing and sustaining a reform, particularly one that generates a public reaction 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991:143). In this category the problems faced in Nepal are 
divided into two parts—political instability and political commitment/consensus. 
 
A. Political Instability 
Decision makers often represent the interests of particular organisations. They also 
respond to concerns about the political support available to the regime they represent or 
its leadership (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 100-101). Political stability is one of the 
primary pre-requisites for the successful implementation of privatisation. However, in 
Nepal, since the restoration of the multiparty system in 1990, in total 15 governments of 
different forms, structures and ideologies have come into power.  
 
The following table (6.1.2) shows the composition of different governments during this 
period. The table shows the frequent change in government (even four different types of 
governments in one year). This frequent change in government naturally generates 
variations in the privatisation policy on the one hand and brings about delays in its 
implementation on the other. It is evident that political instability continues to prevail in 
the country, and adversely affects the privatisation process (K. C, 1999:231). The table 
shows that the political instability in the country delayed the privatisation process, as the 
government’s focus was not on long-term policy, but rather on retaining power (as 57% 
of our respondents also identified as a major barrier of privatisation in Nepal). In 
particular, due to the lack of a majority of a single party in parliament during the period 
of 1994-1998, there were frequent changes in government. During these periods the only 
concern of the governments was how to sustain the government, rather than other issues. 
Hence, only two enterprises were privatised during that four-year period, despite the 
government’s policy of privatising 30 PEs during the Ninth Plan period (1997-2002). 
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Table 6.1.2: Composition of Different Governments Since 1991 
Head of the 
government 
Periods Type of 
government 
Party 
Involved in 
Govt. 
Reason for Removal from the 
Govt.  
P.M. Girija Prasad 
Koirala 
1991-1994 Majority Nepali 
Congress 
Internal conflict in the ruling 
party which led to mid term 
election 
P.M. Manmohan 
Adhikari 
1994-1995 Minority CPN (UML) Passed of vote of no-confidence 
P.M. Sher Bahadur 
Deuba 
1995-1997 Coalition led 
by NC  
NC,RPP,NSP Failed in vote of confidence 
P.M. Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand 
1997- 1997 Coalition led 
by 
RPP(Chand) 
RPP(Chand), 
CPN(UML), 
NSP 
Passed of vote of no-confidence 
P.M.Surya Bahadur 
Thapa 
1997- 1998 Coalition led 
by 
RPP(Thapa) 
Coalition led 
by 
RPP(Thapa) 
P.M. resigned the post with the 
consultation of NC party 
P.M. Girija Prasad 
Koirala 
1998- 1998 NC Minority CPN(UML) withdraw support 
P.M. Girija Prasad 
Koirala 
1998- 1998 Coalition led 
by NC 
NC, CPN(ML) NCP(ML) withdraw from the 
government 
P.M. Girija Prasad 
Koirala 
1998-1999 Coalition led 
by NC 
NC, 
CPN(UML), 
NSP 
Election declared 
P.M. Krishna Prasad 
Bhattarai 
1999-2000 Majority Nepali 
Congress 
Internal conflict in the ruling 
party which compelled the PM 
to resign 
P.M. Girija Prasad 
Koirala 
2000- 2001 Majority Nepali 
Congress 
Resignation 
P.M. Sher Bahadur 
Deuba 
2001- 2002 
Sep.  
Majority Nepali 
Congress 
Dismissed by the King 
P.M. Lokendra Bd. 
Chand 
Sep 2002- 
June 2003 
Appointed by 
the King 
Individual 
Basis 
Resignation 
P.M. Surya Bd. Thapa June 2003- 
June 2004 
Appointed by 
the King 
Individual 
Basis 
Resignation 
P. M. Sher Bahadur 
Deuba 
June 2004- 
Jan. 2005 
Appointed by 
the King 
Coalition 
government23 
Dismissed by the King 
No P.M appointed but 
the Government is 
Headed by His Majesty 
the King himself 
Feb.1 2005 - - To date 
(Source: information collected from the field work) 
 
Similarly, after the general election in 1999, the Nepali Congress Party won the single 
majority in the House of Representatives (HoR) but conflicts within the party exacerbated 
the instability in the political spheres, which divided the party into the two factions and 
after 2002 even caused a constitutional crisis in the country, as the political crisis 
                                                 
23 Four parties were included in the government - NC (Democratic) - a fraction of Nepali Congress Party, 
CPN (UML), RPP, NSP and some individuals (two people). 
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deepened, a crisis which is still prevalent in the country. So the single most important 
factor that contributed to the problems of privatisation is political instability in Nepal. 
  
B. Political Commitment/Consensus 
Privatisation is essentially a national economic policy. In Nepal, there seems to be a lack 
of political commitment and national consensus regarding adopting the privatisation 
policy. Among the major political parties, Nepali Congress (NC), Rastriya Prajatantra 
Party (RPP), and Nepal Sadbhabana Party (NSP) are seen to be in favour of privatisation 
to a large extent. On the other hand, the Communist Party of Nepal, United Marxist-
Leninist (CPN- UML), and other leftists, view that possible outcomes of the policy ought 
to be assessed and that it should be implemented gradually and cautiously. Furthermore, 
privatisation in Nepal has been criticised by different segments of the society, namely the 
trade unions, some so-called academicians, employees of various public enterprises, and 
so forth. However, some groups firmly accept the policy as the only remedial measure for 
encompassing economic vulnerability (K. C., 1999: 232). It is, thus, obvious that there is 
a lack of political commitment and national consensus with regard to the privatisation 
policy and program. As a result, the privatisation process has not been able to gain 
momentum. The respondents (13%) also identified this as the second most important 
barrier encountered in the process of privatisation in Nepal. 
6.1.2 Resource Scarcities (Financial and Others) 
One of the most important factors that hinder the privatisation process is the scarcity of 
resources to implement the policy adequately. In this category, financial and related 
problems faced in the process of privatisation in Nepal have been discussed. 
 
A. Lack of Developed Capital Market (Weak Capital Markets) 
Some argue (Savas, 2000:304) that, if the public trusts the government, even primitive 
capital markets can be used to carry out the sale of shares to the public. The commercial 
Bank of Jamaica was successfully privatised by a public offering of shares, even though 
the Kingston Stock Exchange was open only two afternoons a week for two hours each 
time and daily turnover averaged only $30,000 (Ibid). However, the situation could not 
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be comparable in all cases, as the writer described, because the outcomes are also 
dependent on other circumstances. 
 
The capital market in Nepal is in a nascent stage. There is only one organised stock 
market in the country—the Nepal Stock Exchange Limited. However, its activities are 
mainly concentrated on the capital city only. Most of the investors are unaware of the role 
and activities of the Nepal Stock Exchange Ltd. As a consequence, there is an acute 
problem of mobilising funds for private enterprises. Even the existing private sector 
covers only small and cottage industries. 
 
At the same time, the capital market is in its early stages so it cannot smoothly absorb all 
the shares floated in the market, especially when the number is large. Most of the general 
public are not familiar with the transactions of the capital market. Consequently, the 
shares of candidate companies cannot be floated in the market; rather interested strategic 
investors have to be sought. 
 
The empirical evidence also confirmed that the lack of developed capital market is a 
major problem faced in Nepal. Though only 3% of the respondents gave this reason first 
priority as a major cause, 5% gave second and 13% gave third priority, which identifies it 
as one of the major impediments to privatisation.   
 
B. Lack of Investors (Shortage of Capital) 
It is argued that privatisation cannot be carried out because nationals lack the capital to 
participate effectively and therefore foreign or minority domination would be inevitable 
(Savas, 2000:304). There is dearth of genuine investors in Nepal. In order to privatise 
some of the public enterprises, in the past the government has published notices several 
times inviting the submission of proposals but, in some cases, only one or two proposals 
have been submitted. On the one hand, this may be due to a scarcity of investors, 
particularly big investors, and on the other hand, most of the investors are involved in 
easy money-making, such as the trading of foreign goods, which brings the investors a 
higher profit margin (MoF, 1999:55).  We have a very low foreign investment in the 
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industrial sector. In the fiscal year 2002/2003 a total of 71 joint venture industries were 
approved, with a total project cost of Rs. 4.88 billion. In the fiscal year 2003/2004, 78 
such industries with a total project cost of Rs. 4.32 billion were approved (economic 
survey 2003/2004, MoF). There were FDI in the industrial sector, but none of them were 
attracted to invest in the privatisation process. They were interested to invest in the new 
industries rather than to buy old PEs through privatisation. The following box presents an 
instance of how difficult it is to attract investors in Nepal, especially in privatisation:  
 
Box 6: HTF privatisation receives cold response 
The government’s decision to privatise Hetauda Textile Factory (HTF) has once again suffered 
a severe blow. According to officials of privatisation cell of the Ministry of Finance, as in the 
past the response was cold from industrialists. "Only one candidate has submitted the bid 
proposal," said the official. The deadline for submission of proposal expired on Thursday. 
  
The government has already issued such tender calls for two consecutive times in the past and 
had to drop the idea of privatising following similar responses from buyers.  
 
Established over 25 years ago with investment amounting to over Rs 200 million with technical 
and financial assistance from the government of China, the textile factory was one of the most 
successful state-owned ventures until a decade ago. However, the factory started to face 
financial turmoil in the post democratic era mainly due to financial irregularities and heavy 
politicization among the trade union.  
 
The government ultimately took the decision of privatising the industry after laying off all its 
employees in February, 2001. Subsequently, it closed down the industry and released Rs 250 
million to clear the salaries and allowances of over 1,100 employees. 
(Source: The Kathmandu Post January 21, 2005) 
 
 
Likewise, the private sector prefers to invest their money in less risky and high profit 
(unproductive) sectors, e.g. collection of gold and silver, purchase of land and building, 
and so on. Very few investors have shown interest in investing in public enterprises (K. 
C., 1999: 231-32). As a result, by investing in the privatisation of public enterprises, they 
do not want to bear relatively more risk, put more effort and get lower return. Moreover, 
some of the investors want to invest in the industries but they lack the essential know-
how. As a result, they do not dare to invest, and if they do, they fail (MoF, 1999:55). 
Some of the respondents (about 3%) ranked this problem as one of the main impediments 
to privatisation in Nepal.  
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C. Privatisation Fund  
As Simoneti and Böhm (1999) argued, effective corporate governance is the key to the 
efficiency and restructuring of newly privatised enterprises in transitional economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Privatisation funds are intended to provide a corporate 
governance solution to the problem of widely dispersed ownership in enterprises after 
mass privatisation. They have emerged as the major external institutional shareholders—
the ‘true’ owners of the enterprises (p.163). However, in Nepal’s case it is not widely 
expected, as the writers explained, since the business environment and the economy is 
different from the transition economies; here we want to show that the allocating fund for 
the implementation is so much less that a smooth implementation is not expected to 
occur. 
 
Hence, the privatisation fund is another source of criticism. According to the prevailing 
law, all the money received by the government should be deposited in the government’s 
regular account. But the sales proceeds of public enterprises are deposited in a deposit 
account. The explanation of this is that there are several expenditures during the 
privatisation process for which the funds can’t be immediately available from the regular 
government account. So these expenditures are borne from this account. This 
arrangement has made the privatisation process relatively faster and flexible, but the 
Auditor General’s Office has shown grave concern about it (MoF, 1999:59). 
 
 In the implementation of any policy, if not only the privatisation policy, there should be 
a proper means of resource allocation. The above description shows that there is no 
proper resource allocation for the smooth implementation of the privatisation policy in 
Nepal. The Privatisation Cell, which is working as a secretariat of the privatisation 
committee, has not been able to bear the expenses in a simple and easy way, as there is no 
separate fund allocated for implementing the privatisation policy. The cell has to rely on 
the regular budget, which is not enough, as such a case is normal in other government 
organisations, due to the limited financial resources in the country. However, our 
respondents believe that this is not a vital impediment to the smooth implementation of 
the policy, as there is a regular budget allocation. Only about 3% of respondents gave 
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first priority to this reason, which they considered to be one of the major impediments to 
privatisation in Nepal.  
 6.1.3 Environmental and Operational Barriers 
Several surveys in the United States enquired about the principal operational barriers to 
privatisation and found that there were three major operational barriers to privatisation, 
namely labour issues (resistance), the fear of a loss of control, and politics (Savas, 
2000:284). In Nepal’s case, we have also found such barriers during the implementation 
process, as well as finding that the privatisation has also been obstructed by a set of 
adverse ‘environmental’ conditions in the Nepalese economy.  These environmental and 
operational barriers existing in the Nepalese case include employee-related problems, bad 
conditions of PEs, a lack of transparency and delaying problems, which are discussed 
here in brief. 
 
A. Employee-Related Problems 
During the process of privatisation, employees/labourers are usually dissatisfied with 
privatisation. In most of the enterprises, labour resistance was one of the major problems 
which caused privatisation delays. As I have discussed above, there is no consensus 
among the different segments of society, hence employee-related issues are vital. In spite 
of ‘no redundancy’ provisions, voluntary retirement schemes and five percent share 
distribution to the employees at a 25% discount rate, the government has not been able to 
maintain effective communication with employees and labour unions in the privatisation 
program. This is evidenced by the ensuing labour strikes and lockouts at the time of 
privatisation in all the privatised units (CRPS, 1995:42). Thus, in the process of 
privatisation employees’/labourers’ resistance was one of the major problems.  
 
After privatising some PEs, many problems have arisen; they are psychological and 
status-related, discipline-related and facilities-related. The top management complains 
about the absence of discipline among labourers and employees, their laziness, their 
aggressive temperaments and their political inclinations. At the same time, the labourers 
complain about the rude behaviour of the management and the few facilities provided. 
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They also complain that the management does not comply with the purchase and sales 
agreements. Consequently, they have to pressure the management, sometimes through 
demonstrations and even calling strikes, to fulfil those demands that have been 
provisioned in the agreement. The management hires new staff on daily wages instead of 
making the existing staff permanent, because daily-wage staff are very easy to handle and 
are ready to work on a piece-rate basis, which is very cheap. Furthermore, they do not 
demand that management comply with the provisions of the existing laws (MoF, 
1999:53-54). The empirical evidence also confirmed that labour-related problems are one 
of the major impediments to privatisation in Nepal, as there has always been a 
contradictory interest between the government/management and workers. About 3% of 
respondents rated this as a major problem; however about 10% placed it second and 8% 
rated it third. Hence, it is identified as one of the barriers to privatisation in Nepal. 
 
B. Bad Conditions of Public Enterprises  
Most public enterprises are operated in very bad conditions. There is no timely repair or 
maintenance of plants and equipment. Work culture has collapsed in these enterprises. 
All employees are involved in politics directly or indirectly. They are always very 
demanding, which makes the administration of these employees a very difficult task. 
 
Sufficient studies have not been carried out before establishing these enterprises. The 
most important thing is that these enterprises were established in a closed economy. They 
were enjoying the protection and monopoly of the market. Now the environment has 
changed and the economy is open. In this new economic environment there is less 
protection, subsidy and monopoly of the market. As a consequence, some of these 
enterprises have to face competition in the market. Hence, some of these enterprises are 
no longer economically viable and the rest of them are also very difficult to rehabilitate. 
They require big additional investments, better quality of management and a great deal of 
patience. As a result, the private sector hesitates to bid for these enterprises. Even if it 
does bid, it has several terms and conditions and offers a very low price (MoF, 1999:56). 
The following box shows the financial conditions of the PEs, which of course creates a 
problem for privatisation, as most are not economically viable.  
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Some of our respondents (about 2%) identified this as one of the problems of 
privatisation in Nepal, as it is difficult to have competition in the bidding process if only 
a few, if not none, show an interest to take part.  
 
Box 7:   Annual Report of Public Enterprises 
PEs incur losses of Rs 5.9b 
 
The 38 state owned enterprises of the country jointly incurred an operational loss of Rs 5.92 
billion during this fiscal year, which is over 18 percent of the capital expenditure earmarked for 
last fiscal year. The operational loss of these enterprises during the last fiscal year had stood at 
Rs 4.85 billion.  
 
According to the annual report on the status and performance of public enterprises (PE) 
released today by Ministry of Finance, equity investment and loan investment of the 
government on these enterprises has reached Rs 59.04 billion and Rs 51.77 billion respectively.  
However, the net return of investments from these enterprises, during this period, was very low. 
The report states that the government had received Rs 1.52 billion as dividends from these 38 
public enterprises - a return of just 2.58 percent on total equity investment.  
 
The government received a dividend of Rs 1.5 billion from Nepal Telecom and another Rs 3.6 
million, Rs 3 million, Rs 1.1 million and Rs 1 million from Industrial Area Management 
Limited, Janakpur Cigarette Factory, National Productivity and Financial Development Center 
and National Trading Limited, respectively. The government had received Rs 874.3 million as 
dividend from these enterprises during the last fiscal year. 
  
The report states that apart from three enterprises under public utility sector, which had 
generated a profit of Rs 2.04 billion, all other sectors had incurred losses during the review 
period.  
(Source: The Kathmandu Post July 16, 2005) 
 
 
C. Lack of Transparency 
Privatisation policy is concerned with many groups, sections and organisations, whose 
support and cooperation are essential for the successful implementation of the policy. 
Transparency in policies and procedures is one of the most important pre-requisites in 
this regard. However, in the Nepalese context, it is said that there is a lack of 
transparency, and consequently, this is seen as a major problem in the privatisation 
process, particularly in the valuation of assets, bidding procedures and selection criteria 
for evaluating bids, disclosure of purchase price, method of selection of a successful 
bidder, monitoring and supervision of privatised units, and so forth (K. C., 1999: 233). 
After the enactment of the Privatisation Act in 1994, most of the procedures are required 
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to be published and most of the criteria are fixed, so there should be transparency, but 
something still needs to be done by the government to address this criticism. About 9% of 
the respondents believed that this is one of the most important factors affecting 
privatisation in Nepal, which overall constituted the third most important impediment to 
privatisation in Nepal from the stakeholders’ point of view (as seen in the table: 6.1.1). 
 
D. Delaying Problem  
In the present context, the privatisation process has become very lengthy and time-
consuming. From the moment privatisation was initiated, from the top management to the 
lowest level employees, all began to conduct undesirable activities in the respective 
enterprises. Strikes and demonstrations have become standard in the enterprises; the 
misuse of machines, plants, equipment, other property and the company’s funds is also 
considered normal. As a result, the condition of the company deteriorates day by day. 
Eventually, by the time the bid notice for the privatisation of the company is published, 
the condition of the company is so bad that most of the potential bidders refrain from 
bidding. Those bidders that do submit a bid offer such a low price that the government 
finds it difficult to accept the low proposals. A prominent reason for such an unfortunate 
situation is the unnecessary delaying of the privatisation process (MoF, 1999:57). Though 
the reason of ‘delaying problem in the process’ has been ranked tenth by the respondents 
among the eleven, it has nevertheless constituted a serious setback attracting lucrative 
proposals in the bidding process. 
6.1.4 Formation of a Privatisation Committee 
The formation of a privatisation committee is another source of problems. According to 
the Privatisation Act, the government has to nominate two members of the House of 
Representatives for this committee. In order to promote a consensus among the political 
parties, the government usually nominates one member from the opposition party. Since 
political parties differ in their view regarding privatisation, some members of the 
committee try to avoid taking a decision or prefer to delay the process. Moreover, they do 
not accept the responsibility for the democratic decision process. This was one of the 
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major reasons why the privatisation of Himal Cement Company and Nepal Tea 
Development Company took an unnecessarily long time (MoF, 1999:57). 
 
On the other hand, it has been criticised that there is no labour representative in the 
privatisation committee, and no trade union representative, and there is no involvement of 
a chief of the enterprise, and so forth, which would surely help them to reach a consensus 
on the privatisation process. Excluding those representatives may have a negative impact 
on reaching consensus among the different segments of society. Furthermore, there may 
be misunderstandings of the actual situation of the enterprise that is under consideration 
of privatisation (which is also in the pipeline of privatisation).  
 
About 3% of respondents considered that the formation of a privatisation committee is 
also a barrier which should be taken into consideration to improve the pace of 
privatisation. They considered that the committee should be more representative than its 
present form, as there is no trade union representation, no labour representation, and so 
on. It is believed that these representatives must be included in the formation of a 
privatisation committee, which would be a positive step in reaching a consensus for 
privatisation in Nepal.  
6.1.5 Buck Passing 
The Ministry of Finance identified another major practical problem, which is that the 
privatisation issue has become very sensitive to idle talk. Everybody suspects malpractice 
in the privatisation deal, even without evidence. Decisions taken with good intentions are 
also misinterpreted and questions are raised in forums without investigating the facts. The 
Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority and other such agencies start 
probing even for small mistakes, and bureaucrats face serious moral, psychological, 
physical and carrier-related impacts and no one speaks up in their defence. As a 
consequence, the concerned bureaucrats have started to avoid risks. As the functions and 
responsibilities of the different levels of bureaucrats are not defined clearly, the 
bureaucrats can conveniently avoid decision making. Even small decisions that could be 
taken at a bureaucratic level are unnecessarily passed on to the minister, to the 
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privatisation committee and/or to the cabinet thus delaying the process and creating a 
negative environment (MoF, 1999:60). Hence, the problem of governance (bad 
governance) is another major reason that the implementation of privatisation encountered 
problems.  
 
6.2 The Major Problems of Privatised Enterprises 
At the time of the interview, the respondents were also asked about the major problems of 
privatised enterprises. In total, 222 respondents were interviewed and were asked to 
express their opinions on this matter. The following table summarises the results as 
expressed by the different strategic groups (respondents):  
Table 6.2.1: The Major Problems of Privatised Enterprises 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives 
Total 
 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Weak management 26 19 9 12 3 25 38 17 
Lack of entrepreneurship in 
the private sector 21 15 13 18 3 25 37 17 
Lack of conducive 
environment for the 
operation of the enterprises 
21 15 12 16   33 15 
Lack of adequate 
cooperation from the 
government 
20 15 10 14 2 17 32 14 
Lack of funding for 
expansion 19 14 9 12 2 17 30 14 
Lack of market 7 5 12 16 1 8 20 9 
Frequent protest of 
labourers 9 7 4 5   13 6 
Unfavourable export and 
import policy for the 
enterprises 
8 6 4 5   12 5 
Lack of trained manpower 5 4 1 1 1 8 7 3 
Total 136 100 74 100 12 100 222 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (17% for each) said that weak management and lack of 
entrepreneurship in the private sector are the two most prominent problems faced by 
privatised enterprises in Nepal. A lack of a conducive environment for the operation of 
the enterprises, lack of adequate cooperation from the government and lack of funding for 
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expansion are three other major problems faced by privatised enterprises in Nepal, as 
identified by our respondents (15%, 14% and 14% respectively). Similarly, other 
problems, which are deemed less important as identified by our respondents, are a lack of 
market, frequent protests by labourers, unfavourable export and import policies of the 
government for the enterprises, and lack of trained manpower (9%, 6%, 5% and 3% 
respectively). Lack of protection and supportive policy of the government and lack of 
cooperation among the government, management and employees were other major 
problems that key informants added to the list of problems. Some others pointed out that 
the lack of innovation/improvement in terms of efficiency, technological development, 
market exploration and competition were also problems. Similarly, some other key 
informants cited the dominance of limited industrialists in policies, difficult banking 
procedures, overstaffing and the dominance of Indian products in the Nepalese market as 
the problems.  
 
The respondents were also asked how those problems that they have pointed out could be 
solved; the following table presents their responses: 
Table 6.2.2: How the Problems of Privatised Enterprises could be solved? 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives 
Total  
 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Sound government policies 
and programs 54 40 18 24 3 27 75 34 
Govt. should come up with 
positive attitude 29 22 24 32 5 46 58 27 
Strong monitoring and 
evaluation system 21 16 16 22 3 27 40 18 
Creating friendly 
environment for the operation 
of the enterprises 
17 13 13 18 -  30 14 
Availability of funds at 
reasonable interest rate 10 7 2 3 -  12 5 
Freedom of choosing 
employees 3 2 1 1 -  4 2 
Total 134 100 74 100 11 100 219 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
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The majority of the respondents stated that the government should come up with sound 
policies and programs to facilitate the privatisation program (61% respondents made this 
a priority). It shows that the respondents looked to the government to play a positive role 
in solving the problems that Nepalese privatised enterprises have encountered. The 
second largest majority of the respondents (18%) identified that the monitoring and 
evaluation system should be strong and the government should closely monitor privatised 
enterprises. Some (14%) stressed that the overall environment should be business friendly 
to enable the smooth operation of privatised enterprises, by which they mean that the 
law-and-order situation of the country directly affects the industry sector. Only a few 
(5%) thought that the funds for the expansion of enterprises should available at 
reasonable interest rates, while very few (2%) viewed that freedom to choose the 
employees of the enterprises would help to solve the problems that privatised enterprises 
face.  
 
During the interview, most of the key respondents argued that the monitoring and 
evaluation systems after privatisation have been very weak, so the impact of privatisation 
could not be gauged, as nobody knows what goes on in the company after privatisation. 
As in other economic policies, the government should regularly monitor and evaluate the 
privatisation policy. However, in Nepal there is virtually an absence of monitoring 
systems in terms of price regulation, employment conditions, output and quality levels, 
and efficiency. The monitoring process of the privatised units has so far been 
concentrated on the payment of the amount owed by the private sector. It has also been 
observed that only two privatised units have fulfilled their privatisation debt obligations 
to the government. It is, indeed, very difficult to conceive how the government discharges 
its monitoring and evaluation responsibilities when it often fails to collect its due from 
the buyers (K. C., 1999:233). 
 
In all the privatised enterprises, it was a common complaint from all sides, whether the 
investor, employee or the local resident, that the government never came back after 
privatisation. They all want the government to cooperate and monitor the initial 
functioning of the privatised enterprises so that the transaction can be smooth and will 
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succeed in the long run. Employees complain that the government is negligent towards 
the privatised enterprises. The investors criticise that the government has never made any 
supervision programs to evaluate the conditions of the privatised companies and the 
workers working there. The investors frequently raise the issue that the government 
considered it to be its ultimate responsibility to transfer the company after concluding the 
process of privatisation. But the investors disagree with that attitude and action and 
demand extensive cooperation from the government in making available soft loans, 
solving legal, policy-level and other practical problems of the privatised companies, and 
so on (MoF, 1999:57-58). According to the investors, the ultimate responsibility of the 
government is to see the privatised company being run successfully and contribute to the 
national economic development, and not just to hand over the ownership of a public 
enterprise to the private sector and then forget it. 
 
6.3 Suggested Arguments (What could be done to enable smooth Privatisation?) 
 
The previous sub-section of this chapter has outlined a series of problems encountered in 
the process of privatisation in Nepal, as well as the problems encountered by the 
privatised enterprises. In this sub-section, I will discuss the suggested measures that may 
be appropriate to solve the problems, as well as being helpful for improvements in future 
privatisations. These suggestions are based on the information collected during the 
process of interviewing and formal or informal discussions with the stakeholders, 
especially policy makers, academicians, employees of the privatised enterprises and 
private sector managers and trade union leaders. The suggestions would be helpful in the 
context of the Nepalese economy and political environment, which may be different from 
other contexts of policy reform. Hence, the sub-section is fully dependent on the opinions 
of the different strategic groups. 
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Box 8 : Six Objections to Privatisation and How to Address Them 
1. “We can’t throw public sector workers into the street. It’s wrong and they won’t stand for it.  
2. “Privatisation is just another wax for powerful politicians and businessmen to scratch each 
other’s backs, and get rich at the expense of the people”.  
3. “Our citizens won’t accept our handing over precious national assets to foreign (or local) fat 
cats”. 
4. “Our local private sector is too weak. Without state enterprises, our economy will grind to a 
halt”. 
5. “All that privatisation will do is replace a public monopoly with a private monopoly”. 
6. “Why put ourselves through this trauma? Lets just manage our state enterprises better”. 
Source: World Development Report 1997, page 64, cf. Manandhar 1998) 
 
 
6.3.1 Issues/Factors to be Considered When Privatising PEs in the Future 
The stakeholders were asked to point out important factors to be considered when 
implementing the privatisation policy in Nepal. The following table shows the opinions 
expressed by our respondents: 
 
Table 6.3.1: Issues/Factors to be Considered While Privatising Public Enterprises 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Proper valuation of 
asset/property 
42 32 35 47 2 18 79 36 
National interest 39 30 13 18 1 9 53 24 
Transparent decisions 19 14 13 18 2 18 34 16 
Technical capability of 
bidder 
12 9 3 4 1 9 16 7 
Welfare of employees 5 4 5 7 4 37 14 7 
Reducing liability of the 
government 
9 7 1 1   10 5 
Financial status of 
bidder 
3 2 3 4 1 9 7 3 
Revenue generation 3 2 1 1   4 2 
Total 132 100 74 100 11 100 217 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (36%, 24% and 16%) expressed that the most important 
three factors are the proper valuation of assets/property of the enterprises, national 
interest and transparent decisions while implementing the privatisation policy. This 
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argument has been expressed by political parties also24. The main differences were 
regarding the process of privatisation, specifically the valuation process. The respondents 
expressed their concerns over this issue and during the interview said that the government 
should hire more technical manpower and evaluate the property in depth so that there was 
no question of fraud or wrongdoing on the property, particularly in the enterprise being 
sold. The government should be selective and implement the policy, taking full 
consideration of national interest. Decision-making processes should be transparent, 
especially while evaluating the property and evaluating the bids. The privatisation 
process should be initiated in a transparent manner, i.e. using appropriate media for the 
pros and cons of the policy to build the consensus, conducting seminars and workshops, 
interaction program for creating awareness regarding the policy process and procedures 
that have been taken, etc. However, only the third strategic group (trade union 
representatives) has given first priority to the welfare of employees as an important factor 
to be considered. This was due to the interests of the group, as they represent the 
labourers. The other major factors that should be taken in to account while implementing 
the privatisation policy are the technical capability of the bidder (7%) and the welfare of 
employees (7%). The three least important factors are reducing the liability of the 
government (5%), financial status of the bidder (3%) and revenue generation (2%).  
 
Most of the key respondents suggested that the government must be honest and fully 
committed, with a vision to promote economic development, restructuring the enterprises 
and consulting all the stakeholders prior to privatisation. They also felt that property of 
the SOEs should be properly evaluated, and that a technically and financially sound 
party/bidder should be selected. Similarly, some of the respondents stressed the need for 
reforming all the economic policies of the government so that a favourable environment 
could be created and a mechanism developed to increase the efficiency of the enterprises 
in order to facilitate the growth of domestic enterprises. 
                                                 
24 See the opinion of the political parties in Chapter Four where the main differences were on the valuation 
process.  
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6.3.2 Types of Public Enterprises to be Privatised 
I attempted to ascertain what types of enterprises stakeholders wanted to privatise on a 
priority basis; the following table reveals the results: 
Table 6.3.2: Types of Public Enterprises to be Privatised 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
For which private sector is 
capable 
62 46 33 45 4 33 99 45 
Running at a loss 34 25 22 30 5 42 61 28 
Mismanaged enterprises 25 19 17 23 2 17 44 20 
Enterprises susceptible to 
political interference 
8 6   1 8 9 4 
Running at a profit 5 4 2 2   7 3 
Total 134 100 74 100 12 100 220 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The majority of the respondents (45%) expressed that the type of enterprises that should 
be privatised are whichever ones the private sector is capable of operating; specifically, 
most of them said that the trading sector enterprises, financial sector enterprises and some 
industrial sector enterprises could be privatised, as the private sector is capable of running 
those. Similarly, they expressed that the service sector and social sector should remain in 
the hands of the government until the private sector is fully developed. However, the 
trade union representatives gave first priority to the enterprises running at a loss; 28% of 
respondents believed that loss-making enterprises should be privatised first, so that the 
government could be relieved from its huge investment in these enterprises. However, the 
core of economic theory does not support this opinion, as the private sector would not be 
willing to take over such enterprises.  Mismanaged enterprises (20%) and enterprises 
susceptible to political interference (4%) should be privatised first before privatising 
profit-making (3%) enterprises. Hence, profit-making enterprises should be privatised 
only after loss-making enterprises and mismanaged enterprises; this viewpoint is 
inherently flawed, and I believe that in Nepal’s case, the main reason that privatisation 
has failed is because we started privatising loss-making enterprises first.  
 175
6.3.3 Whether the Performance of PEs could be Improved without Privatisation 
Respondents were asked to state whether the performance of PEs could be improved 
without privatisation; the majority said no. The following table shows the results: 
 
Table 6.3.3: Whether the Performance of Public Enterprises could be Improved 
without Privatisation 
 
Policy makers and 
Academicians 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Yes 59 44 10 83 69 47 
No 75 56 2 17 77 53 
Total 134 100 12 100 146 100 
 (Source: Sub-Sample one and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
 
Only 47% of total respondents (majority of the sub-group—trade union representatives—
83%) said that without privatisation, the performance of PEs could be improved. They 
gave examples of a performance contract (though this is almost failing in Nepal due to 
the ongoing conflict, which is shown in the following box), autonomous management, 
less political interference, clarity of objectives—conducting in a business-like manner 
(profit motive) or social manner (service motive irrespective of profit), and so on. 
However, the majority of the policy makers and academicians (56%) were in favour of 
privatisation. Hence, the majority of the respondents (53%) stated that privatisation is 
important to improve the performance of PEs, which again paints a bleak picture, since in 
reality most of the privatised enterprises are hardly running (some of them have already 
closed down and some may be closed at any time). The following box indicates that one 
of the alternatives of privatisation has already almost failed in Nepal:  
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Box 9: Performance contract suffers setback 
The government's plan to extend performance contract in additional debt-ridden state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
has suffered a severe blow as the heads of the most of the enterprises are expressing reluctance to sign the 
contract.  
"The risk imposed by fragile security system and rigid labour law of the country has become so high that the most 
of the managing directors of SOEs nowadays do not feel comfortable in signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the government," said a high ranking official of Ministry of Finance. Talking to the 
Post he said that the SOEs chiefs fear that they would not be able to deliver the required outputs expected from 
them due to growing Maoist activities and possible impulsive actions of workers. Concerned officials at the 
ministry said that the government had planned to sign performance contract for Janakpur Cigarette Factory, Nepal 
Electricity Authority, Herbs Production and Processing Centre and National Productivity and Economic 
Development Centre, among others, in the latest phase. "However due to unavoidable circumstances we have not 
been able to extend the contracts to those," states the source. According to him, frequent blockades and bandas 
called by Maoists, which has prevented SOEs from delivering goods to the market, and demands of the labour 
unions, regarding hike in salaries and provision of other benefits, could be identified as reasons which has induced 
fear among them.  
"As one of the major objectives of the contract is to enhance productivity of the enterprise by making optimum 
utilization of available resources and capacity, the heads of the SOEs deem that they would not be able to produce 
desired results amidst such situation," he said. "And they probably will never gain the confidence to sign the 
contract unless political stability is maintained and required amendments are made in the labour laws of the 
country," he added.  
The government had initiated the process of performance contract with inefficient SOEs in 2003 by signing 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Udaypur Cement Industry, Hetauda Cement Industry, Employees 
Provident Fund, Agriculture Development Bank and Janak Education Materials.  
The measure was considered a milestone in reform process initiated by the government as it provided 
entrepreneurial autonomy to the General Managers (GM) to undertake any decision regarding procurement and 
finance and made them accountable of the decisions they had taken. This was unlike in the past when the heads of 
the SOEs had to endorse each and every decision from the Board of Directors.  Furthermore the contracts had also 
identified duties of the Board, which were limited to formulation of policies, implementation of directives and 
orders and reviewing corporate plans and budgets. While evaluation of the performance of each SOE were made 
on the basis of scores it obtained on stipulated indicators such as capacity utilization, return on investment, sales, 
turnover, employees' productivity and net profit. 
(Source: THE KATHMANDU POST, April 19, 2005) 
 
 
6.3.4 Modality of Privatisation which could be Appropriate and Effective in the 
Nepalese Context 
When the respondents were asked about the methods/modalities to be followed for 
effective privatisation, most of the respondents suggested that share sale is the best 
possible mode for the trading sector (28%) and financial sector (32%); assets sale for the 
manufacturing sector (29%); management contract (21%) for social sector; and co-
operatisation for the public utility sector (26%) and social sector (38%). Some key 
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respondents, however, emphasised broad-based public participation and public-private 
partnerships, and some favoured active participation of workers in management. The 
following table, however, shows the overall priority given by the stakeholders for 
choosing the modality for the Nepalese privatisation program:  
Table 6.3.4: Modality of Privatisation suitable for Nepal 
Policy makers 
and 
academicians 
Employees of 
the privatised 
enterprises 
Trade Union 
Representatives Total 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Share sale 35 28 31 44 2 22 68 34 
Assets and business sale 40 32 6 8 1 11 47 23 
Co-operatisation 7 6 16 22 2 22 25 12 
Management contract 12 10 12 17   24 12 
Lease 10 8 4 6 4 45 18 9 
Mgmt/employee buyout 12 10 2 3   14 7 
Reorganisation 7 6     7 3 
Total 123 100 71 100 9 100 203 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one, two and three of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The table shows that the widely chosen model for Nepal is the ‘share sale’ method, which 
was selected by 34% of respondents. However, sub-sample one (policy makers and 
academicians) chose the ‘assets and business sale’ method as a first priority, which shows 
the varying interests of different strategic groups based on the resources at hand. 
Employees and trade union representatives chose ‘share sale’ as a suitable modality. 
Similarly, ‘assets and business sale’ (23%), ‘co-operatisation’ (12%), ‘management 
contract’ (12%) and ‘lease’ (9%) are other methods that our respondents identified. Only 
a few, however, chooses ‘management/employee buy-out’ (7%) and ‘reorganisation’ 
(3%) of the enterprises.   Similarly, the key respondents who chose ‘assets and business 
sale’, stressed that it should be done by ensuring the workers’ participation in 
management. Some other key respondents thought that ‘management contract’ would be 
the best method of privatisation for Nepal. A few respondents suggested that ‘lease’ 
would be a good alternative. 
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6.3.5 The Pace of the Privatisation Process in Nepal 
I have attempted to identify whether the pace of privatisation should be rapid or made 
gradual with due assessment; the results are as follows: 
Table 6.3.5: The Pace of Privatisation Process in Nepal 
 Frequency Percent 
Rapid 17 13 
Gradual, after due 
assessment 106 80 
No Privatisation 9 7 
Total 132 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The table shows that only 13% of respondents believed that the process should be rapid 
in order to boost privatisation, while 80% expressed that it should be gradual only after 
undergoing due assessment. They were of the opinion that in a country like Nepal, where 
the role of the private sector in development is at an early stage, the privatisation process 
should be implemented gradually using the ‘learning by doing’ principle. Abu Shair 
(1997:124) has rightly pointed out that “if privatisation within the context of developing 
countries is to be sustainable and people-centred, it has to be a gradual process, relatively 
crisis-free, untroubled and unforced, marked by the fashion of collective participation 
from below and individual participation in the market place” (Shair, Abu and Osma J A 
Rahim, 1997 cf. KC, 1999:235). Only 7% of respondents, however, were completely 
against privatisation, saying they preferred no privatisation at all. Almost all (95%) key 
respondents expressed that the pace of privatisation should be gradual after conducting 
due assessment of the program and should correct such allegations as the process is not 
transparent, valuation of the enterprises is not scientific and evaluation of bids is not 
properly disseminated to the public, etc.  
6.3.6 The Necessary Pre-Requisites for the Success of Privatisation in Nepal 
“Policies are continuously transferred by implementing actions that simultaneously alter 
resources and objectives…. It is not policy design but redesign that goes on most of the 
time. Who is to say, then, whether implementation consists of altering objectives to 
correspond with available resources or of mobilising new resources to accomplish old 
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objectives? …Implementation is evolution. …When we act to implement a policy, we 
change it” (Majone and Wildavsky, 1978 cf. Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983:8). The 
views expressed here by the writers clearly state that the implementation of any policy is 
a dynamic process that can be modified—redesigned in due course for most effective 
implementation. The implementation of the Nepalese privatisation policy has 
encountered so many problems that have already been discussed in the previous sub-
section. Here, attempts have been made to find out what pre-requisites are necessary for 
the effective implementation of the privatisation policy. The respondents were asked to 
express their opinion of what they thought were the most important factors to be 
considered while implementing the policy—how privatisation could be successful in 
Nepal. The following table shows their responses:   
Table 6.3.6: The Necessary Pre-Requisites for the Success of Privatisation in Nepal 
 Frequency Percent 
• Detailed studies of the PEs 57 43 
• Political consensus 34 25 
• Transparency 20 15 
• Discipline in financial matters 7 5 
• Improvement of the valuation process 6 4 
• Improvement of the implementation 
process 
5 4 
• Competency in civil service /efficient 
bureaucracy to implement the policy 
5 4 
Total 134 100 
(Source: Sub-Sample one of the Field Survey 2003/2004) 
The table shows that the majority of the respondents (43%) expressed that the detailed 
study of PEs in the pipeline of privatisation is a very important factor for the success of 
privatisation in Nepal. During the interview the respondents expressed that the overall 
diagnosis of the enterprise—an actual picture showing pros and cons—could help the 
prospective buyer to consider the bidding process, which ultimately helps the overall 
implementation process. The other most important prerequisites are political consensus 
(25%) and transparency (15%) in the whole process, which enables the success of 
privatisation in Nepal. Regarding the process of privatisation, most of the key 
respondents (about 70%) expressed that the process was quite transparent and that 
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information regarding privatisation was made publicly available; although there is a room 
for improvement, to a great extent the process was appropriate. However, some 
respondents showed their dissatisfaction and critically commented that transparency has 
been ignored, and the information relating to the selection of bidders and valuation of the 
enterprises has not been publicly shared with the stakeholders. Some others expressed 
that discipline in financial matters of the PEs (5%), improvements in the valuation 
process of PEs (4%), and improvements in the implementation process itself (4%) are 
other pre-requisites. Similarly, 4% of respondents stated that the civil service 
(bureaucracy), the implementing body, needed to be competent to ensure the success of 
privatisation in Nepal. They openly opined that until the implementing agency could be 
efficient and effective, any sound policy could not achieve its objectives, in the absence 
of effective implementation. Hence, their focus was on the institutional arrangement, 
which comprises the legal framework as well as the manpower arrangement.  
 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the problems faced in the process of implementation of 
the privatisation policy, the problems faced by privatised enterprises and some suggested 
improvements that should be taken in to consideration, which could be helpful for 
implementing successful privatisation in Nepal. 
 
The problems encountered during the process of privatisation in Nepal are identified as 
political instability, which is evident from the fact that there have been 15 governments 
during the 15-year period since the political change in 1990; a lack of political 
commitment/consensus; a lack of developed capital markets (weak capital markets); a 
lack of investors (shortage of capital); a lack of adequate funding for a smooth 
privatisation; employee-related problems such as protests, strikes, etc; the poor conditions 
of public enterprises, which de-motivate the investors to take over them; a lack of 
transparency in the process itself; delaying of the process and the formation of a 
privatisation committee. The implementation of a privatisation policy in Nepal has been 
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greatly affected by all of these constraints, which have impeded the achievement of the 
desired goals of the policy.  
 
Similarly, we have tried to determine the problems that have been faced by the privatised 
enterprises after they were transferred to private ownership, and found that weak 
management, lack of entrepreneurship in the private sector, lack of a conducive 
environment for the operation of the enterprises, lack of adequate cooperation from the 
government, lack of funding for expansion, lack of market, frequent protest of labourers, 
etc, all contribute to the failure of privatisation. There are many problems but the 
government is capable if it shows a commitment to and clear vision of implementing the 
policy in an honest and efficient manner.  
 
We have also explored what could be done to improve the implementation process so that 
the future of privatisation, which in Nepal’s case is considered inevitable, may be 
successful (positive). Some identified factors are the proper valuation of assets/property, 
consideration of national interest, transparent decision making, evaluating the technical 
capability of bidders, privatisation of PEs for which the private sector is capable and 
those enterprises who are running at losses, gradual privatisation after due assessment, 
choosing the modality of share sale, detailed studies of the PEs before initiating the 
privatisation, reaching political consensus, improvement of the valuation process, strict 
discipline in financial matters while privatising the enterprises, improvement of the 
implementation process itself, and enhancing the efficient of the bureaucracy. In this 
chapter we have identified that although Nepal has faced problems during the 
implementation process of privatisation, the situation could be improved by adopting 
appropriate measure and the future of privatisation may be made secure, as the 
government cannot run the rest of the PEs. Hence, the prospects of privatisation can be 
seen as positive by correcting the weaknesses that had been discovered by the 
privatisation implemented thus far. 
 
The next chapter will deal with theoretical implications, a summary of the research 
findings, recommendations, future research and conclusions.  
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Chapter Seven 
Implementing Privatisation Policy in Nepal: Discussion of Findings and Conclusions 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
As I pointed out in the first chapter, the purpose of this study was to understand the 
implementation process and the impact of the privatisation policy in Nepal. In this regard, 
an attempt has been made to discuss the entire implementation process in general, and in 
particular four separate cases. I have also attempted to examine the changes brought 
about after the implementation of the privatisation policy and compare them with the pre-
privatisation situation. This comparison enabled me to reach a conclusion regarding 
whether the policy was/is a viable policy option. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the major findings of the study in relation to the 
issues mentioned in the first chapter (research questions). In the first part of this chapter, 
the theories used and their implications are discussed and in the second part, a summary 
of the research findings has been drawn from the study. Policy recommendations and 
future research have been discussed in the third part, and finally the conclusions. 
 
7.1 Implementing Privatisation Policy in Nepal: How far is it Compatible with the          
Theories and Models Presented as an Analytical Framework? 
It has often been assumed that implementation is a simple technical process of executing 
preconceived plans. This assumption, according to Wittrock (1986), fundamentally 
misconstrues the realities of implementation and inhibits the formulation of a sound 
theoretical basis (Adjei, 1996: 85).  
 
As I mentioned in previous chapters, the theories of implementation and strategic group 
analysis and the concept of privatisation have been used for this study. In this sub-
section, I have tried to show how far the theories and models are compatible with the 
Nepalese situation and its realities. The concept of privatisation helped us to understand 
the subject matter. It helped us to understand what exactly it is, why it is necessary, what 
methods we can follow and what the characteristics of each method are. On the other 
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hand, the theory of implementation has provided us with a different way of understanding 
and analysing the process of reform, and described the perspectives of those who want to 
make the change and those who resist or support the change. Similarly, the strategic 
group theory has helped us to identify the actors/strategic groups that were influential in 
formulating the policy and their role in its implementation, which may be beneficial for 
their own benefit.  
 
The concept of privatisation has been discussed and defined in different ways by various 
writers in Chapter Two. Political to economic meanings of privatisation have been 
discussed, yet the main concept taken from the different writers’ points of view is that it 
is the transfer of a function, activity, or organisation from the public to the private sector. 
It is a move towards the divestment of total ownership from government, the public to the 
private sector; it entails the conversion of enterprises formerly controlled by the 
government into private hands (Starr, 1989; Nelson, 1996; Adam, et al. 1992; Stiglitz, 
1992; Savas, 2000; Hodge, 2000; Farazmand, 2001; Narain, 2003; Parker and Saal, 2003; 
Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004).  In Nepal, ‘privatisation’ means involving the private 
sector in the management of an enterprise, or selling or leasing it, or an act to infuse 
participation by any means, either wholly or partly, of the private sector or of the 
employees or workers, or of all desirous groups (Article 2(b) of the Privatisation Act of 
1994 of Nepal). Hence, the concept discussed in Chapter Two and that perceived by the 
government of Nepal are, in a broad sense, identical. Furthermore, the meanings 
perceived by various writers and perceived by the Nepalese government are in 
agreement. 
 
The five forces that influence the promotion of privatisation are: pragmatic, economic, 
ideological, commercial, and populist (Savas, 2000). The effects of those forces are better 
government; less dependence on government; less government; more business 
opportunities; and better society, respectively.  Hence, the five forces are quite similar to 
that necessity of privatisation felt by the government in Nepal in 1991. The high-level 
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Administrative Reform Commission (1992) recommended that the government roll back 
its activities that could be performed by the private sector25.  
 
The objectives/goals of privatisation are varied, i.e. political goals such as reducing the 
size of the public sector, restoring or strengthening the private sector; efficiency goals 
such as increasing productivity and microeconomic efficiency; fiscal stabilisation goals 
such as maximising the proceeds of sales, reducing the future drain of subventions and 
capital contributions from government revenue, increasing tax revenues from higher 
profits and reducing public debts; and resources mobilisation goals such as promoting 
foreign investment in the country, and releasing limited state resources for investment in 
other sectors such as education and health. Similarly, other objectives could be stated as 
follows: reduce the government’s operating deficit, raise cash through SOE sales, 
generate new sources of tax revenue, deepen domestic capital markets and broaden 
domestic equity ownership, promote domestic investment, increase competition, increase 
production and operating efficiency, reduce the role of the state in the economy and 
reduce public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) (Steel and Heald, 1984; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988; Stiglitz, 1992; Dobek, 1993; Lieberman, 1993; Bennett, 1997; Savas, 
2000; Hodge, 2000; Narain, 2003; Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004; GTZ, 2004).  
 
In Nepal’s case, the privatisation policy had three objectives: reducing the financial and 
administrative burden on the government; improving operational efficiency; and 
involving the participation of the general public and the private sector in the management 
of public enterprises (SCOPE, 1997:4).  Similarly, according to the preamble of the 
Privatisation Act of 1994, the objectives of privatisation in Nepal are to increase 
productivity through the enhancement of efficiency of state-owned enterprises; mitigate 
the financial administrative burden to the government; and to usher in all-round economic 
development of the country by broadening the participation of the private sector in the 
operation of such enterprises (Preamble of the Privatisation Act of 1994). Hence, the 
broad objectives discussed by various writers are identical to the objectives set out by the 
                                                 
25 The report of the Administrative Reform Commission (1992) discussed that the government’s role should 
be reduced and it should  involve more guidance and regulation, and for this purpose privatisation policy 
should be adopted. 
 185
Nepalese government. Similarly, the objectives that the writers have presented/ discussed 
certainly contribute to understanding why the different governments have been 
implementing the policy in different political and economic environments.  
 
The privatisation of PEs can be accomplished by a public offering of shares, the sale of 
shares to private buyers (private sale of shares), sale of government or SOE assets, the 
restitution of assets to former owners, and by management/employee buy-outs, lease and 
management contracts, reorganisation (or ‘break-up’) into component parts, or other 
forms of ‘self’ privatisation (Vuylsteke, 1988; UNIDO, 1994; Pirie, Madsen, 1988, cited 
from UNESCAP, 1999; Savas, 2000; Farazmand, 2001; Narain, 2003; Parker and Saal, 
2003 and GTZ, 2004). In Nepal, four techniques have been applied so far, which are 
share sale, assets and business sale, lease and management contract. Share sale in Nepal 
corresponds with a public offering of shares as described by the writers. The 
implementation issues described in each of the seven methods by Vuylsteke (1988) helps 
to inform prior to choosing the appropriate method and the possible threat or pressure of 
the effective implementation. The four cases discussed in the thesis represent three 
methods—assets and business sale, share sale and lease. In the first (HBTF) and second 
(BPM) cases, the ‘assets sale’ method was applied. In these cases the procedure discussed 
by Vuylsteke was followed. In the third case (NFI), the ‘share sale’ method was applied 
and the procedure discussed by the writer on the public offering of shares was applied. 
Similarly, in the fourth case (BJM), the company was leased out for a five-year period. In 
this case, the procedures explained by the writer for leases and management contracts 
have been followed to some extent. The methods used in Nepal are the popular methods 
used in most countries26.  
 
In short, the concept of privatisation, as well as the objectives and methods discussed in 
the theoretical part, give us a better understanding of it and also enables us to compare 
the Nepalese situation with the views expressed by various writers. 
 
                                                 
26 According to Vuylsteke (1988) most of the countries use public offering of shares, assets sale, private 
offering of shares, lease and management contract (See Vuylsteke, 1988: 169-72). 
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The implementation theory helps us understand the reform process with the policy-
making procedure, i.e. agenda setting, decision making and implementation, and the 
challenges met during the process. It also helps us to identify the actors involved in the 
process who want to either make the change or resist the change. 
 
Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or 
groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in previous policy 
decisions. The implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives have 
been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions; it takes place only after 
legislation has been passed and funds committed. It may include a wide variety of actions 
such as issuing and enforcing directives, disbursing funds, signing contracts, collecting 
data, analysing problems, assigning and hiring personnel, creating organisational units, 
and negotiating with private citizens, business, interest groups, legislative committees, 
bureaucratic units, and even other countries. Implementation may be viewed as a process 
of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them. 
Similarly, as a process, implementation is dependent on knowing what you want to do, 
the availability of the required resources and the ability to control these resources to 
achieve the desired end (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980; Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Lane, 1995; Blair, 2000; Schofield, 2001; 
Hill, 2003; Barrett, 2004; O’Toole, 2004; Harding, 2005). Definitions of the policy 
implementation offered by various writers are quite relevant to understanding what 
implementation is. Although in the Nepalese context no clear definition of 
implementation has been found, the concepts discussed here are helpful in finding out 
whether it was similarly perceived by the actors involved in the implementation process. 
The empirical study shows that the concept was indeed similarly perceived by Nepalese 
actors. Hence, those concepts are quite clear and applicable to the Nepalese case.  
 
There are two approaches to implementation: forward mapping and backward mapping 
(Elmore, 1982). Forward mapping begins at the top of the process, with as clear a 
statement as possible of the policy maker’s intent, and proceeds through a sequence of 
increasingly specific steps to define what is expected of implementers at each level. 
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Backward mapping shares with forward mapping the notion that policy makers have a 
strong interest in affecting the implementation process and the outcomes of policy 
decisions. Similarly, there are other approaches to implementation—top-down and 
bottom-up approaches (Sabatier, 1986). In four points Sabatier summarised the 
differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches: initial focus, identification of 
major actors in the process, evaluation criteria and overall focus. The features of top-
down approaches to implementation and forward mapping are compatible with the 
implementation procedure of the Nepalese privatisation policy. For example, the 
government decided to implement the policy at a central level, enacted the Privatisation 
Act in the parliament and implemented it thereafter by involving the different actors. 
Hence, the approaches described in Chapter Two help us become familiar with the 
notion. 
  
Several models of implementation can be found in the literature, with their various pros 
and cons. For the sake of analysis, we have briefly discussed some models in Chapter 
Two—the rationalist, linear and interactive models (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; 
Dunsire, 1990; and Grindle and Thomas, 1990, 1991). The rationalist model assumes that 
although the government chooses correct and appropriate policy objectives, it may fail in 
their implementation if the other factors have not been given due attention. Grindle and 
Thomas (1990, 1991) discussed two models of policy reform—linear and interactive. 
According to the linear model, a proposed reform gets on the agenda for government 
action, a decision is made on the proposal, and the new policy or institutional 
arrangement is implemented, either successfully or unsuccessfully. In this model, focus is 
due to the policy analysis and implementation is either ignored or considered to be the 
responsibility of another group; the managers. Hence, the implementation has been 
neglected in this model. But the interactive model focuses more on implementation.  In 
this model, pressure to put reform issues on the policy agenda comes from many sources, 
as we have seen in our case too. Some issues receive active consideration by policy 
makers and the authorisation process may move through one or more stages of the 
bureaucracy and may have to be confirmed at some level of political decision making. 
There would be issues to be discussed and a policy agenda to be made.  
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The effects of change in policy become more visible as implementation proceeds, and 
there are likely to be more challenges to the original conception of the reform. The 
characteristics of the policy will have an important influence on the nature of the reaction 
or response to change. The distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy or 
institutional change, its technical complexity, its administrative intensity, its short- or 
long-term impact, and the degree to which it encourages participation determine whether 
the reaction or response to the initiative will occur primarily in a public or a bureaucratic 
arena (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:126). When we linked this to our case, we found that 
with the implementation of the privatisation policy, resistance comes primarily from the 
labourers and to some extent from the public. On the one hand, its main aim was to 
reduce the burden on the government and to generate revenue for the government, it 
tends to increase the prices of goods and services produced by the enterprises and this 
consequently has a direct impact on society. However, the resistance from the public in 
Nepal’s case was surprisingly limited; only a few people tried to block the government 
from implementing this policy by challenging the government decision in the Supreme 
Court of Nepal. From the study, it appears that the amount of explicit opposition to the 
adopted policy has been, to some extent, limited, as we saw in the opinion of the major 
political parties where we found more common ground than differences. On the other 
hand, the privatisation of public enterprises is directly related to the future of workers 
working in the enterprises. So the opposition from the employees was critical. Despite the 
explicit opposition from the political parties in policy content as such, the problems of 
implementation are more closely related to the process of implementation and other 
factors which are discussed in Chapter Six, for example, political instability, lack of 
developed capital market, lack of investors, poor conditions of public enterprises, lack of 
transparency, problems with delay, lack of monitoring and evaluation systems and the 
formation of a privatisation committee. In fact all of these problems contribute to the 
process of privatisation.  
 
When we refer to the interactive model of implementation, we see that the processes 
described by the writers regarding issues, policy agenda and decision stages correspond 
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to the processes applied in the privatisation policy making in Nepal. However, in the 
implementation arena, resistance from the public and/or political parties was rather 
limited and to a greater extent came from the employees. But there were other 
implementation-related problems in Nepal (which are presented in Chapter Six), though 
such problems are not expected/mentioned in the model. Such problems arose perhaps 
because of the different political/social environment and/or the institutionalised cultural 
setting of the country. 
 
The ten preconditions for the perfect implementation discussed by Gunn (1978, Kendal, 
2002) are the most important factors to be considered while implementing a policy. Some 
of these are controlling external factors; adequate time and resources, based upon a valid 
theory of cause and effect; single implementer or agency, which need not depend on 
another agency; perfect communication and coordination; and perfect obedience to those 
in authority. In Nepal’s case, most of the criticism of the perceived failure of the 
privatisation policy relates to the implementation process, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
The failure to fulfil these pre-conditions for policy implementation leads to an 
implementation deficit.  
 
Similarly, the strategic group theory discussed by Evers (Evers, 1966; 1973; 1982; Evers 
and Schiel, 1988) helps us to understand how strategic groups could try to gain access to 
the resources available through privatisation. In Nepal’s case we found that some 
strategic groups, such as employees of the PEs, tried to block the privatisation process as 
it was a threat to the security of their jobs. Similarly, trade unions also oppose the policy, 
as they advocate the welfare of the labourers. In contrast, most of the governments 
(except the left-leaning UML government, which was in power for nine months in 1997) 
who were in power, to a great extent, favoured the privatisation policy. Similarly the 
international financial institutions (which can also be deemed a strategic group in a broad 
sense) were in favour of privatisation. Hence, the concept of strategic group analysis 
helps us to recognise which groups favour and which oppose the privatisation policy, 
which enables us to improve the policy by taking their arguments into account. 
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7.2 Summary of the Research Findings  
 
As I have mentioned earlier, this research incorporates six research questions, which are 
as follows:  
1. What are the factors that led HMG/N to adopt the privatisation policy and what 
are the major processes applied to the implementation of the privatisation 
policy in Nepal? 
2. To what extent is the present legal and institutional setting conducive to the 
implementation of the privatisation policy? 
3. Who were/are the main influential actors/strategic groups to adopt the 
privatisation policy in Nepal? 
4. What are the main obstacles encountered in the process of implementation of 
the privatisation policy in Nepal? 
5. What is the impact of the privatisation policy in Nepal? 
6. What lessons could be learned from the privatisation policy of Nepal (is 
privatisation of public enterprises essential in Nepal? If so, has it been 
successful)? 
Based on the study carried out in the implementation process of the overall privatisation 
program in general and four privatised enterprises in particular, the following is a 
summary of the research findings. The findings are presented based on the research 
questions mentioned above. 
 
7.2.1 Causes/Factors and Processes of Privatisation in Nepal 
Public enterprises in Nepal have been established mainly to serve various objectives—
infrastructural facilities and services, providing basic consumer and development goods, 
adequate supplies of essential goods, managerial support to needy enterprises. The 
majority of PEs were established in Nepal during the sixties and early seventies. By the 
end of the Seventh Plan period (1985-90), there were 63 PEs in Nepal. 
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The failure of state-owned enterprises, especially in developing countries, in achieving 
the desired goals has been the most important contributing factor for the adoption of the 
philosophy of privatisation. The high costs and poor performance of PEs and the modest 
and fleeting results of reform efforts have turned the government towards privatisation. 
Multilateral institutions were also at the forefront in encouraging the government to 
accept rationalisation of the public sector as part of the wider reforms incorporated in its 
program of structural adjustment. Promptings from the World Bank, USAID, UNDP, and 
IMF were influential in the government’s decision to divest itself of poorly performing 
PEs. At the same time, shifting development theory, ideologies and fiscal crises, and the 
emergence of a dynamic private sector have also compelled the government to embark 
upon the path of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation since 1992. On the one 
hand, the private sector was coming of age to shoulder the responsibility of operating 
huge enterprises (though the empirical evidence showed that it is still at an early stage), 
while on the other hand, the government was unable to meet the growing challenges 
posed by the sustained and persistent losses of the PEs. Therefore, the government 
decided to privatise its PEs in a phase-based manner. 
 
The empirical study confirmed that the privatisation of PEs in Nepal was/is necessary due 
to the following reasons: 
• To increase the productivity of the enterprises 
• To reduce financial and administrative burden on the government 
• To increase the efficiency of the enterprises 
• To reduce political intervention in the enterprises 
• To increase government investment in the social sector 
• It is necessary because of the pressure from the donor community  
• To generate additional revenue for the government 
• Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology) 
 
However, some respondents were against privatisation and argued that it is not necessary. 
They stated that the welfare of employees, regular supply of quality goods and services at 
reasonable prices, optimum use of public resources, and that privatisation promotes the 
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concentration of wealth and worsens socio-economic conditions. But the majority of 
respondents and available literature regarding privatisation in Nepal confirm that it is 
urgently necessary to implement the policy to save the government from these ailing 
enterprises. 
 
The government issued a policy paper on privatisation in 1991 and formed a privatisation 
committee. The Privatisation Committee and the Privatisation Cell in the Ministry of 
Finance are responsible for the implementation of the privatisation policy.  
 
The privatisation policy process also consists of three sets of activities, which are 
essential to forming a policy according to Grindle and Thomas (1991): agenda setting, 
decision making and implementation. The study indicated that the privatisation policy to 
a large extent has the character of what Grindle and Thomas label ‘politics-as-usual’. The 
policy process has been dominated by professional and bureaucratic concerns in all 
arenas and politicians, especially in the decision-making arena. In the agenda-setting 
arena, Administrative Reform Commission and a series of seminars/workshops have had 
a key role in formulating the national policy goals. In the decision-making arena, 
resource allocation and administrative measures have been integrated into the national 
planning process through the five-year plans. And in the implementation arena, the 
Privatisation Committee, Privatisation Cell and finally the cabinet are responsible for 
carrying out the privatisation of the PEs on a case-by-case basis. Hence, many strategic 
groups were involved in the policy-making and implementation processes in Nepal. 
 
The policy paper and the Privatisation Act of 1994 have set the major processes in the 
implementation phase. After getting the report from the technical committee, valuation 
and appraisal of the enterprise, selection of candidates, and determination of privatisation 
process, the government publishes a notice for bidding. After receiving bids from 
interested bidders, preliminary and high-level negotiating committees negotiate at least 
once with all the valid bidders. These committees discuss with all bidders and 
recommend to the Privatisation Committee and the committee decides upon the 
successful bidders and the Privatisation Cell prepares the proposal and sends it to the 
 193
cabinet for a final decision. These are the main steps for the implementation of the 
privatisation policy in each transaction (in each PE).  
 
To date, a total of 24 PEs have been privatised. Of the privatised corporations until now, 
three corporations have been privatised by selling the assets and business, ten by selling 
the shares, nine by dissolution/liquidation and 1/1 by management contract and leasing 
out and selling the assets respectively. 
 
7.2.2 Whether the Present Legal and Institutional Settings are Conducive for the 
Smooth Implementation of Privatisation Policy? 
To implement the privatisation policy, there is a separate implementation unit 
(Privatisation Cell) operating under the Ministry of Finance in Nepal. The white paper on 
the privatisation policy firstly recommended the institutional arrangement, which was 
later included in the Privatisation Act of 1994. Now there is a high-level Privatisation 
Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister or State Minister for Finance. The 
other members of the committee include the chairman of the Finance Committee of the 
House of Representatives; two members of parliament nominated by the government; 
National Planning Commission member; secretaries of Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Law, Ministry of Labour, ministry concerned with the enterprises being privatised and 
president of the Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Joint 
secretary of the corporation coordination and privatisation division of the Ministry of 
Finance is the member secretary of the committee. After the deliberation and intensive 
evaluation of the proposals, the committee recommends its decision to the cabinet to take 
a final decision on the privatisation of the particular enterprises. Hence, the main 
institutions responsible for privatisation are the Privatisation Committee and finally the 
cabinet.  
 
The privatisation white paper was the main basis for privatisation in the initial period but 
since the enactment of the Privatisation Act in 1994, the act is the principal legal 
instrument for privatisation through which many provisions have been set out. These 
include the formulation of a privatisation committee; powers, functions and duties of the 
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committee; committee meeting and decision procedures; publication of notices for 
privatisation; evaluation process of enterprises; determination of privatisation process; 
evaluation of the proposals; agreement to be concluded for privatisation; formation of 
sub-committees; settlement of disputes; provisions relating to employees; liquidation of 
enterprises; delegation of powers for smooth privatisation in Nepal. Apart from this, the 
yearly budget speech of the government is also a legal basis in which the policies and 
programs of the government for the coming fiscal year are declared.  
 
During the field research, respondents drawn from different strategic groups were asked 
whether the present legal and institutional setting is conducive for the smooth 
implementation of the policy. Only about 36% respondents said yes, about 39% said no 
and about 25% did not know or did not have any opinion. Hence, the majority of the 
respondents/strategic groups expressed that the present legal and institutional settings are 
not conducive, though the margin was not very significant. They mainly criticised the 
transparency and seek for the modification of legal provisions including enacting the 
privatisation regulations to ensure transparent and efficient implementation. However, 
most of the key respondents (about 30 people) expressed that the real problem of 
implementation was/is not due to the present legal provisions, as we already have the 
Privatisation Act of 1994, in which most of the issues have been enlisted including the 
process, but to some extent the institutional setting, as there are only a few staff in the 
Privatisation Cell, most of whom do not have technical knowledge of implementing the 
policy.  
 
7.2.3 Main Influential Actors/Strategic Groups to Adopt the Privatisation Policy in 
Nepal 
The study also identified the policy elite in the process of privatisation. Obviously the 
members of the Administrative Reform Commission 1991, and the Privatisation 
Committee members would be part of the privatisation policy elite. Outside the 
commission/committee, a wider set of actors joining the national discourse on 
privatisation policy would include bureaucrats, academics, researchers, consultants, 
journalists and representatives of international donors, who are influential for setting the 
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agenda for the reform initiatives. In a nutshell, the main actors for the policy reform, 
therefore, were policy elites including the prime minister, the Finance Minister, the Vice-
Chairman of the National Planning Commission, high-ranking government officials, the 
members of parliament, the business community and the donor agencies. All these elites 
had their followers and supporters, who hoped to gain from the privatisation process. Our 
study shows that all these were actors/strategic groups who were influential in setting the 
agenda for the policy reforms. 
 
In the decision-making arena, the privatisation committee members and bureaucrats 
would definitely be key players. However, the government who were in power when the 
legal provisions were enacted on privatisation, as well as the then–parliament, are major 
actors in the formulation of the Privatisation Act of 1994. Without the government’s 
commitment and initiation for the policy change, the privatisation policy would not have 
been implemented. The empirical study also confirmed that the then-government, after 
the political change in 1990, who was committed to implement the economic reform in 
Nepal, was an important actor, including the international donor community who were 
also encouraging, if not compelling, the government to implement the privatisation 
policy. Also in the implementation arena the privatisation committee members, the 
technical committee members and the bureaucrats are among the key players. However, 
the Privatisation Cell and the cabinet play a key role in the implementation arena.  
 
7.2.4 Main Obstacles Encountered in the Process of Privatisation in Nepal 
When it comes to implementation, things tend to develop in unexpected ways. Grindle 
and Thomas proposed that when policy decisions are not implemented, this may be due 
to opposition by influential groups and a lack of resources among decision makers to 
tackle this opposition (Askvik, 2001:21). Based on this study, it seems that the explicit 
opposition to the adopted policy has been, to some extent, limited, as we saw in the 
opinion of the major political parties, where we found that they had more common 
ground than differences. However, the opposition of the employees was/is crucial; at the 
same time opposition from the general public also existed, as we have seen through the 
cases filed in the Supreme Court of Nepal. Despite explicit opposition from the political 
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parties regarding policy content as such, the problems of implementation were more 
closely related to the process of implementation and other factors, such as evaluation of 
the enterprise, selection of bidders, political instability, political commitment/consensus, 
lack of developed capital market, lack of investors, poor conditions of public enterprises, 
lack of confidence in government transactions, lack of monitoring and evaluation 
systems, problem of delaying, the formation of privatisation committee, privatisation 
fund and buck passing. At the same time the private sector media (especially left-leaning) 
and opposition parties accused the government of a lack of transparency in the process of 
implementation. In fact, all of these problems contribute to the goal of privatisation. At 
the same time, privatised enterprises have also faced some problems, which appear to 
affect the impact of privatisation. The problems that they have faced have been identified 
as weak management, lack of entrepreneurship in the private sector, lack of a conducive 
environment for the operation of the enterprises, lack of adequate cooperation from the 
government, lack of funding for expansion, lack of market, frequent protesting of 
labourers, unfavourable export and import policy of the government, lack of trained 
manpower in the country, deteriorated law-and-order situation in the country, and 
ongoing conflict between the different political forces.  
 
7.2.5 What is the Impact of the Privatisation Policy in Nepal? 
Privatisation is too often a process rather than a pragmatic solution. In fact, it takes time 
to see the exact outcome of a privatisation policy. However, production, sales, and 
technological improvement aspects of privatised enterprises have satisfactorily improved. 
In addition, they are doing well in capacity growth and production diversification areas. 
These efforts will help to improve the performance of privatised enterprises in future.  
 
From the production and sales point of view, performances of privatised enterprises are in a 
very good state. In all four cases production and sales had increased. On the other hand, 
almost all enterprises failed to increase their profits.  
 
In fact, privatisation appears to have a negative impact on employment. About four-fifths 
of privatised enterprises have reduced the number of employees, but about 18% of 
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privatised enterprises created more jobs. One of the objectives of the privatisation 
program was to reduce the financial burden on the government of the PEs. In terms of 
subsidies, the situation is disappointing. Even after the completion of privatisation of 
39% of public enterprises, the volume of total subsidies has not decreased. After the 
implementation of the privatisation policy, operating subsidies have increased but capital 
subsidies have been reduced (MoF, 2004- economic survey, 2004). Although the study 
paints a negative picture in terms of the financial situation, in terms of a case basis, to 
some extent there is a positive fiscal effect associated with privatisation. The government 
is no longer providing subsidies to at least 24 privatised enterprises and it has collected 
revenue by selling these public enterprises. In addition, this has relieved the government 
of managing these enterprises, as the government was responsible for appointing the 
board of directors before the privatisation. Thus, at least the government is now free of 
39% of the PEs that have already been privatised. The government can now invest its 
resources in other worthy sectors, including the social sector. This is an important 
contribution to the economic policy of Nepal. 
 
In terms of impact analysis, there are contradictory results in different studies. For 
example, the impact analysis conducted by the Ministry of Finance (MoF, 1999) shows 
very positive results, whereas the research conducted by the Pro Public (Adhikari and 
Adhikari, 2000) shows a negative result. Although the overall impact of privatisation is 
negative in this study as well, the question is whether it is due to privatisation or other 
factors. Since mostly the industrial sector is affected by the ongoing conflicts, many 
small- and medium-sized enterprises have already been either closed down or reduced 
their activities. They can hardly run on mere hope that the situation will improve. The 
deteriorated situation of the country, therefore, may have equally adverse effects on the 
privatised enterprises. Hence, the independent studies would confirm this dilemma if 
further research on the effect of the conflict on the Nepalese industrial sector were to be 
carried out.  
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7.2.6 What Lessons could be Learned from the Privatisation Policy of Nepal? 
The study indicated that we can learn a lot from the Nepalese privatisation policy. The 
lessons learned can be summarised as follows:  
1. Privatisation is a political process to make it economically successful. Politicians 
must listen to public opinion and win support, even to commit to privatisation. 
Moreover, political commitment, continuity and consistency should be the 
hallmarks of privatisation. 
2. The privatisation program should be geared towards the development and 
promotion of the private sector. 
3. In order to attain operational efficiency of the privatised units, they should be 
restructured prior to privatisation. 
4. There must be an in-depth study and proper investigation of the possible options 
and modalities of privatisation. 
5. One should not allow considerations of sale price to dominate the whole 
privatisation activity. Of course price is important; however it must not be the sole 
consideration.  
6. The conditionalities of privatisation should include factors like management 
improvement, improved technology, quality improvements, transparent pricing 
policies, among other things. 
7. It is important to choose the most appropriate method of privatisation. It has been 
more than 25 years since the privatisation process began. There are many 
methods. It is not a simple formula.  
8. There is no set standard for privatisation. Each country has its own unique culture 
and tradition; no two sets of privatisation are ever identical. The approach must be 
custom tailored to each individual task.  
9. The process of privatisation must be transparent. The public must be notified how 
and in what way the process is being carried out. This information must not be 
kept from the public.  
10. Various groups (strategic groups) may be involved in and affected by 
privatisation. The skill is in identifying these groups in advance, and involving 
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them in the outcome, e.g. job guarantee of the workers. It is a very complex 
process. 
11. Different problems may arise during the implementation process. One should be 
able to identify the problems in advance. It is like playing chess; it is to anticipate 
in advance what is going to happen and be able to act accordingly. 
12. A privatisation program should educate the employees and labourers and 
effectively communicate with them to ensure a smooth implementation. 
13. The process of privatisation should be used to extend share ownership wherever 
possible. It enhances the economic and social benefits. The advantages of wider 
share ownership to the new company are several. If people own shares they feel a 
sense of loyalty to the company and are more likely to use it instead of its 
competitors.  
14. Improving the performance of remaining public enterprises is no less urgent than 
privatisation. 
15. The last lesson is that government must be determined to do it. The benefits take a 
little time to become evident, as it is a continuous process. Therefore if you want 
to enjoy the benefits of privatisation, it is not simply a question of contemplating 
it, you have to actually do it. Making a sound policy alone is not enough, as the 
implementation is vital to attaining the goal. 
 
7.3 Policy Recommendations and Future Research 
Policy Recommendations 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapters regarding the problems and prospects of 
privatisation in Nepal, the following recommendations have been made for the 
improvement of the policy:  
1. As we have found, there are no representatives of trade unions, management and 
employees of the PEs to be privatised in the Privatisation Committee; it is 
urgently necessary to include them in the committee to ensure that there are no 
misunderstandings regarding the PEs and that all voices are heard. Also this 
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provision would ensure the transparency of the process and help to get 
cooperation from all stakeholders. 
2. As we have found that there was no political consensus among the major political 
parties, especially on the privatisation process, attempts should be made to 
achieve a broader consensus among the major political parties, including the civil 
society members, trade union leaders and employees of the PEs, media and 
academicians.  
3. To reach consensus on the program, to ensure the transparency and soliciting 
greater support for the program, an awareness program would be helpful. Hence, 
the use of media such as radio, television, newspapers, etc. would be useful. 
Similarly, counselling programs for the employees/workers and stakeholders prior 
to the announcement of candidature should be carried out to obtain a higher level 
cooperation from them. 
4. As some of the respondents opined that the total period of privatisation after the 
announcement of certain candidates was too long, so the PEs in the pipeline for 
privatisation developed unprecedented problems, not only from the employees but 
also from the management itself, as they were trying to misuse the resources of 
the enterprises for their own benefit, hence the economic/financial condition of 
the PEs deteriorated. To eliminate this problem, efforts should be made to shorten 
the time of each transaction by undertaking the necessary action before the 
announcement of privatisation. The Privatisation Committee should ensure the 
valuation and other necessary action before announcing privatisation so that none 
of the stakeholders can misuse the resources for their own personal benefit. 
5. After the enactment of the Privatisation Act in 1994, privatisation regulations 
have not been enacted to ensure a high standard of privatisation. Hence, a separate 
regulation should be enacted as soon as possible within the framework of the 
Privatisation Act for regulating and accelerating rational uses of the privatisation 
proceeds. As the Auditor General’s report also indicated the improper use of 
privatisation proceeds, regulations could form a legal basis which could not only 
enable the smooth privatisation but also fulfil the lack of legal provision for 
privatisation expenses. Similarly, legal provisions should be added to the 
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regulations for the monitoring and evaluation of the privatised enterprises on a 
regular basis by the government. Furthermore, regular AGMs (annual general 
meetings of the shareholders) should be compulsory for the privatised enterprises 
to ensure the interest of the shareholders. The management should be responsible 
for this and such provisions should be included in the new privatisation 
regulation.    
6. As the private sector is still at an early stage, privatisation should not be target- 
based but need-based. Similarly, economically unviable enterprises should be 
closed down rather than trying to privatise those which the private sector is not 
willing to take over. The industrial environment of the country has deteriorated 
day-by-day as the internal conflict deepens. The privatisation program has also 
been affected since the private sector is unwilling to buy the PEs, the government 
should not aim to privatise loss-making PEs. 
7. The government should ensure the transparency of the valuation process and 
measures adopted while awarding the contract, by publishing valuation 
procedures and values ascertained for each company or keeping the valuation 
report in public libraries after concluding the agreement with the successful 
bidder. The Privatisation Cell could interact with the media by disseminating the 
basis of the valuation and final award in due course, which will certainly stop 
accusations of undervaluation and so on. 
8. Pre-privatisation restructuring of the company should be undertaken based on the 
experts’ recommendation prior to the invitation of proposals from interested 
bidders.  If necessary, the issues of overstaffing, over-capitalisation, problems of 
liability, etc. should be addressed for the smooth operation of the company after 
privatisation. 
9. Given the limited staff size, the Privatisation Cell is not in a position to act as a 
regulatory agency. Hence, it should be manned adequately with professionals for 
ideal implementation. The privatisation program should be accompanied by a 
strong regulatory and monitoring institutional framework and the cell should be 
restructured along these lines.  
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10. The bid evaluation criteria including the weights of each parameter should be 
clear and disclosed transparently to all concerned prior to the invitation of the 
bids. Similarly, the negotiation period should be made shorter by developing the 
well-defined terms of reference of the negotiation. Wherever possible, provisions 
relating to the fines and penalties, employments and business plans should be 
maintained with uniformity while finalising the sales and purchase agreement.  
11. Though the privatisation of PEs in Nepal has become inevitable in the changing 
context of liberalisation and free market economy, since Nepal is a member of 
WTO, selective privatisation should be carried out. Industrial/manufacturing, 
trading and banking sectors, for which the private sector is developed, should be 
privatised first on a priority basis. However, PEs related to the service sector and 
natural resources should be privatised only after strong regulatory mechanisms are 
put in place. 
12. As stated earlier, merely transferring PEs to private control is not enough for 
Nepal, as most of the privatised enterprises have not performed as expected. 
Hence, rebalancing the public and private sectors would be better (public-private 
partnership- PPP). The role and responsibility of the state as well as the scope and 
activities of the private sector need to be carefully defined with regard to 
privatisation in Nepal. Only those enterprises for which the private sector is ready 
should be privatised and the rest of the enterprises should be under government 
control, but efficiency and effectiveness should be enhanced by giving them more 
autonomy (in this regard, a performance contract would be the best option, 
although the result of such an option has also been disappointing for the time 
being, due to the ongoing conflict situation in Nepal). 
13. The share sale method, compared to other methods of privatisation, could be more 
appropriate, effective and transparent. Hence, priority should be given to 
involving public and employees as owners to ensure effective participation in 
privatisation efforts.  
14. The new push for privatisation in Nepal is, basically, a result of general despair 
with public sector inefficiency, rather than hope for the private sector’s efficiency 
(Manandhar, 1998:109). As is evident, on the one hand the private sector is asking 
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for liberal and free economic policies, and on the other hand they have demanded 
incentives, subsidies and protection from competition. Unless the enterprise is left 
to work in a competitive environment with professional management, the transfer 
of ownership alone hardly brings about the expected changes in enterprise 
performance. Hence, in order to enhance the operational efficiency of the 
enterprises, the government should focus on the need to develop the private sector 
concurrent with the transfer of ownership. Until the private sector is fully 
developed, the privatisation program could not be successful as expected. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for the promotion and development of the 
private sector in Nepal. The ongoing conflict between the government and the 
rebels/opposition should be resolved for the overall development of the country, 
as it has vicious effects not only on the economic sector but also on the country 
overall. 
Future Research 
This study has covered the implementation process of the privatisation policy. It has 
addressed how the privatisation policy has been formulated, how the decision has been 
made and how the policy has been implemented in different PEs. At the same time what 
types of problems have emerged during the implementation phase, whether the objectives 
of privatisation have been met (impact), how the policy could be improved in order to 
achieve the objectives, etc. have also been discussed in this study. However, the study 
could not cover why the performance of privatised enterprises did not improve as 
expected, and why the overall performance of privatised enterprises was not positive. 
Whether it is due to privatisation (shifting from the government to the private sector) or 
other factors, for instance, ongoing conflict, the deteriorating law-and-order situation of 
the country, which has even compelled multinational companies to be closed down 
(recently Unilever Nepal Limited was shut down for some time due to the threat of the 
Maoist rebels), may be important subjects of further research that this study could not 
address. Similarly, looking only at the implementation aspect of all privatised enterprises 
(this study covered only four cases), or covering all enterprises only in the aspect of 
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performance (without addressing the implementation aspect) would be a worthy future 
study to explore the issues with more depth.  
 
Comparing the performance of public enterprises with the enterprises run by the private 
sector could also be a worthy way to develop a better understanding of whether the 
private sector is doing better than the public sector, as is widely perceived.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
The following conclusions have been drawn on the privatisation process in Nepal based 
on the study carried out. The conclusions have been presented in connection with the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter One.  
 
The first hypothesis of this study was: privatisation policy has been implemented not only 
as a necessity of the country (internally) but also as a requirement imposed by the donor 
community. The study confirmed this hypothesis, as we found that due to the 
deteriorating conditions of the PEs and the ideological shift of the new government with 
the advice and suggestions of the international donor community, the government 
formulated and implemented the privatisation policy in Nepal.  
 
Similarly, the second hypothesis was that the privatisation policy has been implemented 
to achieve some stated goals but they have not been achieved as expected. As stated 
earlier, there were three objectives of the privatisation policy in Nepal when the 
government embarked upon the policy: (a) reduction of managerial and financial burden 
on the government, (b) promotion of functional expertise to enhance productivity and 
output, and (c) promotion of the private sector’s role and public employees’ participation 
in industrial investment. The study showed that to some extent the managerial and 
financial burden of the government has been reduced as the government is free at least 
from the privatised enterprises (24 enterprises so far). The second objective has not been 
met as expected, as the privatised enterprises have not been able to increase managerial 
expertise as almost all enterprises have been barely surviving. Though production has 
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increased in almost all of the privatised enterprises, overall performance has not been 
positive. The third objective has been met partially, as the participation of the private 
sector was active during the implementation though there was very limited competition in 
the bidding process. Hence, the major objective of the privatisation was not met. At the 
same time, public employees’ participation in privatised enterprises has been totally nil, 
as they were not interested in taking over the 5% shares allocated for them at a reduced 
price. This could be attributed to the ailing situation of the enterprises that have been 
privatised so far.  
 
The third hypothesis was that privatisation policy has some implementation barriers that 
affect the policy’s ability to meet its objectives. The study showed that there were many 
implementation barriers that in turn affect the achievement of the objectives of the policy. 
In Chapter Six we discussed the obstacles encountered during the implementation phase. 
Similarly the privatised enterprises have also suffered from some problems, due to which 
they could not operate the companies in a conducive environment. Hence, the third 
hypothesis has also been confirmed. 
 
The fourth hypothesis was that privatisation has brought about some positive changes, i.e. 
assisted in reducing financial burdens on the government, contributed to enhancing the 
efficiency of enterprises, and facilitated popular participation in management; these 
benefits, however, are negligible. As almost all privatised enterprises have suffered in 
one way or another, and the overall financial performance has been negative, the overall 
picture of the privatisation in Nepal is negative, although it is yet to be confirmed 
whether this is due to privatisation or other external or internal factors, i.e. ongoing 
conflict.  
 
The final hypothesis was that the privatisation policy per se is not necessarily conducive 
to improving the efficiency of the enterprises. The overall result of the study shows that 
in principle, privatisation would enhance the efficiency of the enterprises by ensuring 
open competition and a liberalised market economy, the participation of private sector 
expertise to enhance the productivity of the enterprises, etc. but it could not contribute 
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equally in all economic environments. It depends on other factors, like the law-and-order 
situation of the country, a conducive environment for foreign investment, sound 
economic policy, committed and positive attitudes of the government for the 
development of the private sector, political stability in the country, and so forth. Hence, 
privatisation in the absence of those crucial factors does not necessarily enhance the 
efficiency of the enterprises. 
 
According to Rondinelli, privatisation was commonplace throughout the world in the 
nineties; in communist, socialist, and capitalist countries, in developed and developing 
countries, in democracies and dictatorships; more than one hundred countries had 
officially endorsed privatisation and more were considering it (1998: 149-70). In the 
United States it was being supported by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and 
conservatives. It was no longer a partisan or ideological issue but a pragmatic and 
increasingly routine approach to governing and to managing public services (Daley, 
1996: 629-31). In this global situation Nepal could not be exempt and therefore the 
privatisation policy was adopted in the nineties in line with the global wave, in the hope 
that the policy could improve the efficiency of PEs. So what this shows is that adopting 
the privatisation policy in Nepal was not only an option but also a compulsion. However, 
it should not be overstated. As the major advocate of privatisation, the World Bank has 
conceded/admitted that privatisation in developing countries was overstated and it has not 
been had the expected positive impacts (Kessides, 2004: 6). Though privatisation was 
regarded as successful in South American countries like Chile (Birch and Haar, 2000), 
the trend has now changed. Opinion polls in several developing and transition economies, 
especially in Latin America, reveals growing public dissatisfaction with privatisation. 
Disapproval ratings were higher in 2002 than in 2000 and higher in 2000 than in 1998. In 
2002 almost 90% of Argentines and 80% of Chileans surveyed disapproved of 
privatisation (Kessides, 2004: 6). It has been stated that “as with all economic elixirs, 
privatisation has been oversimplified, oversold, and ultimately a disappointment—
delivering less than promised.”  
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Finally what we can conclude from the study is that although the overall impact of 
privatisation in Nepal is not very promising, it is necessary for the overall development of 
the country, as the government cannot continue to run such loss-making enterprises in the 
age of globalisation and liberalisation (as the government has already been admitted as a 
member in the WTO system); nevertheless privatisation should be implemented in a 
cautious manner. The government should go ahead with the policy selectively but 
conduct a re-evaluation of the process it applied earlier and learn from the previous 
shortcomings. It should educate the people and disseminate to them the pros and cons of 
privatisation in order to obtain public support, so that this process that is necessary for the 
country may be carried out effectively.  
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Annex-1: Methodology 
Primarily, the study followed a qualitative approach to research that is concerned with the 
meaning and process. Through this research I intended to explore the process, meaning 
and understanding of the implementation of the privatisation policy in Nepal. Hence, a 
qualitative approach to research has been followed in this study. However, a quantitative 
method has also been used to interpret the data collected. 
 
A total of four privatised enterprises representing different methods of privatisation have 
been selected for this study. Among the selected enterprises, two were privatised by 
‘asset and business sale’, one by ‘share sale’ and another by ‘management contract’, 
which was later on changed to a ‘lease contract’. Thus the selection of the case was based 
on the fair representation of the method used in the implementation process and 
geographical location. Though data has been collected on other enterprises as well from 
the secondary sources, for the case study only four were selected and studied in depth. 
Those were as follows: 
1. Harisiddhi Brick and Tile Factory  (HBTF) located in Kathmandu 
2. Bhrikuti Paper Mills (BPM) located in Gaidakot, Nawalparasi (Western part of 
Nepal),  
3. Nepal Foundry Industry (NFI) located in Kathmandu, and 
4. Biratnagar Jute Mills (BJM) located in Biratnagar (Eastern Part of Nepal). 
 
Among these four enterprises, Harisiddhi and Bhrikuti paper mills were privatised in the 
first phase of privatisation in 1992; Nepal Foundry Industries in the third phase in 1996; 
and Biratnagar Jute Mills was privatised in the third phase in 1996 by management 
contract, but later on it was converted to a lease contract in 2002. To see the effect of the 
privatisation it must be operated for some years after the privatisation. So those 
enterprises privatised early in the process that have been operating since then would be 
worthy to collect data from, that would help to evaluate the changes brought about by 
privatisation. It would also help to compare the company’s performance before and after 
the privatisation so that the prospects of the policy could be understood. With these 
aspects in mind, the four cases were purposefully selected and studied. 
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Data Collection Method  
In order to collect data from the primary sources some commonly used strategies, such as 
interviewing, questionnaire survey and observations were used. I have collected the 
primary and the secondary information as follows: 
Primary information: Primary information was collected using two methods— field 
survey 2003/2004 (272 people) and in-depth interview with selected key respondents (30 
people). 
Field Survey 2003/2004 
In total 272 people from four different strategic groups were purposively selected and 
interviewed by using a structured questionnaire. The field survey 2003/2004 was 
comprised as follows:   
1. Sub-sample one of the field survey 2003 /2004:  In this category, policy makers 
(including higher level government officials and others who were directly or 
indirectly involved on the implementation process of the privatisation policy) and 
academicians were included. Mixing both groups in one strategic group was done 
due to the similar responses to most of the questions they expressed during the 
interview period. Altogether 136 persons were interviewed from this category. 
Hence, this was the biggest group in terms of numbers of persons interviewed. 
2. Sub-sample two of the field survey 2003 /2004: In this category, employees of 
the privatised enterprises (in four selected enterprises) were interviewed. 
Altogether 74 people from the different levels (managers to lower level 
employees, from administrative fields to technical fields) were interviewed. 
3. Sub-sample three of the field survey 2003 /2004: In this category, private sector 
officials, especially trade union representatives of two major trade unions in 
Nepal—Nepal Trade Union Congress (NTUC - affiliated with the Nepali 
Congress Party) and General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT- 
affiliated with the Communist Party of Nepal unified Marxist and Leninist- 
UML). Altogether 12 people were interviewed from this category. 
4. Sub-sample four of the field survey 2003 /2004:  In this category, consumers 
and the general public living in the vicinity of the selected privatised enterprises 
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were included. The purpose was to ascertain their experience of how they 
perceive privatisation and to what extent they are affected by the privatised 
enterprises. Altogether 50 persons were interviewed.  
Characteristics of survey: 
People interviewed No. 
Total no. of persons interviewed 272 
Male 240 
Female 32 
Dominant age group 30-40 
Dominant education level Bachelor’s degree and above 
 
In addition to this, I obtained first-hand information on the implementation process by 
studying the minutes and other records provided by the implementing agencies, including 
the Privatization Cell, MoF and various companies.  
In-depth interview 
In-depth interviews (formal and informal) were conducted with 30 key respondents from 
different walks of society, including higher-level government officials, privatisation 
committee members, trade union leaders, experts on privatisation, representatives of 
various organisations/institutes and others who have in-depth knowledge of privatisation 
and policy implementation. Unstructured interviews/ discussions were conducted with the 
respondents using the interview guidelines.  
Characteristics of in-depth interview: 
People interviewed No. 
Total no. of persons interviewed 30 
Male 29 
Female 1 
Dominant age group 40-50 
Dominant education level Masters Degree and above 
 
To compare the performance of the privatised enterprises, available data for pre- and 
post-privatisation were collected from the four enterprises using a structured data form. 
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Five different sets of questionnaire were used in this research. One set was employed for 
collecting relevant information from sub-sample one, i.e. policy makers and 
academicians. The large portion of the survey belongs to this group. Another set was for 
the employees working in the privatised enterprises (sub-sample two). The third set was 
for the trade union representatives and the fourth was for the general public and the 
neighbours of the privatised enterprises. Hence, four sets of questionnaires were used for 
the four different strategic groups. Additionally, another set was used for collecting the 
quantitative data from the four privatised enterprises selected for this study, to compare 
their performance before and after the privatisation.  
 
Collected data from the four different strategic groups and the quantitative data from the 
four selected enterprises were first entered into SPSS and analysed in different ways. 
Mainly, frequency was calculated from the four strategic groups and pre- and post-
analyses were done on the quantitative data collected from the four enterprises. Similarly, 
in-depth interviews were presented in a qualitative way in different parts of the 
dissertation. 
 
Opinions of different strategic groups and other interviewees were used to analyse the 
facts. In other words, I tried to show how our respondents reacted to the facts collected 
from various sources, including company records, government minutes and records. The 
opinions expressed by the different strategic groups, therefore were used to connect with 
the facts and reality of the privatisation policy in Nepal.  
Secondary Information 
Besides the primary information collected from interviews, some secondary data were 
also collected. I have collected the information on the following topics: 
• Performance of state-owned enterprises. 
• Issues and goals of privatisation in Nepal. 
• Need for privatisation. 
• Historical development of privatisation in Nepal. 
• Institutional and legal arrangements for privatisation. 
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• Performance and achievements of privatised enterprises. 
• Implementation process of the privatisation program. 
• Study reports of the privatised enterprises. 
• Status reports of the PEs. 
• Available literature on privatisation, public sector reform, efficiency, policy 
implementation and other related materials. 
• Public documents (newspapers, gazette, etc.). 
 
Most of the information collected on the above topics was from written documents, 
reports, study reports, journals and newspapers. 
 
Difficulties and Obstacles in Conducting the Research 
During my research period, I faced some problems due to the ongoing conflict between 
the Nepalese government and the Maoist Rebels. Political uncertainty in the country 
caused frequent nationwide strikes, vandalism, riots, arson and so on, and disturbed the 
planning and conduct of my research. So the overall law-and-order situation of the 
country became an influential obstacle to conducting my fieldwork. I had to cancel my 
schedule many times due to strikes organised by various political parties and the Maoist 
rebels.  
 
Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, due to a lack of a proper recording 
system and in some cases the reluctant cooperation of the officials, it was difficult to 
obtain information as expected. In most cases, I had to cancel appointments repeatedly, 
since most office holders (senior government officials) were busy attending meetings on 
a regular basis (in some cases just in the name of their ‘business’). There were hardly any 
instances that I met senior officials on the first appointment. It was, however, possible to 
get the necessary documents and to hold interviews with senior officials through the 
relentless efforts of the researcher.  
 
Most of the employees working in the privatised enterprises showed fear about 
responding to questions. They tried to avoid the questions that we wanted to ask out of 
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fear of the management knowing what their responses were. However, after assuring 
them that neither the management nor other parties would find out about their personal 
opinions, they were ready to help us. It was a difficult task to convince them. However, 
with the help of my research assistants, and in some cases good connections with some 
officials, I have somehow managed to gather the information related to my research 
project. 
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Annex-2: Description of the Respondents 
1. Sub sample one: Policy makers and academicians 
2. Sub sample two: Employees of the privatized enterprises 
3. Sub sample three: Trade union Representatives 
4. Sub sample four: General public residing around the privatised enterprises 
 
Annex 2.1 Gender of the respondents 
Gender 
Sub sample 
one 
Sub sample 
two 
Sub sample 
three 
Sub sample 
four 
Key 
Respondents 
Total 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Female 19 14 6 8 1 8 6 12 1 3 33 11 
Male 117 86 68 92 11 92 44 88 29 97 269 89 
Total 136 100 74 100 12 100 50 100 30 100 302 100
 
Annex 2.2 Age of the respondents 
Age 
Sub sample 
one 
Sub sample 
two 
Sub sample 
three 
Sub sample 
four 
Key 
Respondents 
Total 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
20-25 8 6 2 3 -  4 8 - - 14 5 
26-30 31 23 14 19 1 8 2 4 - - 48 16 
31-35 21 15 15 20 1 8 15 30 3 10 55 18 
36-40 26 19 28 38 4 34 17 34 4 13 79 26 
41-45 15 11 10 13 5 42 10 20 8 27 48 16 
46-50 29 22 2 3 1 8 2 4 9 30 43 14 
51-55 3 2 3 4 - - - - 2 7 8 3 
56-60 3 2 - - - - - - 4 13 7 2 
Total 136 100 74 100 12 100 50 100 30 100 302 100
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Annex 2.3 Education level of the respondents 
Education 
Sub sample 
one 
Sub 
sample 
two 
Sub sample 
three 
Sub sample 
four 
Key 
Respondents Total 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Class 9 - - 13 18 - - 14 28 - - 27 9 
Class 10 - - 8 11 - - - - - - 8 3 
SLC - - 18 24 2 17 8 16 2 7 30 10 
IA - - 10 14 2 17 12 24 - - 24 8 
Bachelors 48 35 17 23 3 25 13 26 2 7 83 27 
Masters 85 63 7 9 4 33 3 6 15 50 114 38 
CA - - 1 1 1 8 - - 2 7 4 1 
PhD 3 2  - - - - - 9 30 12 4 
Total 136 100 74 100 12 100 50 100 30 100 302 100
 
 
Annex 2.4 Numbers of the respondents (sub sample four) interviewed from the four 
Enterprises 
 Frequency Percent 
BJM 9 18 
BPM 15 30 
HBTF 15 30 
NFI 11 22 
Total 50 100 
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Annex-3: Performance of Privatized enterprises 
 
Table 3.1: Production of Privatized Enterprises 
 
Increase / Decrease Enterprise Unit Productio
n (before 
privatizati
on) 
Production 
(for the 
year 
1996/97) 
Quantit
y 
Percenta
ge 
First Phase (1992)      
Bhrikuti Paper Mills M.T 1500 9124 7624 508.27 
Harisiddhi Bricks & Tile Factory Pieces 17000000 21100000 4100000 24.12 
Bansbari Leather & Shoe 
Factory 
Sq.Ft. 190000 947192 757192 398.52 
Second Phase (1993-1994)      
Nepal Lube Oil Lt 505800 971881 466081 92.15 
     
M.T 2889 4900 2011 69.60 
M.T 2327 200 -2127 -91.41 
Nepal Bitumin & Barrel Industry 
bitumen 
                 lube oil 
                 emulsion 
M.T 1 500 499     99.90 
Nepal Film Development 
Company 
Film 8 15 7 87.5 
Balaju Textile Industry 
 
Meter 689160 1097175 408015 59.20 
Third Phase (1996-1997)      
Nepal Foundry Industry Kg 161000 170000 9000 5.59 
Raghupati Jute Mills M.T 22 23 1 4.55 
Agriculture Tools Factory ,, 400 400 0 0.00 
 
(Source: Office of the Auditor-General.1998 vol. 2, p.13.) 
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Table 3.2: Sales of Privatized Enterprises 
                               (Rs. in ‘000) 
Increase / Decrease Enterprise Sales   (before 
privatization) 
Sales 
(1996/97) Amount Percentage 
First Phase (1992)     
Bhrikuti Paper Mills 76542 340432 263890 344.76 
Harisiddhi Bricks & Tile 
Factory 
27827 43093 15266 54.86 
Bansbari Leather & Shoe 
Factory 
52044 76090 24046 46.20 
Second Phase (1993-1994)     
Nepal Lube Oil 75352 69641 -5711 -7.58 
Nepal Bitumin & Barrel 
Industry 
31086 74853 43767 140.79 
Nepal Film Development 
Company 
9182 27608 18426 200.67 
Balaju Textile Industry 17117 9342 -7775 -45.42 
Third Phase (1996-1997)     
Nepal Foundry Industry 5065 4035 -1030 -20.34 
(Source: Office of the Auditor-General .1998) 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Profit Situation of Privatized Enterprises 
             (Rs. in ‘000) 
Increase / Decrease 
Enterprises Profit   
(before 
privatization)
Profit 
(1996/97) 
Amount Percentage 
First Phase (1992)     
Bhrikuti Paper Mills 4234 12466 8232 194.43 
Harisiddhi Bricks & Tile 
Factory 
1323 N.A. N.A N.A 
Bansbari Leather & Shoe 
Factory 
764 3000 2236 292.67 
Second Phase (1993-1994)     
Nepal Lube Oil 12148 6280 -5868 -48.30 
Nepal Bitumin & Barrel 2535 588 -1947 -76.80 
Nepal Film Development 
Company 
6521 5845 -678 -10.37 
Third  Phase (1996-1997)     
Nepal Foundry Industry -2643 -967 1676 -63.41 
(Source: Office of the Auditor-General. 1998, vol.2, p.14) 
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Table 3.4: Employee/Labour Productivity 
 
Enterprise Unit Before 
privatization 
After 
privatization  
Remarks 
 
First Phase (1992)     
 
Bhrikuti Paper Mills 
M. T 9.43 11.66 Increased 
Harisiddhi Bricks & Tile Factory Pieces 29,000 32,000 Increased 
Second Phase (1993-1994)     
 
 
M. T 
 
 
52 
 
 
37 
 
 
Decreased 
Nepal Bitumen & Barrel 
Industry 
Bitumen 
Barrel M. T 248 251 Increased 
Balaju Textile Industry Meters 4150 2200 Decreased 
(Source: CRPS 1995:31) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Government Subsidy to Public Enterprises 
(Rs in million) 
Annual Growth Year Operating/ 
Transport 
Subsidy 
Capital 
Subsidy 
Total 
Subsidy Budget 
Inflation 
(Percent) 
Before 
Privatization 
      
1988/89 36.2 410.5 446.7    
1989/90 18.1 446.8 464.9 6.67 13.63 11.00 
1990/91 43.2 724.0 767.2    
1991/92 170.0 372.2 542.2    
1992/93 NA. 791.2 791.2    
After 
Privatization 
      
1994/95 571.4 77.5 648.9    
1995/96 726.0 179.0 905.0 17.95 12.84 7.00 
1996/97 713.6 180.0 893.6    
1997/98 988.0 76.9 1064.9    
(Source: Ministry of Finance, 1998) 
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Table 3.6: Employment Effects of Privatization 
Difference Enterprise Before 
Privatization 
After 
Privatization No. % 
Remarks 
First Phase (1992)      
Bhrikuti Paper Mills 1321 1800 479 36.26 Increase 
Harisiddhi Bricks & Tile Factory 595 500 -95 -15.97 Decrease 
Bansbari Leather & Shoe Factory 545 83 -462 -84.77 Decrease 
Second  Phase (1993-1994)      
Nepal Lube Oil 101 93 -8 -7.92 Decrease 
Nepal Bitumin & Barrel Industry 58 54 -4 -6.90 Decrease 
Raw Hide Collection & Dev. Corp. 564 0 -564 100.00 Closed 
Nepal Film Development 
Company 
99 54 -45 -45.45 Decrease 
Balaju Textile Industry 165 101 -64 -38.79 Decrease 
Third  Phase (1996-1997)      
Nepal Foundry Industry 65 20 -45 -69.23 Decrease 
Raghupati Jute Mills 1114 1446 332 29.80 Increase 
Agricultural Tool Factory 287 0 -287 100.00 Closed 
Total 4914 4151 -763 -15.63 Decrease 
(Sources: Office of the Auditor-General 1998 & CRPS 1995) 
 
 
 
Patterns of Overall Impact 
Table 3.7: Overall Performance of Selected Privatized Enterprises 
Indicators N∗ Increase 
(%) 
Decrease 
(%) 
No effects 
(%) 
Mix 
(%) 
Remarks 
Production 9 88.9 - - 11.1 Very Good 
Sales 8 62.5 37.5 - - Satisfactory 
Profit 6 33.3 67.7 - - Poor 
Productivity 4 50.0 25.0 - 25.0 Poor 
Employment Effects 11 18 64 18  Poor 
(Source: based on the above table 3.1 to 3.6) 
 
                                                 
∗ It shows the number of privatised enterprises whose data has been analysed. 
< Scale of comparison is presented as follows: Very Good for more than 80 percent; Good for 71 to 80 percent; 
Satisfactory for 61 to 70 percent; Fair for 51 to 60 percent; and Poor for 50 and below than 50 percent. 
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Table 3.8: Present Status of Privatized Enterprises 
Privatized 
Enterprises 
Investment Production Sales Employment Borrowings Profit/ 
Loss 
BPM Increased Increased Increased Increased Increased Loss 
HBTF Increased Increased Increased Minor change Increased Loss 
BLSF Increased Decreased Decreased Decreased Increased Profit 
NFDC Increased Increased Increased Decreased Increased  Profit 
NLOL Increased No 
Significant 
Change 
No 
Significan
t Change 
Decreased Increased  Profit 
NBBI Increased Increased Increased Minor Change Increased  Profit 
NFI Increased Increased Increased Decreased Increased Profit 
RJM Increased Increased Increased Increased Increased Loss 
BTI Increased Decreased Decreased Decreased Increased Loss 
BBF Decreased Decreased Increased Minor Change Increased Loss 
(Source: MoF (1999) Monitoring Privatized Enterprises) 
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Annex-4: Questionnaires 
 
Annex 4.1 Questionnaire one 
(For Sub sample one: Policy makers and academicians) 
(This questionnaire is only for the academic purpose. The answers you give us will be 
kept fully confidential.) 
 
General Information of the Respondent: 
1. Name:   2. Age: 3. Position (if any):    
4.  Education:   5. Office: 6. Address: 
7. Name of Interviewer: 8. Date of Interview: 
1. Do you think that privatization of public enterprises is essential in Nepal? 
F Yes   F No   F Others (specify)…. F Don’t know  
1.1. If yes, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
  F To increase productivity of the enterprises  
F To increase efficiency of the enterprises  
F To reduce political intervention in the enterprises  
F To reduce financial and administrative burden of the government 
F To increase Govt. investment in social sector 
F To promote private sector  
F To generate additional revenue for the government 
F To reduce the public sector borrowing requirement 
F Because of the pressure from the donor community 
F Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology) 
F Because of the government budget deficit 
F Others 
F Don't know 
1.2. If no, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
 F Welfare of employees 
F Regular supply of quality goods/services in reasonable prices 
F Optimum use of public resources 
F Because it promotes the concentration of wealth 
F Because it worsens the socio-economic conditions 
F Others …… ….  
2. Do you think that the objectives of privatization have been met?  
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know/ No comment 
If no, what could be done? ……… 
3. Who were the influential actors for adopting this policy? 
F Political leaders of the ruling party F Higher-level government officials 
 xv
F Donor community    F Private sector (FNCCI etc.) 
4. What are the gains of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Increased private participation 
F Reduced financial and administrative burden of the government 
F Increased employment  F Increased revenue 
F Increased efficiency/productivity of the enterprises 
F Reduced corruption  F Reduced political interference 
F Supply of quality goods and services F Strengthened market competition 
F Don’t know         F Others (please specify) …. 
5. What are the losses of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Poor service/quality of goods  F Loss of revenue 
F Price increase   F Loss of employment 
F Creation of private monopoly F Others F Don't know 
6. What issues/factors should be considered while privatizing public enterprises 
in future? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Proper valuation of asset/property F Technical capability of bidder 
F Financial status of bidder F Transparent decision 
F Welfare of employees  F Reducing liability of the government 
F Revenue generation  F National interest 
F Don’t know   F Others (please specify) …… 
7. What types of public enterprises should be privatized? (Please give in order 1, 
2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F For which private sector is capable F Running in losses 
F Running in profit   F Mismanaged enterprises 
F Enterprises susceptible to political interference 
F Others (please specify if any)… 
8. What are the main obstacles that met in the process of implementation of the 
policy? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for highest preference) 
F Political instability  F Lack of political consensus 
F Lack of investors  F Lack of developed capital markets 
F Lack of privatization fund for the implementation 
F Worst condition of PEs F Lack of transparency 
F Employee-related problems F Delaying in the process 
F Lack of monitoring and evaluation systemF Buck shifting 
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F  Formation of privatization committee       F Others (please specify)….  
9. How do you rate the overall impact of privatization in Nepal? 
F Good F Average F Poor  F Don’t know 
10. Has the economic burden of the government been reduced/increased after 
privatization? 
F Reduced  F Increased  F Don’t know 
11. What are the major problems of the privatized enterprises? (Please give in 
order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for highest preference) 
F Lack of fund for expansion F Frequent protest of labourers 
F Lack of adequate cooperation from the government 
F Lack of conducive environment for the operation of the enterprises 
F Unfavourable export and import policy for the enterprises 
F Lack of market  F Lack of entrepreneurship in the private sector 
F Lack of trained manpower F Weak management 
12. How these problems could be solved? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for 
the highest preference) 
F Govt. should come up with positive attitude 
F Sound government policies and programs 
F Creating friendly environment for the operation of the enterprises 
F Availability of fund in reasonable interest rate 
F Freedom of choosing the employees 
F Strong monitoring and evaluation system 
F Others (please specify)……………… 
13. What is the existing role of the government in management of the privatized 
enterprises? 
F Positive F Negative F Don’t know 
14. Do you think that existing policies, statutes and regulations are sufficient to 
promote privatization process in Nepal?  
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
If no, what changes are required in the policies, statutes and regulations? … 
15. Do you think that present legal and institutional provisions are conducive for 
the successful implementation of privatization policy? 
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
16. Do you think that performance of PEs could be improved without 
privatization?  
F Yes  F No  If yes, how? ………………  
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17. What is the existing role of the government for the welfare of workers of the 
privatized enterprises? 
F Positive F Negative F Don’t know 
18. Have there been any facilities/supports provided by the government for the 
overall development of the privatized enterprises? 
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know/no comment 
If yes, please specify………………… 
19. Was there any conflict during the implementation of the policy 
between/among different actors?  
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
If yes, please specify…………. 
20. Which modality of privatization would be more appropriate and effective in 
Nepalese context?  
Modalities  
 
PEs sector 
Assets 
sale 
Share 
sale 
Reorgan
ization 
Mgmt. 
/Employee 
buyout 
Mgmt. 
Contract 
Lease Coop-
eratives 
Others/ 
please 
specify 
Manufacturing 
Sector 
        
Trade Sector         
Public Utilities 
Sector 
        
Service Sector         
Social Sector         
Financial Sector         
Mgmt. = management 
21. Please state whether the process of privatization should be- 
 F  Rapid  F gradual, after due assessment F No privatization  
22. In your opinion, what is the necessary pre-requisite for the success of 
privatization in Nepal? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest 
preference) 
F Political consensus  F Detailed studies of the PEs 
F Transparency 
F Competency in civil service/efficient bureaucracy to implement the policy 
F Discipline in financial matters  
F Improvement in the implementation process 
F Improvement in the valuation process F Others (please specify)  
23. To what extent are you satisfied with the privatization process adopted in 
Nepal with respect to: 
 xviii
Benefits Strongly 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Strongly 
dissatisfied 
General objectives      
Transparency in valuation process 
of assets 
     
Modality adopted      
Selling process      
Monitoring system      
Institutional arrangement 
(privatization committee, 
privatization cell, technical 
committee etc.) 
     
Others (please specify)……      
 
24. In your opinion, who would be the principal beneficiaries and losers of 
privatization program (please give in order 1,2,3 etc. 1 for the highest 
preference) 
Principal Beneficiaries Principal Losers 
 
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
 
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
25. Please kindly state your other Comments/ Suggestions if any?………  
 
Annex 4.2 Questionnaire Two  
(For Sub sample Two: Employees of the Privatized enterprises) 
(This questionnaire is only for the academic purpose. The answers you give us will be 
kept fully confidential.) 
General Information of the Respondent 
 1. Name:   2. Age:  3. Education:   
 4. Caste/ethnicity: 5. Designation:  6. Employment duration: 
         7. Training (if any):       8. Name of the enterprise: 9. Address:  
         10. Name of interviewer:  11. Date of interview: 
1. Do you think that privatization of public enterprises is essential in Nepal? 
F Yes   F No   F Others (specify)..  F Don’t know  
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 1.1. If yes, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F To increase productivity of the enterprises  
F To increase efficiency of the enterprises  
F To reduce political intervention in the enterprises  
F To reduce financial and administrative burden of the government 
F To increase Govt. investment in social sector 
F To promote private sector  
F To generate additional revenue for the government  
F To reduce the public sector borrowing requirement 
F Because of the pressure from the donor community 
F Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology) 
F Because of the government budget deficit 
F Others 
F Don't know 
1.2. If no, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Welfare of employees 
F Regular supply of quality goods/services in reasonable prices 
F Optimum use of public resources 
F Because it promotes the concentration of wealth 
F Because it worsens the socio-economic conditions 
F Others … ……. 
 2.  What type of public enterprises should be privatized? 
F For which private sector is capable  F Running in losses 
F Running in profit    F Mismanaged enterprises 
F Enterprises susceptible to political interference F Others  
3. What are the gains of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Increased private participation 
F Reduced financial and administrative burden of the government 
F Increased employment   F Increased revenue 
F Increased efficiency/productivity of the enterprises 
F Reduced corruption   F Reduced political interference 
F Supply of quality goods and services F Strengthened competitive market 
 F Don’t know     F Others 
4. What are the losses of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
 xx
F Poor service/quality of goods F Loss of revenue 
F Price increase   F Loss of employment 
F Creation of private monopoly F Others F Don't know 
5. How do you rate the level of transparency followed by the government during 
the process of privatization of public enterprise?  
F Good  F Average  F Poor F Don’t know 
6. What methods of privatization should be followed in the future to make 
privatization more effective and transparent? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 
1 for the highest preference) 
F Assets and businesses sale F Share sale   
F Management/employee buyout F Management contract 
F Lease    F Co-operatization  
F Others    F Don’t know 
7. What issues/factors should be considered while privatizing public enterprises? 
(Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Proper valuation of asset/propertyF Technical capability of bidder 
F Financial status of bidder F Transparent decision 
F Welfare of employees  F Reducing liability of the government 
F Revenue generation  F National interest 
F Don’t know   F Others 
8. What do you think regarding the efficiency of the enterprise after 
privatization?  
F Increased   F Decreased  
F No change   F Don’t know 
9. What is the status of market shares of this enterprise after privatization?    
F Increased    F Decreased 
F No change   F Don’t know 
10. What are the major problems of privatized enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for highest preference) 
F Lack of fund for expansion  F Frequent protest of labourers 
F Lack of adequate cooperation from the government 
F Lack of conducive environment for the operation of the enterprises 
F Unfavourable export and import policy for the enterprises 
F Lack of market  F Lack of entrepreneurship in the private sector 
F Lack of trained manpower F Weak management 
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11. How these problems could be solved? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for 
the highest preference) 
F Govt. should come up with positive attitude 
F Sound government policies and programs 
F Creating friendly environment for the operation of the enterprises 
F Availability of fund in reasonable interest rate 
F Freedom of choosing the employees 
F Strong monitoring and evaluation system 
F Others (please specify)……………… 
12. What do you think about the management of this enterprise after 
privatization? 
F Improved F Deteriorated F No change  F Don’t know 
13. What do you think about employment status of this enterprise after 
privatization? 
F Increased F Decreased F No significant change F Don’t know 
14. How do you compare your salary and benefits with other similar types of 
enterprises? 
F  Higher   F At par  F Lower F Don’t know 
15. What is the level of job security in the enterprise? 
F High  F Average F Low  F Don’t know 
16. Do you have any say/role in the decision making process of the enterprise? 
F Yes        F No 
17. In your opinion, who would be the principal beneficiaries and losers of 
privatization program (please give in order 1,2,3 etc. 1 for the highest 
preference): 
 
Principal Beneficiaries  Principal Losers  
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
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18. How do you see the following conditions in the privatized enterprises? 
 New 
addition 
Increased No 
change 
Decreased Abolished 
1.Salary/Allowances      
2. Leaves      
3.Other Facilities      
4. Working Conditions      
5. Working Time      
6. Number of Workers      
7. Security      
8. Union Activities      
9. Worker’s Exploitation      
10. Company’s Capacity      
11. Capacity Utilization      
12. Sales      
13. Profits      
14. Bonus      
15. Social Security 
(insurances, pension, gratuity 
etc.) 
     
19. Please kindly state your suggestions, comments if any? …… ……… 
(Thank you very much for your kind cooperation.) 
 
Annex 4.3 Questionnaire Three  
(For Sub sample three: Trade Union Representatives) 
(This questionnaire is only for the academic purpose. The answers you give us will be 
kept fully confidential.) 
Personal Information of the respondent: 
1. Name:              2. Age:    3. Education:    
4. Designation:  5. Enterprises (if affiliated): 6. Address:    
7. Name of Interviewer:               8. Date of Interview: 
2. Do you think that the privatization of public enterprises is essential in Nepal? 
F Yes   F No   F Others (specify)  F Don’t know  
 1.1. If yes, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F To increase productivity of the enterprises  
F To increase efficiency of the enterprises  
F To reduce political intervention in the enterprises  
F To reduce financial and administrative burden of the government 
F To increase Govt. investment in social sector 
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F To promote private sector  
F To generate additional revenue for the government  
F To reduce the public sector borrowing requirement 
F Because of the pressure from the donor community 
F Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology) 
F Because of the government budget deficit 
F Others     F Don't know 
1.2. If no, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Welfare of employees 
F Regular supply of quality goods/services in reasonable prices 
F Optimum use of public resources 
F Because it promotes the concentration of wealth 
F Because it worsens the socio-economic conditions 
F Others …… …. 
2.  What type of public enterprises should be privatized? (Please give in order 1, 
2,3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F For which private sector is capable  F Running in losses 
F Running in profit    F Mismanaged enterprises 
F Enterprises susceptible to political interference F Others  
20. What are the gains of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Increased private participation 
F Reduced financial and administrative burden of the government 
F Increased employment   F Increased revenue 
F Increased efficiency/productivity of the enterprises 
F Reduced corruption   F Reduced political interference 
F Supply of quality goods and services F Strengthened competitive market 
 F Don’t know     F Others 
21. What are the losses of privatization of public enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Poor service/quality of goods F Loss of revenue 
F Price increase   F Loss of employment 
F Creation of private monopoly F Others F Don't know 
22. How do you rate the level of transparency followed by the government during 
the process of privatization of public enterprise?  
F Good  F Average F Poor F Don’t know 
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23. What is the existing role of the government in management of the privatized 
enterprises? 
F Positive F Negative F Don’t know 
24. Do you think that existing policies, statutes and regulations are sufficient to 
promote privatization process in Nepal?  
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
If no, what changes are required in the policy, acts and regulations? …… 
25. Do you think that present legal and institutional provisions are conducive for 
the successful implementation of privatization policy? 
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
26. Do you think that performance of PEs could be improved without 
privatization?  
F Yes  F No  If yes, how? …………… ……………  
27. What is the existing role of the government for the welfare of workers of the 
privatized enterprises? 
F Positive F Negative F Don’t know 
28. What methods of privatization should be followed in the future to make 
privatization more effective and transparent? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 
1 for the highest preference) 
F Assets and businesses sale F Share sale 
F Reorganization   F Management/employee buyout 
F Management contract  F Lease 
F Cooperatisation  F Others  F Don’t know 
29. What issues/factors should be considered while privatizing public enterprises? 
(Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Proper valuation of asset/property F Technical capability of bidder 
F Financial status of bidder F Transparent decision 
F Welfare of employees  F Reducing liability of the government 
F Revenue generation  F National interest 
F Don’t know    F Others 
30. What do you think regarding the efficiency of the enterprise after 
privatization?  
F Increased  F Decreased  F No change F Don’t know 
31. What are the main obstacles that met in the process of implementation of the 
policy? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Political instability F Lack of political consensus 
F Lack of investors F Lack of developed capital markets 
F Lack of privatization fund for the implementation 
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F Worst condition of PEs  F Lack of transparency 
F Employee-related problems  F Delaying in the process 
F Lack of monitoring and evaluation system F Buck shifting 
F  Formation of privatization committee        F Others (please specify)….  
32. What are the major problems of privatized enterprises? (Please give in order 
1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Lack of fund for expansion  F Frequent protest of labourers 
F Lack of adequate cooperation from the government 
F Lack of conducive environment for the operation of the enterprises 
F Unfavourable export and import policy for the enterprises 
F Lack of market  F Lack of entrepreneurship in the private sector 
F Lack of trained manpower  F Weak management 
33. How these problems could be solved? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for 
the highest preference) 
F Govt. should come up with positive attitude 
F Sound government policies and programs 
F Creating friendly environment for the operating of the enterprises 
F Availability of fund in reasonable interest rate 
F Freedom of choosing the employees 
F Strong monitoring and evaluation system 
F Others (please specify) …… ………… 
34. What do you think about the managerial level effectiveness of the enterprise 
after privatization? 
F More efficient F Deteriorated F No change F Don’t know 
35. What do you think about employment generation after privatization? 
F Increased F Decreased F No significant change F Don’t know 
36. What is the level of job security in the enterprise? 
F High F Average F Low  F Don’t know 
37. Do you think that the employee have any role in the decision making process 
of the enterprise? 
F Yes F No 
38. In your opinion, who would be the principal beneficiaries and losers of 
privatization program (please give in order 1,2,3 etc. 1 for the highest 
preference): 
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Principal Beneficiaries Principal Losers 
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
F Big business houses (big investors) 
F Small investors 
F Government/ Decision makers 
F Consumers 
F Employees 
F Others (please specify) 
 
39. How do you rate the overall impact of privatization in Nepal? 
F Good  F Average F Poor F Don’t know 
40. How do you see the following conditions in the privatized enterprises? 
 New 
addition 
Increased No change Decreased Abolished 
1.Salary/allowances      
2. Leaves      
3.Other facilities      
4. Working conditions      
5. Working time      
6. Number of workers      
7. Security      
8. Union activities      
9. Worker’s exploitation      
10. Company’s capacity      
11. Capacity utilization      
12. Sales      
13. Profits      
14. Bonus      
15. Social security 
(insurances, pension, 
gratuity etc.) 
     
41. Please kindly state your suggestions, comments if any? ………… ………… 
(Thank you very much for your kind cooperation.) 
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Annex 4.4 Questionnaire Four  
(For Sub sample four: General public residing around the privatised enterprises) 
(This questionnaire is only for the academic purpose. The answers you give us will be 
kept fully confidential.) 
General Information of the Respondent: 
 1. Name:  2. Age:   3. Education: 4.Caste/ethnicity: 
5. Address: 6. Name of the Enterprise:   7. District:   8. Name of 
interviewer: 9. Date of interview: 
1. Do you know about privatization? 
F Yes   F No 
2. Did you know that ……………………………has been privatized in ……  .? 
F Yes   F No 
3. Have you felt any changes in the operation of this company after privatization? 
F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
4. Has there been any change in the prices of the goods/services supplied by the 
privatized enterprise after privatization?  
 F Increased F Decreased F No change   F Don’t know 
5. Has there been any change in the quality of services/products provided/delivered by 
the privatized enterprise after privatization? 
 F Improved F Decreased F Not significant change F Don’t know 
6. Has the company adversely affected the local environment to a greater extent than 
before privatization? 
 F Yes  F No   F Don’t know If yes, please specify… … 
7. Has the privatized enterprise generated an additional employment for the local 
people? 
 F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
8. How do you evaluate the delivery situation of services/products of the privatized 
enterprise compared to other similar enterprises? 
 F Good F Average F Poor F Don’t know 
9. How do you evaluate the good will of the privatized enterprise compared to other 
similar enterprises? 
 F Good  F Average F Poor  F Don’t know 
10. Is privatization of public enterprises essential in Nepal? 
F Yes  F No    Æ (Q. 10.2) F Don’t know  
      10.1 If yes, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F To increase productivity of the enterprises  
F To increase efficiency of the enterprises  
F To reduce political intervention in the enterprises  
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F To reduce financial and administrative burden of the government 
F To increase Govt. investment in social sector 
F To promote private sector  
F To generate additional revenue for the government  
F To reduce the public sector borrowing requirement 
F Because of the pressure from the donor community 
F Because of the shifting preference of the government (ideology) 
F Because of the government budget deficit 
F Others    F Don't know 
10.2. If no, why? (Please give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Welfare of employee F Regular supply of quality of goods/services 
F Optimum use of public resources  
F Because it promotes the concentration of wealth 
F Because it worsens the socio-economic conditions F Others …  … 
11. How do you rate the level of transparency followed by the government during the 
process of privatization of this enterprise?  
F Good  F Average F Poor F Don’t know 
12. In your opinion, what are the gains of privatization of public enterprises? (Please 
give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Increased private participation 
F Reduced financial and administrative burden of the government 
F Increased employment   F Increased revenue 
F Increased efficiency/productivity of the enterprises 
F Reduced corruption   F Reduced political interference 
F Supply of quality goods and services F Strengthened competitive market 
  F Others 
13. In your opinion, what are the losses of privatization of public enterprises? (Please 
give in order 1, 2, 3 etc. 1 for the highest preference) 
F Poor service/quality of goods F Loss of revenue 
F Price increase   F Loss of employment 
F Creation of private monopoly F Others  F Don't know 
14. Has the privatized enterprises launched any social welfare programs for the local 
people? 
       F Yes  F No  F Don’t know 
  If yes, please specify…………………………… 
15. Have you experienced any problem because of the privatization of the company? 
 xxix
F Yes  F No    F Don’t know 
 If yes, please specify…… ……… ………… ….  
16. Do you have any comments/suggestions? Please specify. 
  
(Thank you very much for your kind cooperation.) 
 
Annex 4.5 Questionnaire Five 
(Survey Questionnaire for privatized Enterprises) 
(This questionnaire is only for the academic purpose. The answer you give us will be kept 
fully confidential.) 
1. Background Information:      
1.1 Name of the Company:   1.2 Central Offices:  
 1.3 Date of Registration:    1.4 Managing Directors:  
 1.5 Chairman:     1.6 Directors: 
1.7 Method of Privatization:   1.8 Year of Privatization:  
1.9 Terms of Payment (including total proceeds, interest rate, if any): 
2. Relevant Statistical Indicators: 
 
S.No  Before Privatization After Privatization 
(Latest Thee Years) 
Year 3 Year 2 Year 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 
  
199.. 199.. 199.. 200.. 200.. 200.. 
1 Production       
 a.       
 b.       
 c.       
 d.       
 e.       
 f.       
 g. 
    
  
 Total Production       
 Product Diversification (Name)       
2. Sales       
 a.       
 b.       
 c.       
 a. Capacity Utilization (in %)       
 b. Capacity Expansion       
3. Price (in Rs)       
 (i)  ………       
 (ii) ………       
 (iii)  ……….       
 (iv) ………       
 Import (in quantity)       
 xxx
 ………………….       
  Price (per unit)       
 …………………       
 ………………..       
4 Export (in quantity)       
 ………………..       
 Price (per unit)       
 ……………….       
 ………………       
5 Closing Stock (in quantity)       
 (i)  ……       
 (ii) ………       
 (iii)  ……….       
 (iv) ………       
6 Debt (in Rs)       
 i) Foreign        
 ii) Government        
 iii) Local       
7 Grant (in Rs.)       
 i) Foreign       
 ii) Government       
8 Govt. Subsidy (in Rs.)       
9 Tax Payment (in Rs)       
 (a) Customs       
 (b) VAT (Sales Tax)       
 c) Income Tax       
 d) Other Taxes       
10 Net Profit (in Rs)       
11 Social Welfare Program (if any)       
12 Total Employment  (Number)       
 i) Administrative        
     a. Permanent        
     b. Temporary       
     c. Daily wages       
 ii) Technical        
     a. Permanent        
     b. Temporary       
     c. Daily wages       
 iii) Labourer        
       a.  Permanent        
       b. Temporary       
       c.  Daily wages       
 Total       
13 Total expenditure (in Rs.)       
 a. Administrative       
 b. Other       
(Thank you very much for your kind cooperation.) 
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Annex 4.6 Interview Guide for Key Respondents 
 
General Information 
1. Name of the Respondent: 2. Address: 3. Position (if any):  4. Age:       
5. Sex    6. Education:  7. Name of Interviewer:   
8. Date of Interview: 
1. Why privatization policy has been adopted in Nepal? 
2. Do you think these objectives have been met? If no, what could be done? 
3. Is privatization of public enterprises essential in Nepal? If yes, why? If no, why? 
4. What are the gains of privatization of public enterprises? 
5. What are the losses of privatization of public enterprises? 
6. How do you rate the overall level of transparency in the process of privatization?  
7. How the process of privatization could be made more transparent? 
8. What method should be followed to make privatization more effective? 
9. What issues/factors should be considered while privatizing public enterprises in 
future? 
10. What are the main obstacles that met in the process of implementation of the 
policy? 
11. Has there been any conflict while during the policy implementation process? If 
yes could you please specify? 
12. How do you rate the impact of privatization in Nepal? 
13. Has the government's revenue (received from the enterprises) increased after 
privatization?  
14. Has the economic burden of the government reduced/increased after 
privatization? 
15. What are the major problems of privatized enterprises? 
16. How these problems could be solved? 
17. What facilities/supports have been provided by the government for the overall 
development of the privatized enterprises? 
18. Do you think that existing policy, acts and regulations are sufficient to promote 
privatization process in Nepal? If no, what changes are required in the policy, acts 
and regulations? 
19. What is the existing role of the government for the welfare of workers of the 
privatized enterprises? 
20. Do you think that performance of PEs could be improved without privatization? 
21. Which modality of privatization would be more appropriate and effective in 
Nepalese context? 
22. In your opinion, what is the necessary pre-requite for the success of privatization 
in Nepal? 
23. To what extent are you satisfied with the privatization process adopted in Nepal? 
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24. In your opinion, who are the principal beneficiaries and losers of privatization 
program? 
25. Other Comments/ Suggestions 
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Annex-5: Name of the Key Respondents 
 
SN. Name Designation Office (if any) 
1 Prof. Dr. Bhim Dev 
Bhatta 
Member Public Service Commission 
2 Dr. Madhunithi Tiwari Ex-member Public Service Commission 
3 Dr. Bhoj Raj Ghimire Secretary National Planning Commission 
4 Dr. Hira Mani Ghimire Governance 
Advisor 
DFID /Nepal 
5 Dr. Shree Krishna 
Shrestha 
Reader/ 
Chairman 
Public Administration Campus, TU, 
Pro-Public 
6 Dr. Narayan Manandhar Advisor Commission for Investigation of Abuse 
of Authority (CIAA) 
7 Dr. Mohan Chandra 
Adhikari 
Advisor Biratnagar Jute Mills Ltd. 
8 Dr. Dev Bhakta Shakya Executive 
Director 
FNCCI 
9 Dr. Maheshwor P. 
Bharati 
Project 
coordinator 
Seed Sector Support Project (SSSP) 
(HMGN/DFID) 
10 Mr. Dev Raj Dahal Country 
Director 
FES/Nepal 
11 Mr. Bala Nanda Paudel Joint 
Secretary 
National Planning Commission 
Secretariat 
12 Mr. Bimal Wagle Joint 
Secretary 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and 
Supply 
13 Mr. Pramod Kumar 
Karki 
Joint 
Secretary 
Ministry of Finance 
14 Mr. Sushil Pd. Sharma 
Dhungel 
Member 
Secretary 
Privatization Committee, Ministry of 
Finance 
15 Mr. Chandi Pd Dhahal Joint 
Secretary 
Revenue Administration Training 
Center, Board member, Udayapur 
Cement Industry 
16 Mr. Kisore Bhakta 
Mathema 
Managing 
Director 
Harisiddhi Brick and Tile Factory 
17 Mr. Bishnu Rimal General 
secretary 
GEFONT 
18 Mr. Gopi Nath Mainali Senior 
Instructor 
Revenue Administration Training 
Centre 
19 Mr.Krishna Pd. Acharya Under 
Secretary 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and 
Supply 
20 Mr. Narayan Pd. Shanjel Under 
Secretary 
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and 
Supply 
21 Mr. Ravi Bhattarai Under 
Secretary 
Privatization Cell, Ministry of Finance 
22 Mr. Uttam Bk.Wagle Under Privatization Cell, Ministry of Finance 
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Secretary 
23 Mr. Rudhra Pd. Adhikari CA Privatization Cell, Ministry of Finance 
24 Mr. Niles Tuladhar CA Harisiddhi Brick and Tile Factory 
25 Mr. Som Adhikari Executive 
Officer 
Morang Udhog Sang, Biratnagar 
26 Mr. Mahesh Hamal Administrati
ve Officer 
Biratnager Jute Mills Ltd. 
27 Ms Binda Pandey  GEFONT 
28 Mr. Rajendra Acharya  NTUC 
29 Mr. Mahendra Baniya Union 
Leader 
Biratnagar Jute Mills Ltd 
30 Mr. Dinesh Rai Union 
Leader 
Biratnagar Jute Mills Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
